

# Gulf of Mexico Grouper-Tilefish Individual Fishing Quota Report (2021 update)



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### Message from the Assistant Regional Administrator

The Grouper-Tilefish (GT) Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) annual report is a living document that builds upon previously summarized information and provides a current overview of the GT-IFQ program. The GT-IFQ program includes 13 species in five share categories. This report is not a full comprehensive review of the program, as comprehensive reviews are completed every 5 to 7 years.<sup>1</sup> The first 5-year (2010-2015) review was completed in 2018 and can be found on the Catch Share website,<sup>2</sup> under Additional Information. A joint five-year assessment of the Red Snapper IFQ (RS-IFQ) and GT-IFQ programs was completed in 2021 and covered 2012-2018 years for both programs.

Outreach efforts for the IFQ programs were virtual in 2020 and continued to be virtual in 2021 due to the pandemic. IFQ customer support held a virtual shareholder workshop to review the system updates and improvements. A panel of staff members from the Permits, Law Enforcement, and Fishery Finance offices were also present at the workshop to answer questions. IFQ customer support held 10 virtual dealer outreach meetings. IFQ customer support will resume in-person dealer visits once pandemic-related travel restrictions for federal employees have been lifted. The Catch Up on Catch Shares IFQ newsletter was re-launched in October 2021, and is being distributed quarterly. The newsletter provides available resources pertaining to the Catch Share online system and information to other relevant fishery management issues, including articles on topics such as community perspectives, upcoming actions, system functions, IFQ data, and links to upcoming events and websites.

The 2021 quota for all share categories remained unchanged from 2020 quotas, with 82% of the programs' quota landed. By share category, between 28% and 45% of GT-IFQ with allocation accounts landed GT-IFQ species, with 36 - 44% of those accounts also holding shares. Average ex-vessel prices increased from 2020, with the largest increase seen in deep-water grouper (+\$0.43/lb). All ex-vessel prices remained considerably greater than pre-IFQ average prices.

In 2021, 59% of shareholder accounts held a Gulf of Mexico commercial reef fish permit and, by share category, held between 69% and 86% of all shares. The average 2021 share prices increased for most share categories since 2020 by between \$0.23/lb and \$0.35/lb, except deep water grouper and gag, which respectively decreased by \$2.82/lb and \$0.63/lb. Allocation prices in 2021 stayed the same or increased slightly since 2020. Share and allocation price reporting has improved slightly, but remains an area of concern.

The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) is committed to the continual improvement of GT-IFQ program. Since the program began, stakeholder feedback and suggestions for the program have been used to improve the system NMFS thanks everyone for their input and encourages them to continue to share their concerns and ideas.

Sincerely,

Sau C Mr Aury

John C. McGovern, Ph.D. Assistant Regional Administrator for Sustainable Fisheries

<sup>1</sup> The Guidance For Conducting Review of Catch Share Programs can be found here:

https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/laws-and-policies/catch-shares.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> <u>https://secatchshares.fisheries.noaa.gov/</u>

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#### **ABBREVIATIONS**

Abbreviation	Description
ALS	Accumulated landings system
BFT	Bluefin Tuna Individual Bycatch Quota program
DWG	Deep-water grouper share category
FOIA	Freedom of information act
GDP	Gross domestic product
GSAD	Gulf and South Atlantic Dealer permit
GG	Gag grouper share category
GGM	Gag grouper multi-use
GT-IFQ	Grouper-Tilefish Individual Fishing Quota
Gulf Council	Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council
Gulf	Gulf of Mexico
gw	Gutted weight
HBC	Headboat Collaborative pilot program
HMS	Highly migratory species
IFQ	Individual Fishing Quota
JEA	Joint enforcement agreement
lb	Pounds
LL	Longline gear
Magnuson-Stevens Act	Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
mp	Million pounds
NMFS	National Marine Fisheries Service
OLE	Office of Law Enforcement
RA	Regional Administrator
Reef Fish FMP	Reef Fish Fishery Management Plan
Reef fish permit	Gulf of Mexico commercial reef fish permit
RFOP	Reef fish observer program
RG	Red grouper share category
RGM	Red grouper multi-use
RS-IFQ	Red snapper Individual Fishing Quota
SEFSC	Southeast Fisheries Science Center, NMFS
SERO	Southeast Regional Office, NMFS
SWG	Other shallow-water grouper share category
TF	Tilefish share category
TL	Total length
USCG	United States Coast Guard
VL	Vertical line gear
VMS	Vessel Monitoring system

## **Program Overview and Regulations**

## **Program Overview**

The Grouper-Tilefish individual fishing quota (GT-IFQ) program is a multi-species program, where participants use an online account for all transactions (shares and allocation transfers, landings, and cost recovery fees). The GT-IFQ program has five share categories: gag (GG), red grouper (RG), other shallow-water groupers (SWG), deep-water groupers (DWG), and tilefishes (TF; Table 1). Both GG and RG are single species share categories, while the three remaining categories (SWG, DWG, and TF) are multiple-species categories, designed to capture species complexes that are commonly caught together. For the first five years of the program (2010-2015), anyone who possessed a valid Gulf of Mexico (Gulf) federal dealer permit or Gulf commercial reef fish permit (reef fish permit) was eligible to participate in the program. Beginning, January 1, 2015, all U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens were eligible to obtain a GT-IFQ shareholder account to purchase shares and allocation. Shares are a percentage of the commercial quota, while allocation refers to the poundage that can be used to possess, land, or transfer during a given calendar year. Allocation is annual and expires on December 31. Only accounts with allocation and a valid reef fish permit can legally harvest GT-IFQ species. Appendices 1 through 3 contain a history of the management for GT-IFQ species and implementation of the GT-IFQ program.

Table 1: Species by share category				
IFQ Category	Species <sup>1</sup>			
Gag (GG)	Gag <sup>2</sup>			
Red Grouper (RG)Red grouper2				
	Snowy grouper			
Deep-water Grouper	Speckled hind <sup>2</sup>			
(DWG)	Warsaw grouper <sup>2</sup>			
	Yellowedge grouper			
	Black grouper			
Other Shallow-water	Scamp <sup>2</sup>			
Grouper (SWG)	Yellowfin grouper			
	Yellowmouth grouper			
	Blueline tilefish (grey)			
Tilefishes (TF)	Golden tilefish			
	Goldface tilefish			

<sup>1</sup> The following species were removed in 2012: rock hind (SWG), red hind (SWG),

misty grouper (DWG), anchor tilefish (TF), and blackline tilefish (TF).

<sup>2</sup> Includes a multi-use flexibility measure.

There are three main account types in the GT-IFQ system: shareholder, vessel, and dealer accounts. Each account is composed of a unique set of entities (single or combination of individuals and/or business) and no two accounts are composed of the same set of entities. Shareholder accounts may hold shares and allocation or just allocation. A list of all shareholder accounts and the amount of shares held by each account is available through the Additional Information page on the IFQ website, titled IFQ Gulf Reef Fish Accounts (FOIA).<sup>3</sup> This page can be sorted by any of the column headings. An "X" in the Initial column indicate accounts that the account has never been accessed in the system.

Vessel accounts belong to shareholder accounts based on the reef fish permit for that vessel. Vessel accounts only hold allocation for landings. There may be multiple vessel accounts associated with one shareholder account. Sufficient allocation, at least equal to the pounds to be landed, must be in the vessel account or its associated shareholder account at the time of submission of the landing notification. At the time of landing, allocation that is at least equal to the pounds to be landed must be present in the vessel account. Upon completion of a landing transaction, the system deducts the allocation from the vessel account.

Dealer accounts are associated with federal dealer permit holders. Prior to August 7, 2014, the federal dealer permit was the Gulf reef fish dealer permit; afterwards, the federal permit became the Gulf and South Atlantic Dealer (GSAD) permit. Dealers are limited to completing landing transactions, collecting the cost recovery fee from the fishermen, and paying that fee to the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). All GT-IFQ dealers are required to have a Gulf IFQ dealer endorsement, which may be printed through their IFQ account. A printed copy of the IFQ dealer endorsement must accompany vehicles used to transport IFQ species on land. Endorsements are valid when a dealer's permit and account are active and they do not have any outstanding cost recovery fees. The GT-IFQ program and the Red Snapper Individual Fishing Quota (RS-IFQ) program are contained within the same system and are jointly referred to as the Gulf reef fish IFQ programs. Therefore, there is one dealer endorsement for both programs.

The GT-IFQ program records allocation, landings and quota in pounds (lb) of gutted weight (gw); therefore, throughout this report, allocation, landings, and quotas are in lb gw. Each GT-IFQ share category has distinct shares and associated allocations. At the beginning of each year, NMFS distributes allocation to shareholder accounts based on the annual quota and the share percentage associated with that account. Allocation can be used to account for GT-IFQ species landings or can be transferred to another shareholder. Adjustments (increases or decreases) in the commercial quotas occur due to new information (e.g., stock assessment, calibration, reallocation between fishing sectors). In-season quota increases are distributed proportionately among shareholder accounts based on the percentage of shares held in each account at the time of the adjustment. If a quota decreases in-season, the change is not implemented until the start of the next year, as allocation has already been distributed and transferred within the system.

The GT-IFQ program has several built-in flexibility measures to accommodate the multi-species nature of the commercial reef fish fishery and to reduce bycatch. Two share categories, GG and RG, have a multi-use provision that allows a portion of the red grouper quota to be harvested under the gag allocation, or vice versa. Each year, the system assigns a portion of each shareholder's GG or RG as a multi-use allocation category: red grouper multi-use (RGM) or gag grouper multi-use (GGM). All

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> <u>https://secatchshares.fisheries.noaa.gov/foiaInformation</u>

allocation in the primary category of a shareholder's account must be used before the species can be landed or transferred under the multi-use categories. The system automatically determines the allocation category used for all landings and prohibits multi-use allocation transfers until all primary allocation is exhausted. Three grouper species (scamp, warsaw grouper, and speckled hind) are found in both the shallow and deep-water complexes. Flexibility measures in the GT-IFQ program allow these species to be landed under both share categories. Scamp are designated as a SWG species, but may be landed using DWG allocation once all SWG allocation in an account has been harvested. Warsaw grouper and speckled hind are designated as DWG species and may be landed using SWG allocation after all DWG allocation in an account has been harvested. More information about these flexibility measures are described in the Landings by Species section of this report or can be found under Additional Information on the IFQ website.

The GT-IFQ program also has a built-in 10% overage measure to allow a once-per-year landing overage per share category for any GT-IFQ account that holds shares in that share category. For shareholder accounts with shares, the associated vessel can land once during the year 10% more than their remaining allocation on the vessel per share category. The overage is automatically applied by the system in that year and labeled as an overage. The system automatically deducts this overage from the shareholder's allocation in the following fishing year. Because overages need to be deducted in the following year, GT-IFQ accounts with shares are prohibited from selling shares that would reduce the account's shares to less than the amount needed to repay the overage in the following year. GT-IFQ accounts without shares of their remaining allocation in that share category.

### **Program Objectives**

The GT-IFQ program, as defined in <u>Amendment 29</u> to the Fishery Management Plan for Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf of Mexico (Reef Fish FMP), was implemented to reduce overcapacity of the grouper-tilefish fishing fleet, increase harvesting efficiency, and eliminate the race to fish. By rationalizing effort and reducing overcapacity, the GT-IFQ program was expected to prevent or mitigate derby-fishing conditions and improve profitability of commercial grouper-tilefish fishermen. Anticipated benefits of the program include: increased market stability; elimination of quota closures; increased flexibility for fishing operations; cost-effective and enforceable management; improved safety at sea; and balancing of social, economic, and biological benefits. Additionally, the program was intended to provide direct and indirect biological benefits to grouper-tilefish and other marine resources by reducing bycatch and associated bycatch mortality. These social, economic, and biological benefits collectively are intended to assist NMFS and the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council (Gulf Council) in preventing overfishing and/or rebuilding GT-IFQ stocks through the stewardship aspects of the program.

## **Program Regulations**

The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act) requires fishery managers to ensure that no individual, business, or other entity acquires an excessive share of the

privilege. The GT-IFQ program is monitored to prevent any entity from obtaining shares in excess of the established share cap for each share category (Table 2). The share cap for each category was based on the maximum GT-IFQ shares issued to a person, business, or other entity at the time of initial apportionment. An overall allocation cap is set annually and equals the sum of the maximum allocations associated with the five share category caps; an account is restricted from holding more than the allocation cap at any point in time. In 2020, the final allocation cap for the GT-IFQ program after all quota adjustments was 411,818 lb. As of January 1, 2015, any GT-IFQ account may transfer (increase or decrease holdings) GT-IFQ shares and allocation, regardless of reef fish permit status. There are no program fees associated with share or allocation transfers.

Table 2: Share caps				
Category	Share Cap %			
DWG	14.704321			
GG	2.349938			
RG	4.331882			
SWG	7.266147			
TF	12.212356			

All vessels with a reef fish permit are required to submit a declaration (hail-out) prior to leaving port for a fishing trip. While at sea, vessels are monitored using the satellite-based Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS). Each vessel is required to have an operational NMFS type-approved VMS transmitter. The transmitter automatically determines the vessel's position and transmits that position to NMFS through a NMFS-approved communication service provider. When returning to port, vessels landing GT-IFQ species must provide a pre-landing notification (hail-in) 3 to 24 hours in advance of landing, indicating the time, date, landing location, the intended dealer, and the estimated pounds landed by species. As of January 1, 2019, all reef fish permitted vessels are also required to provide a pre-landing notification for all commercial trips. For vessels without IFQ species on board, the pre-landing notification includes the time, date, landing location, and indication that there are no IFO species onboard. Vessels that declared a commercial reef fish trip must land at an approved landing location. Landing may occur at any time, but IFQ species may only be offloaded between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. local time. A landing transaction report is completed by the GT-IFQ dealer and validated by the allocation holder through entry of the vessel signature PIN. The landing transaction includes the date, time, and location of transaction; accurate weight and actual ex-vessel price of fish landed and sold; and the identity of the shareholder account, vessel, and dealer. Landing transactions must be completed on the day of offload, except when being trailered for transport to dealer, where it must be completed before transport. All landing transactions must occur within 96 hours from the time of landing reported in the notification. All landings data are processed on a real-time basis. Current IFQ landings can be accessed at the Southeast Regional Office (SERO) Catch Share Website: https://secatchshares.fisheries.noaa.gov/home, through the Additional Information view and listed under the document Commercial Quotas/Catch Allowances (all years).

NMFS monitors the economic performance of the program by collecting share, allocation, and ex-vessel prices. Both the transferor and transferee submit total share value, while just the transferor submits the allocation price per pound. Ex-vessel prices are the prices paid by a dealer per pound of fish before any

deductions are made for transferred (leased) allocation and goods and/or services (bait, ice, fuel, repairs, machinery replacement, etc.). Section 304(d)(2)(A)(i) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act requires a fee to recover the actual costs required to directly administer, manage, and enforce the GT-IFQ program. This fee may not exceed 3% of the actual ex-vessel value. The current cost recovery fee is set at 3%. The Regional Administrator may review and adjust this fee annually. The IFQ allocation holder specified in the landing transaction is responsible for the payment of the cost recovery fees, while the dealer who receives the fish is responsible for collecting the cost recovery fee and submitting the fee to NMFS on a quarterly basis.

Complete regulations governing the GT-IFQ program can be found at 50 CFR § 622.22 (<u>www.ecfr.gov</u>) and the program can be accessed through the SERO Website: <u>https://secatchshares.fisheries.noaa.gov/home</u>. Important information regarding the GT-IFQ program is available for download on the website under Additional Information.

## **Program Performance**

## **Program Participants**

#### **Shareholders**

For this report, shareholder refers to an account that holds shares, and does not refer to individuals within the accounts. Shareholder account is a type of role within the system. Shareholder accounts may or may not hold shares. Shareholders accounts without shares may still participate in the program by obtaining allocation from another IFQ shareholder account. Allocation holders are any shareholder account that holds allocation, and these shareholder accounts may or may not also hold shares. The number of shareholders changes each year as accounts acquire or divest shares through transfers. For this report, we calculate the number of shareholders at the end of each year. A shareholder may divest their account of shares (i.e., transfer all shares) for a variety of reasons: to exit the IFO program, to transfer to a new IFQ account after a permit change,<sup>4</sup> or to manage related IFQ accounts from one account.<sup>5</sup> Accounts that are not associated with a reef fish permit are termed public participant accounts. Public participant accounts may be related to other shareholder accounts that may hold reef fish permits. Related accounts may be created as a means of separating the assets (e.g., shares from vessel) or for ease of managing the shares and allocation across multiple related accounts (e.g., when each vessel in a fleet is owned by corporation). Discussions with industry representatives indicate this separation of assets may be a growing business practice. Therefore, caution should be used when interpreting trends related to public participant accounts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> IFQ accounts are established based on the name(s) of the Gulf commercial reef fish permit holder. If the name(s) of the permit holder change (e.g., adding/removing a spouse), a new IFQ account must be established to link to the permit.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Some IFQ participants are associated with more than one IFQ account (e.g., John Smith vs. John and Jane Smith, incorporating each vessel under a different company name), and therefore may shift all their shareholding to one account for ease of management.

In the first 5 years of the program (2010-2014), the total number of GT-IFQ shareholders (i.e., held shares in at least one share category) decreased each year (Table 3). In 2015, there was an increase in shareholders (+ 17). This increase is most likely due to the opening of the GT-IFQ program to public participation (i.e., allows any U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien to obtain open an account and obtain shares and allocation) and dicussions of modifications to the IFQ program in 2015. The number of shareholders continued to increase each year through 2017. The large decrease in total shareholder accounts from 2017 to 2018 (51 accounts) was likely a result of Amendment 36A to the Reef Fish FMP (Amendment 36A). In the 2018 final rule for Amendment 36A, shares from accounts that had not been activated were reverted to NMFS. Gulf Council discussion about potential changes to the IFQ programs continues in Amendment 36B to the Reef Fish FMP in the following years.

Since the start of the program, the majority of shareholders held shares in three or more categories (Table 3). Over time, the proportion of accounts holding shares in one or two share categories has increased and is now 2-3 times greater than at the start of the program. Concurrently, the number of shareholders holding all five categories (GG, RG, DWG, SWG, and TF) has decreased over time from 35% of all shareholders to 26%.

14010 5.	Sharenon	dello og i		U		
			Share C	Categorie	es	
Year	1	2	3	4	5	Total
2010	18	34	258	172	261	743
2011	22	39	239	176	223	699
2012	34	42	225	156	208	665
2013	33	48	214	153	196	644
2014	37	51	206	145	189	628
2015	55	58	208	142	182	645
2016	68	59	213	142	171	653
2017	81	62	207	142	175	667
2018	82	52	182	134	166	616
2019	84	59	183	130	159	615
2020	81	59	179	126	161	606
2021	78	57	177	124	157	593

 Table 3: Shareholders by number of categories held

By share category, shareholders decreased through 2016, with a slight increase in 2017 for many categories (Table 4). In 2018, all categories saw a large decrease in shareholders. This decrease continued for all categories through 2021. The difference in trend of shareholders for the program compared to the share categories can be seen in the increase in shareholders holding only shares in only one share category in 2015-2017 (Table 3).

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DWG	Small N (Share %)	Med. N (Share %)	Large N (Share %)	Total	GG	Small N (Share %)	Med. N (Share %)	Large N (Share %)	Total
Initial	299 (2%)	169 (58%)	12 (40%)	480	Initial	415 (6%)	330 (88%)	3 (6%)	748
2010	300 (2%)	148 (54%)	13 (44%)	461	2010	424 (5%)	290 (85%)	5 (10%)	719
2011	275 (2%)	143 (53%)	13 (45%)	431	2011	391 (4%)	263 (81%)	7 (15%)	661
2012	253 (2%)	134 (49%)	14 (49%)	401	2012	355 (4%)	249 (80%)	8 (16%)	612
2013	238 (2%)	131 (49%)	13 (49%)	382	2013	342 (4%)	244 (78%)	9 (18%)	595
2014	224 (2%)	129 (45%)	15 (53%)	368	2014	333 (4%)	233 (78%)	9 (18%)	575
2015	220 (2%)	131 (48%)	15 (50%)	366	2015	328 (4%)	238 (80%)	8 (16%)	574
2016	215 (2%)	127 (44%)	17 (54%)	359	2016	328 (4%)	232 (75%)	11 (21%)	571
2017	221 (2%)	123 (43%)	17 (55%)	361	2017	331 (4%)	227 (73%)	12 (23%)	570
2018	208 (2%)	118 (41%)	18 (57%)	344	2018	288 (4%)	223 (73%)	12 (23%)	523
2019	206 (2%)	115 (41%)	15 (57%)	336	2019	289 (4%)	218 (73%)	12 (23%)	519
2020	203 (2%)	116 (41%)	15 (58%)	334	2020	285 (4%)	212 (71%)	13 (25%)	510
2021	199 (2%)	113 (40%)	15 (58%)	327	2021	281 (4%)	205 (70%)	14 (26%)	500
RG	Small	Med.	Large	Total	SWG	Small	Med.	Large	Total
NG	N (Share %)	N (Share %)	N (Share %)	TUtal		N (Share %)	N (Share %)	N (Share %)	IUtai
Initial	435 (5%)	248 (77%)	9 (18%)	692	Initial	467 (6%)	275 (68%)	10 (26%)	752
2010	421 (4%)	237 (80%)	7 (16%)	665	2010	460 (5%)	250 (65%)	11 (30%)	721
2011	377 (3%)	227 (81%)	6 (16%)	610	2011	421 (5%)	242 (65%)	11 (30%)	674
2012	349 (3%)	212 (77%)	8 (20%)	569	2012	384 (4%)	234 (65%)	11 (31%)	629
2013	339 (3%)	200 (72%)	11 (25%)	550	2013	364 (4%)	227 (65%)	13 (31%)	604
2014	327 (3%)	192 (71%)	11 (26%)	530	2014	351 (4%)	218 (64%)	13 (32%)	582
2015	332 (3%)	186 (67%)	12 (30%)	530	2015	346 (4%)	223 (67%)	12 (29%)	581
2016	332 (3%)	185 (65%)	13 (32%)	530	2016	345 (4%)	221 (68%)	11 (28%)	577
2017	345 (3%)	190 (65%)	13 (32%)	548	2017	347 (4%)	219 (70%)	10 (26%)	576
2018	303 (3%)	190 (66%)	12 (31%)	505	2018	295 (4%)	216 (70%)	10 (26%)	521
2019	305 (3%)	179 (66%)	12 (31%)	496	2019	295 (4%)	212 (69%)	10 (27%)	517
2020	302 (3%)	172 (61%)	14 (36%)	488	2020	291 (4%)	211 (69%)	10 (27%)	512
2021	296 (3%)	165 (60%)	14 (37%)	475	2021	284 (4%)	208 (65%)	11 (31%)	503
TF	Small	Med.	Large	Total		Total			
11	N (Share %)	N (Share %)	N (Share %)	IUtai	Sha	reholders			
Initial	171 (2%)	100 (36%)	16 (62%)	287	Initial	766		ates the number	
2010	185 (2%)	85 (30%)	17 (68%)	287	2010	743		nd percent is the	
2011	164 (1%)	79 (28%)	17 (71%)	260	2011	699	-	ge held by all o	
2012	155 (1%)	76 (27%)	15 (72%)	246	2012	665		all accounts hole	
2013	144 (1%)	72 (25%)	16 (74%)	232	2013	644		m accounts hold	
2014	143 (1%)	69 (26%)	15 (73%)	227	2014	628		arge accounts ho	
2015	143 (1%)	63 (24%)	16 (75%)	222	2015	645		All values were	
2016	138 (1%)	54 (19%)	19 (80%)	211	2016	653		of the year, exe	
2017	142 (1%)	54 (20%)	18 (79%)	214	2017	667		was the progran	n's start
2018	134 (1%)	52 (18%)	19 (81%)	205	2018	616	date (1/1/2010	I).	
2019	132 (1%)	48 (17%)	18 (82%)	198	2019	615			
2020	133 (1%)	50 (17%)	18 (82%)	201	2020	606			
2021	132 (1%)	49 (16%)	18 (83%)	199	2021	593			

Table 4: Shareholders by share volume and the total share percent held by those accounts

Shareholders are categorized by share volume within a share category: small shareholders hold < 0.05%shares, medium shareholders hold between 0.05-1.4999% shares, while large shareholders hold  $\ge 1.5\%$ shares. Since the program began, by share category, the medium shareholders held the majority of shares, while small shareholders accounted for the greatest number of accounts. Decreases in the number of shareholders primarily occurred among small or medium shareholders, with only slight increases in large shareholders. Despite these changes, proportionally there was very little change among small, medium, and large shareholders. For example, the proportion of DWG large shareholders increased from 3% at the start of the program to 5% in recent years, while the medium DWG shareholders also increased by 2% and small DWG shareholders decreased by 4% during this same period. Since the start of the programs, the greatest number of shareholders hold a small amount of shares, while the smallest number hold largest percentage of shares.

Accounts that are not associated with a reef fish permit are termed public participant accounts, and may include accounts that are related to other shareholder accounts or dealer accounts, accounts that previously held shares, and/or accounts held by any U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien. In the first five years, public participant shareholders could occur if the reef fish permit associated with the account was transferred or terminated. Even in the first year of the program, a small percentage (4%) of shareholders no longer held a reef fish permit (Appendix 4.1). The number of public participant shareholders more than doubled by the second year of the program for all share categories. The number of public participant shareholders continued to increase through 2017, in part due to public participation in the both Gulf IFQ program. In 2018, the number of shareholders without a permit decreased due to Amendment 36A, which reverted shares from inactivated accounts back to NMFS. The amount of shares reverted to NMFS were nominal, all below 0.5% by share category. The amount of shares held by public participant shareholders was initially small (1% or less), and increased over time. The largest increase in share holdings in public participant shareholders occurred in 2015. Since 2015, public participant shareholders have been holding between 11-32% of the shares in each share category. This information should be interpreted with a degree of caution as many related accounts hold the shares in a separate account from the account linked to the permit and vessel. Due to the migration of the Permits system to a new platform, updated information on permits and shareholders is not available at this time. This information will be updated in later reports.

#### **Allocation Holders**

In the GT-IFQ program, an account holder may obtain allocation from shares (distributed at the beginning of the year or from any in-season quota increase) or from the transfer of allocation from another account holder. The number of accounts that hold allocation does not necessarily equal the number of accounts that land allocation, as not all accounts that hold allocation also hold a reef fish permit and some accounts may only transfer allocation. Accounts that hold allocation are termed allocation holders. The number of allocation holders is typically greater than the number of shareholders.

The number of total allocation holders fluctuated over time (Table 5). The number of allocation holders in the entire program was increasing over time, until 2019 when a decrease was seen, which could have been a response to discussions by the Gulf Council for Amendment 36B (Table 5). Within each share category, the number of allocation holders have not exceeded the original allocation holders in recent years.

		on holders by share					
DWG	Ν	With shares	Via Transfer	GG	Ν	With shares	Via Transfer
2010	512	472 (92%)	40 (8%)	2010	789	740 (94%)	49 (6%)
2011	521	445 (85%)	76 (15%)	2011	767	694 (90%)	73 (10%)
2012	498	416 (84%)	81 (16%)	2012	743	645 (87%)	98 (13%)
2013	465	384 (83%)	81 (17%)	2013	716	595 (83%)	121 (17%)
2014	457	365 (80%)	92 (20%)	2014	726	580 (80%)	146 (20%)
2015	464	351 (76%)	113 (24%)	2015	753	560 (74%)	193(26%)
2016	462	349 (76%)	113 (24%)	2016	752	560 (74%)	192 (26%)
2017	455	342 (75%)	113 (25%)	2017	767	556 (72%)	211 (28%)
2018	477	345 (72%)	132 (28%)	2018	756	556 (74%)	200 (26%)
2019	449	328 (73%)	121 (27%)	2019	715	513 (72%)	202 (28%)
2020	463	318 (69%)	145 (31%)	2020	736	509 (69%)	227 (31%)
2021	449	317 (71%)	132 (29%)	2021	727	501 (69%)	226 (31%)
RG	Ν	With shares	Via Transfer	SWG	Ν	With shares	Via Transfer
2010	744	690 (93%)	54 (7%)	2010	762	725 (95%)	37 (5%)
2011	739	675 (91%)	64 (9%)	2011	760	687 (90%)	73 (10%)
2012	715	605 (85%)	110 (15%)	2012	737	644 (87%)	93 (13%)
2013	683	563 (82%)	120 (18%)	2013	720	602 (84%)	118 (16%)
2014	689	544 (79%)	145 (21%)	2014	722	578 (80%)	144 (20%)
2015	716	522 (73%)	194 (27%)	2015	742	555 (75%)	187 (25%)
2016	723	543 (75%)	180 (25%)	2016	738	555 (75%)	183 (25%)
2017	750	525 (70%)	225 (30%)	2017	749	551 (74%)	198 (26%)
2018	755	543 (72%)	212 (28%)	2018	745	548 (74%)	197 (26%)
2019	687	494 (72%)	192 (28%)	2019	694	501 (72%)	193 (28%)
2020	694	486 (70%)	208 (30%)	2020	711	497 (70%)	214 (30%)
2021	689	480 (70%)	209 (30%)	2021	701	493 (70%)	208 (30%)
TF	Ν	With shares	Via Transfer	ALL	Ν	With shares	Via Transfer
2010	299	271 (91%)	28 (9%)	2010	816	765 (94%)	51 (6%)
2011	309	263 (85%)	46 (15%)	2011	833	756 (91%)	77 (9%)
2012	292	243 (83%)	49 (17%)	2012	812	701 (86%)	111 (14%)
2013	282	230 (82%)	52 (18%)	2013	786	659 (84%)	127 (16%)
2014	279	217 (78%)	62 (22%)	2014	795	639 (80%)	156 (20%)
2015	287	212 (74%)	75 (26%)	2015	835	620 (74%)	215 (26%)
2016	273	207 (76%)	66 (24%)	2016	842	655 (78%)	187 (22%)
2017	264	196 (74%)	68 (26%)	2017	872	644 (74%)	228 (26%)
2018	286	199 (70%)	87 (30%)	2018	878	656 (75%)	222 (25%)
2019	279	192 (69%)	87 (31%)	2019	819	603 (74%)	216 (26%)
2020	289	185 (64%)	104 (36%)	2020	833	600 (72%)	233 (28%)
2021	288	187 (65%)	101 (35%)	2021	824	590 (72%)	234 (28%)

Table 5: Allocation holders by share status

Note: N indicates the number of allocation holders and percentage refers to the proportion of those accounts that also hold shares.

Allocation holders can be categorized as those holding or not holding shares (Table 5). Allocation holders that do not hold shares must have obtained allocation through an allocation transfer from another account and are called allocation only accounts. Allocation holders with shares may also increase or decrease the amount of allocation within the account through an allocation transfer from or to another account. At the start of the program, 94% of allocation holders held shares. This percentage has been gradually declining over time, and is currently stabilized around 75% of allocation holders have shares. By share category, the overall trend is similar with a decrease in the percentage of allocation holders with shares. The decreases in allocation holders with shares may have resulted from a variety of factors.

Factors that may influence the percentage of allocation holders with and without shares include: quota changes, shareholders that manage shares in related accounts,<sup>2</sup> the ability for shareholders to obtain shares (e.g., availability or price), changes in harvesting behavior, and/or influences from the RS-IFQ program. Quota increases may allow allocation to be indirectly distributed among more participants through transfers, thereby increasing the percentage of allocation only holders. As the quota increases, those with shares receive a larger amount of allocation than under a smaller quota (e.g., 5% of 100 lb = 5lb, while 5% of 200 lb is 10 lb). If the allocation received by the fisherman is more than needed to land GT-IFO species, they may transfer allocation to another account that does not have shares, rather than land the allocation themselves. The number of related accounts may create more allocation only account holders, as participants aggregate shares into one account. Reduced availability or increased prices of shares may increase the percentage of allocation only holders, as shares become harder to obtain. Finally, participants mainly fishing in one IFQ program may obtain allocation in the other program to reduce discards of incidental catch, as these species commonly co-occur. In fact, the percentage of GT-IFQ vessels that also land red snapper has increased since the start of the program, and has been consistently around 90% in recent years (Table 6).

Table 6: GT-IFQ vessels landing RS-IFQ				
Year	% vessel overlap with			
1 Cal	RS-IFQ program			
2010	78%			
2011	75%			
2012	77%			
2013	81%			
2014	83%			
2015	85%			
2016	87%			
2017	87%			
2018	91%			
2019	90%			
2020	91%			
2021	90%			

#### **Dealers**

The number of dealers receiving GT-IFQ species has increased since the start of the program. Since 2014, the number of dealers has remained slightly over 100 dealers receiving GT-IFQ species (Table 7). Dealers can be categorized by the percentage of annual GT-IFQ species received by the dealer: small (received <1% of GT-IFQ landings), medium (received 1-3% of GT-IFQ landings), and large (>3% of GT-IFQ landings). Some small-sized dealers are likely fishermen who have obtained a GSAD dealer permit to eliminate the need for a seafood wholesaler, and therefore reduce costs and increase profits. Currently, it is not possible to link ownership of a shareholder account to ownership of a dealer account, as accounts may be held under different names (e.g., business vs. individual name(s) vs. different business name). Personal communication with industry representatives indicated that there were

fishermen who also owned dealer permits, but these were not limited to just small-sized dealers. Small dealers represent the majority of dealers, even though they purchase only a small proportion of the overall catch.

The number of medium-sized dealers decreased over time, with a nearly 50% decrease in 2014. Large dealers grew slightly in 2013 and remained consistent thereafter. Small dealers increased over time from 63 in 2010 to nearly 100 in more recent years. The increase in small-sized dealers likely result from fishermen who have obtained a GSAD dealer permit to eliminate the middleman and therefore reduce costs and increase profits. In 2021, there was a decrease in small dealers, which most likely resulted from the pandemic and resulting market conditions.

Year	Total	Small <1% of landings	Medium 1-3% of landings	Large >3% of landings
2010	85	63 (10%)	15 (28%)	7 (62%)
2011	94	75 (13%)	12 (26%)	7 (61%)
2012	97	73 (13%)	16 (29%)	8 (58%)
2013	96	75 (12%)	11 (20%)	10 (68%)
2014	112	94 (14%)	7 (11%)	11 (75%)
2015	114	97 (13%)	7 (12%)	10 (76%)
2016	107	89 (11%)	8 (14%)	10 (75%)
2017	113	95 (14%)	8 (14%)	10 (72%)
2018	114	94 (12%)	10 (18%)	10 (70%)
2019	117	99 (14%)	8 (14%)	10 (73%)
2020	110	93 (14%)	6 (11%)	11 (75%)
2021	107	86 (11%)	11 (17%)	10 (71%)

Table 7: Dealer accounts by landings volume

Note: Dealer size determined by percentage of annual IFQ landings received by each dealer and may include multiple facilities. The percentage refers to the proportion of landings processed by those dealers.

#### Vessels

The number of vessels harvesting GT-IFQ species decreased from the start of the program (630 vessel) and has been at or below 450 vessels since (Table 1Table 8; <u>Appendix 4.2</u>). More vessels consistently harvested species within the GG, RG, and SWG share categories than the DWG or TF share categories. For all share categories, the number of vessels continues to remain below the average number of vessels harvesting GT-IFQ species prior to the program.

Since the start of the program, ~88% of the vessels primarily landed their catch at Florida facilities. Changes in the number of vessels landing in each state may be influenced by factors outside of the GT-IFQ program, and these changes may include, but are not limited to, changes in markets or fishing behavior, availability of facilities, and/or catastrophic events (i.e., hurricanes, red tide events, oil spills). As with accounts holding shares, vessels frequently land fish from more than one share category. In recent years, roughly 60% of the vessels landed species in at least three of the share categories, while no more than 15% land fish in only one share category. Between 10 and 15% of the vessels land fish in all five share categories. Multi-share category landings are expected, as many of the species in the reef fish fishery co-occur and are harvested together. Due to the migration of the Permits system to a new platform, updated information on landings by states is not available at this time. This information will be updated in later reports.

Year	DWG	GG	RG	SWG	TF	Total GT- IFQ Vessels
Pre-IFQ	238	493	546	489	166	630
2010	187	415	393	322	79	452
2011	192	363	383	307	75	440
2012	206	384	398	343	97	449
2013	185	367	363	324	78	414
2014	186	375	384	353	91	434
2015	165	374	376	341	86	446
2016	170	382	380	346	85	441
2017	164	374	376	330	79	453
2018	166	368	376	326	87	455
2019	145	354	359	309	96	428
2020	147	346	354	315	90	425
2021	134	336	326	301	95	393

Table 8: Number vessels that harvested GT-IFQ species

Note: Pre-IFQ years (2007-2009) are an annual average from the Coastal logbook records.

#### **Account Activity**

Account activity (active or inactive) can be determined through analyzing allocation and landing transactions during a year. An account is defined as active if that account has landed allocation or transferred allocation (in or out the account) during the fishing year, while inactive accounts neither landed nor transferred allocation during the year. Accounts may be inactive due to several reasons: non-activated accounts (never accessed), shares resulting in negligible pounds for harvest or sale (e.g., 1-5 lb), inability to harvest (e.g., vessel in dry dock), or personal events (e.g., death, medical issues). Account status is determined each year. Active accounts can be further categorized by activity type: those only transferring allocation (no landing), or those landing and/or transferring allocation. Some reasons why an account holder may only transfer allocation may be due to the limitation in harvest ability (e.g., no permit, vessel inoperative), related accounts (e.g., transfer allocation to related account), and/or insufficient allocation to harvest (e.g., shares resulted in only a few pounds of allocation).

The percentage of inactive accounts has not changed more than  $\sim 10\%$  over time with between 18 and 34% of accounts remaining inactive (Table 9). The percentages of inactive accounts are lower than at the start of the program. By share category, the percentage of accounts landing allocation is generally less than 50%, with higher percentages occurring for RG, GG, and SWG than DWG and TF. These percentages have remained similar across time within each share category, with variances between 5% and 10%.

			is by activity					_			
DWG	Ν	Inactive	Landing	GG	Ν	Inactive	Landing	RG	Ν	Inactive	Landing
2010	512	169 (33%)	161 (31%)	2010	789	244 (31%)	362 (46%)	2010	744	222 (30%)	348 (47%)
2011	521	140 (27%)	169 (32%)	2011	767	221 (29%)	323 (42%)	2011	739	184 (25%)	344 (47%)
2012	498	104 (21%)	185 (37%)	2012	743	184 (25%)	344 (46%)	2012	715	167 (23%)	357 (50%)
2013	465	115 (25%)	168 (36%)	2013	716	206 (29%)	336 (47%)	2013	683	171 (25%)	332 (49%)
2014	457	103 (23%)	168 (37%)	2014	726	187 (26%)	340 (47%)	2014	689	153 (22%)	349 (51%)
2015	464	109 (23%)	152 (33%)	2015	753	206 (27%)	337 (45%)	2015	716	166 (23%)	342 (48%)
2016	462	107 (23%)	149 (32%)	2016	752	200 (27%)	338 (45%)	2016	723	183 (25%)	347 (48%)
2017	455	131 (29%)	148 (33%)	2017	767	234 (31%)	339 (44%)	2017	750	207 (28%)	344 (46%)
2018	477	139 (29%)	152 (32%)	2018	756	239 (32%)	333 (44%)	2018	755	218 (29%)	340 (45%)
2019	449	108 (24%)	135 (30%)	2019	715	198 (28%)	320 (45%)	2019	687	181 (26%)	326 (47%)
2020	463	119 (26%)	137 (30%)	2020	736	198 (27%)	320 (43%)	2020	694	176 (25%)	325 (47%)
2021	449	111 (25%)	125 (28%)	2021	727	182 (25%)	313 (43%)	2021	689	142 (21%)	309 (45%)
SWG	Ν	Inactive	Landing	TF	Ν	Inactive	Landing				
2010	762	277 (36%)	282 (37%)	2010	299	101 (34%)	66 (22%)				
2011	760	261 (34%)	272 (36%)	2011	309	77 (25%)	68 (22%)				
2012	737	220 (30%)	303 (41%)	2012	292	59 (20%)	87 (30%)	Madai	NT :	4 41	1 £
2013	720	233 (32%)	297 (41%)	2013	282	70 (25%)	76 (27%)			cates the num	
2014	722	208 (29%)	324 (45%)	2014	279	54 (19%)	83 (30%)			Iders and the	-
2015	742	223 (30%)	311 (42%)	2015	287	64 (22%)	79 (28%)			proportion of t	
2016	738	212 (29%)	312 (42%)	2016	273	61 (22%)	80 (29%)			either had lar	langs or
2017	749	243 (32%)	304 (41%)	2017	264	76 (29%)	72 (27%)	were c	onside	red inactive.	
2018	745	252 (34%)	297 (40%)	2018	286	82 (29%)	80 (28%)				
2019	694	213 (31%)	285 (41%)	2019	279	70 (25%)	91 (33%)				
2020	711	215 (30%)	296 (42%)	2020	289	66 (23%)	83 (29%)				
2021	701	202 (29%)	284 (41%)	2021	288	52 (18%)	89 (31%)				

Table 9: Allocation accounts by activity

Accounts landing GT-IFQ species can be categorized as those with and without shares (Table 10). In each share category, landings were primarily associated with accounts that held shares (96-99%) at the start of the program. The percentage of landings from accounts with shares has decreased over time. In 2021, between 36-44% of the accounts landing GT-IFQ species also held shares. While this appears to show a growing disconnect between accounts with shares and those that land those shares, these data must be interpreted with caution. As mentioned previously, many accounts are related to other accounts and conversations with industry representatives have indicated that some fishermen purposely separate their shares from the account landing the allocation. In 2021, at the height of the pandemic, accounts without shares accounted for a higher percentage of landings, with between 56-64% of all landings.

	Landings by sha				00	/ 1	w/a shares		
DWG	w/ shares		w/o share		GG	w/ shar		w/o shar	
2010	602,749 lb	96%	22,013 lb	4%	2010	473,362 lb	96%	20,576 lb	4%
2011	701,273 lb	90%	78,246 lb	10%	2011	286,560 lb	90%	33,577 lb	10%
2012	806,041 lb	84%	157,794 lb	16%	2012	436,556 lb	83%	88,510 lb	17%
2013	562,498 lb	62%	350,425 lb	38%	2013	470,701 lb	81%	108,963 lb	19%
2014	576,636 lb	55%	471,506 lb	45%	2014	450,465 lb	65%	239,048 lb	35%
2015	458,548 lb	50%	452,791 lb	50%	2015	356,593 lb	64%	198,348 lb	36%
2016	392,801 lb	45%	474,239 lb	55%	2016	495,483 lb	64%	281,707 lb	36%
2017	390,545 lb	48%	431,354 lb	52%	2017	276,519 lb	62%	166,637 lb	38%
2018	383,801 lb	47%	433,651 lb	53%	2018	264,948 lb	59%	186,966 lb	41%
2019	398,633 lb	42%	553,096 lb	58%	2019	291,178 lb	62%	178,697 lb	38%
2020	409,416 lb	51%	394,344 lb	49%	2020	238,560 lb	51%	230,002 lb	49%
2021	352,236 lb	44%	448,191 lb	56%	2021	261,398 lb	42%	367,098 lb	58%
RG	w/ shares	5	w/o share	es	SWG	w/ shar	es	w/o shar	es
2010	2,800,064 lb	96%	113,794 lb	4%	2010	155,091 lb	98%	3,143 lb	2%
2011	4,397,093 lb	92%	385,101 lb	8%	2011	170,156 lb	91%	16,079 lb	9%
2012	4,513,535 lb	87%	703,670 lb	13%	2012	256,643 lb	85%	43,724 lb	15%
2013	3,688,461 lb	80%	906,211 lb	20%	2013	242,464 lb	79%	65,382 lb	21%
2014	3,609,728 lb	66%	1,888,265 lb	34%	2014	193,570 lb	74%	69,681 lb	26%
2015	2,943,654 lb	62%	1,841,338 lb	38%	2015	193,160 lb	68%	89,178 lb	32%
2016	2,619,630 lb	57%	2,011,758lb	43%	2016	221,279 lb	62%	136,884 lb	38%
2017	1,760,921 lb	52%	1,616,289 lb	48%	2017	144,564 lb	60%	94,482 lb	40%
2018	1,151,522 lb	48%	1,252,778 lb	52%	2018	126,056 lb	56%	98,105 lb	44%
2019	1,081,477 lb	52%	1,017,709 lb	48%	2019	105,958 lb	57%	79,056 lb	43%
2020	1,081,245 lb	46%	1,294,229 lb	54%	2020	82,924 lb	51%	81,148 lb	49%
2021	1,128,556 lb	39%	1,756,488 lb	61%	2021	82,772 lb	44%	104,640 lb	56%
TF	w/ shares	5	w/o share	es					
2010	246,987 lb	99%	2,721 lb	1%					
2011	330,997 lb	86%	55,137 lb	14%					
2012	350,670 lb	78%	100,451 lb	22%					
2013	219,869 lb	50%	220,222 lb	50%					
2014	214,600 lb	41%	302,668 lb	59%					
2015	214,554 lb	40%	322,958 lb	60%					
2016	181,045 lb	42%	247,958 lb	58%					
2017	196,264 lb	40%	288,631 lb	60%					
2018	173,916 lb	45%	212,222 lb	55%					
2019	147,814 lb	35%	275,112 lb	65%					
2020	150,061 lb	43%	198,783 lb	57%					
2021	172,799 lb	36%	311,244 lb	64%					

Table 10: Landings by share status

Accounts that only transfer allocation may or may not have shares and/or reef fish permits (<u>Appendix 4.3</u>). Across time and share categories, the majority of the accounts that only transfer allocation held both shares and reef fish permits. The number of accounts only transferring allocation that do not hold shares, has grown since the start of the program, but remained relatively stable since 2015 when the program was opened for public participation. The public participant accounts (i.e., accounts with no permit) that also hold no shares have remained below 20 accounts in any one category represent the lowest number of accounts only transferring allocation. Public participant accounts without shares may function as brokers by simply obtaining and transferring out allocation. Due to the migration of the

Permits system to a new platform, updated information on permits by share status is not available at this time. This information will be updated in later reports.

## **Program Evaluation**

## **Transactions and Landings**

#### **Share Transfers**

A share is the percentage of the commercial quota assigned to a shareholder account that results in allocation (pounds) equivalent to the share percentage of the quota. Shares were distributed at the start of the program to participants based on landings history. Share holdings within an account can only be increased or decreased through share transfers. During the first five years of the program, a recipient account was required to have a reef fish permit to receive shares. Thereafter, the only restrictions on a share transfer was if it exceeded the share cap. Share transfers are a two-step process with the transferor initiating the transfer, and completion of the transfer occurring after the transferee accepts the transfer. There may be a delay between initiation of the transfer and final acceptance of the transfer.

The greatest number of share transfers and volume of shares transferred occurred in the first year of the program (Table 10). Thereafter, the number and volume of share transfers were variable with an overall decreasing trend in both number and volume of shares within and across share categories (Table 11). While number and volume of share transfers decreased over time, the average volume of shares per transfer increased slightly over time for most share categories.

In 2015, the number and volume of share transfers was considerably greater than other years. This was primarily attributed to the opening of the GT-IFQ program to public participation. In the following years, the number and volume of share transfers decreased again. Excluding 2010 and 2015, the total volume of shares transferred, by share category each year, were between 3-23%, while the average volume of shares per transaction was less than 1%.

		er and volume of					
DWG	Ν	<b>Total Shares</b>	Average Shares	GG	Ν	<b>Total Shares</b>	<b>Average Shares</b>
2010	161	25.8	0.16	2010	256	24.0	0.09
2011	96	7.0	0.07	2011	138	18.8	0.14
2012	78	9.3	0.12	2012	129	14.8	0.12
2013	53	7.3	0.14	2013	88	5.5	0.06
2014	62	12.6	0.20	2014	106	19.2	0.18
2015	85	32.7	0.38	2015	153	24.7	0.16
2016	56	9.6	0.17	2016	84	7.9	0.09
2017	31	3.0	0.10	2017	67	7.1	0.11
2018	34	11.6	0.34	2018	63	4.8	0.08
2019	34	23.5	0.69	2019	70	15.1	0.22
2020	28	7.2	0.26	2020	59	11.8	0.20
2021	18	3.4	0.19	2021	51	8.4	0.17
RG	Ν	<b>Total Shares</b>	<b>Average Shares</b>	SWG	Ν	<b>Total Shares</b>	<b>Average Shares</b>
2010	267	24.3	0.09	2010	195	25.6	0.13
2011	168	13.5	0.08	2011	104	8.4	0.08
2012	202	17.2	0.08	2012	97	6.9	0.07
2013	145	13.7	0.09	2013	82	12.2	0.15
2014	144	14.2	0.10	2014	63	10.6	0.17
2015	214	32.9	0.15	2015	97	21.6	0.22
2016	118	13.1	0.11	2016	56	7.3	0.13
2017	117	5.0	0.04	2017	45	3.5	0.08
2018	84	12.3	0.15	2018	55	12.3	0.22
2019	67	8.8	0.13	2019	54	14.0	0.26
2020	66	9.5	0.14	2020	51	7.2	0.14
2021	47	8.3	0.18	2021	43	11.2	0.26
TF	Ν	<b>Total Shares</b>	Average Shares	ALL	Ν	<b>Total Shares</b>	<b>Average Shares</b>
2010	91	31.6	0.35	2010	970	131.30	0.14
2011	59	9.0	0.15	2011	565	56.62	0.10
2012	44	11.8	0.27	2012	550	59.97	0.11
2013	29	5.5	0.19	2013	397	44.34	0.11
2014	34	16.3	0.48	2014	409	72.94	0.18
2015	57	38.2	0.67	2015	606	150.17	0.25
2016	34	21.1	0.62	2016	348	59.04	0.17
2017	24	3.2	0.13	2017	284	21.70	0.08
2017 2018	20	3.2 6.8	0.13 0.34	2017 2018	256	47.84	0.19
2017 2018 2019	20 14	3.2 6.8 13.8	0.13 0.34 0.98	2017 2018 2019	256 239	47.84 75.14	0.19 0.31
2017 2018	20	3.2 6.8	0.13 0.34	2017 2018	256	47.84	0.19

Table 11: Number and volume of share transfers

Note: N indicates the number of share transfers. Total shares is the sum of all shares transferred, and the average shares indicates weighted average amount of shares transferred per transaction.

#### **Allocation Transfers**

Annual GT-IFQ allocation is the actual poundage each IFQ account can use or transfer to possess or land GT-IFQ species during a given calendar year. Individual units of allocation cannot be tracked in the system (e.g., the same pounds may be transferred multiple times). Only allocation transfers between shareholder accounts were analyzed in this report, and not transfers within accounts (e.g., shareholder account to own vessel account or vice versa).

The number of allocation transfers and total pounds transferred for the program have increased over time (Table 12). Percentages of the quota transferred ranged from 53% to 294%. In all share categories, the percentage of allocation transferred has exceeded the quota (greater than 100%) in at least one year. The greatest percentage of quota transferred typically occurs in DWG or TF categories, with up to 294% of the quota transferred. The lowest percentages of quota transferred occur most often in GG or SWG categories. The average volume of share transferred correlated to the quotas, with lower quotas having smaller (<2,000 lb) average volumes and lower median volumes (100 lb - 900 lb).

DWG	Ν	mp	Avg.	Median	%	GG	Ν	mp	Avg. lb	Median	%
2010	490	1.027	<b>lb</b> 2,097	<b>lb</b> 737	<b>quota</b> 101%	2010	945	0.743	787	<b>lb</b> 300	quota 53%
2010	632	1.447	2,097	544		2010	1,250	0.743	266	109	77%
2011 2012	764		,	600	142%	2011			289	109	89%
		1.525	1,996		135%		1,745 1,718	0.504			
2013	608	1.762	2,899	525	158%	2013	/	0.622	362	200	88%
2014	846	2.371	2,802	700	214%	2014	2,232	1.236	554	216	148%
2015	<mark>898</mark> 947	3.241 2.439	3,609	1,000	294% 238%	2015 2016	1,847	1.255 1.391	680 637	232 229	134% 148%
2016	780	2.439	2,575	548 725	238%	2010	2,183	0.849	572	229	
2017 2018	820	2.133	2,761		210%	2017	1,485		553	200	<mark>90%</mark> 75%
			2,802	1,000		2018	1,274	0.705			
2019	1,038	2.829	2,726	806	276%		1,734	1.219	703	200	130%
2020	803	2.077	2,587	1,000	203%	2020	1,932	1.302	674	200	139%
2021	953	2.406	2,525	965	235%	2021	2,673	2.172	813	207	231%
RG	Ν	mp	Avg. lb	Median lb	% quota	SWG	Ν	mp	Avg. lb	Median lb	% quota
2010	1,065	3.217	3,021	926	56%	2010	616	0.315	511	186	77%
2011	1,550	4.260	2,749	1,000	81%	2011	568	0.273	480	200	67%
2012	1,906	4.737	2,485	1,000	88%	2012	900	0.366	406	200	72%
2013	1,752	5.579	3,185	1,000	101%	2013	911	0.493	541	212	95%
2014	2,317	7.188	3,102	1,000	128%	2014	1,000	0.507	507	200	97%
2015	2,480	8.655	3,490	1,072	151%	2015	1,084	0.577	532	200	110%
2016	2,978	15.069	5,060	1,000	194%	2016	1,595	0.662	415	200	126%
2017	1,758	8.906	5,066	1,000	114%	2017	1,147	0.504	440	200	96%
2018	1,373	8.391	6,112	1,000	108%	2018	999	0.463	464	200	88%
2019	2,373	6.067	2,557	500	202%	2019	1,165	0.549	471	184	105%
2020	2,565	5.368	2,093	527	179%	2020	1,210	0.480	396	106	91%
2021	3,078	5.727	1,861	500	191%	2021	1,436	0.577	402	100	110%
TF	Ν	mp	Avg. lb	Median lb	% quota	ALL	Ν	mp	% quota		
2010	268	0.490	1,827	445	111%	2010	3,384	5.792	64%		
2011	328	0.766	2,334	518	174%	2011	4,328	7.078	94%		
2012	385	0.686	1,782	406	118%	2012	5,700	7.817	96%		
2013	291	0.933	3,207	600	160%	2013	5,280	9.389	111%		
2014	430	1.256	2,920	700	216%	2014	6,825	12.557	145%		
2015	504	1.412	2,801	888	243%	2015	6,813	15.139	171%		
2016	515	1.134	2,202	500	195%	2016	8,218	20.695	191%		
2017	472	1.073	2,274	544	184%	2017	5,642	13.485	124%		
2018	422	0.865	2,049	500	149%	2018	4,888	12.722	117%		
2019	668	1.219	1,825	500	209%	2019	6,978	11.882	196%		
2020	554	0.856	1,546	500	147%	2020	7,064	10.084	166%		
2021	693	1.276	1,841	500	219%	2021	8,833	12.158	200%		

Table 12: Number and volume of allocation transfers

Note: N indicates the number of allocation transfers.

### **Quota and Landings**

Adjustments in quotas can occur due to the stock status change (e.g., new assessment) or management measures (e.g., reallocation between sectors). Quota increases may be applied at any time during the fishing season. Amendment 36A to the Reef Fish FMP (2018) provided NMFS the flexibility to address an anticipated decrease in commercial quota after the start of the fishing year. When such an anticipated decrease is expected, NMFS will withhold from distribution quota equal to the expected decrease. If the quota decrease is not completed before June 1, the withheld quota will be distributed to the IFQ shareholders based on shares at the time of distribution.

The GT-IFQ program began with quotas similar to pre-IFQ values (Table 13). In 2012, the Generic Annual Catch Limit amendment resulted in quota increases for each share category. Additional quota increases have occurred for various stocks over the years, and typically are the result of stock assessments or projections of stock size using the most current landings.

DWG quotas have differed only by ~100,000 lb over time, with a quota increase occurring in 2012 due the Generic Annual Catch Limit (ACL) amendment. The quota subsequently decreased over the next four years and has since remained at 1.024 mp. The GG quota had a significant decrease 1.310 million pound (mp) decrease in 2011 following a stock assessment. Small quota increases occurred each year from 2012 to 2015. RG quota decreased by 1.4 mp at the start of 2011, followed by a 0.910 mp late year quota increase in November. The quota fluctuated over the next several years between 5.37 mp and 5.72 mp. In late 2016, based on a stock assessment, the quota increased to 7.78 mp. The quota remained at this level through the end of 2018. Updated stock assessment projections decreased the RG quota to 3 mp in 2019 and it has remained at that level. SWG quota increased in 2012 to 0.582 mp with no further increases.

DWG	Jan 1	Quota Increase	Increase Date	Dec 31	GG	Jan 1	Quota Increase	Increase Date	Dec 31				
2009*	1,020,000			1,020,000	2009*	$1,320,000^{1}$			1,320,000				
2010	1,020,000			1,020,000	2010	1,410,000			1,410,000				
2011	1,020,000			1,020,000	2011	100,000	330,000	6/1	430,000				
2012	1,020,000	107,000	1/30	1,127,000	2012	430,000	137,000	3/12	567,000				
2013	1,118,000			1,118,000	2013	708,000			708,000				
2014	1,110,000			1,110,000	2014	835,000			835,000				
2015	1,101,000			1,101,000	2015	939,000			939,000				
2016	1,024,000			1,024,000	2016	939,000			939,000				
2017	1,024,000			1,024,000	2017	939,000			939,000				
2018	1,024,000			1,024,000	2018	939,000			939,000				
2019	1,024,000			1,024,000	2019	939,000			939,000				
2020	1,024,000			1,024,000	2020	939,000			939,000				
2021	1,024,000			1,024,000	2021	939,000			939,000				
RG	Jan 1	Quota Increase	Increase Date	<b>Dec 31</b>	SWG	Jan 1	Quota Increase	Increase Date	<b>Dec 31</b>				
2009*	$5,750,000^{1}$			5,750,000	2009*	$410,000^{1}$			410,000				
2010	5,750,000			5,750,000	2010	410,000			410,000				
2011	4,320,000	910,000	11/2	5,230,000	2011	410,000			410,000				
2012	5,370,000			5,370,000	2012	410,000	99,000	1/30	509,000				
2013	5,530,000			5,530,000	2013	518,000			518,000				
2014	5,630,000			5,630,000	2014	523,000			523,000				
2015	5,720,000			5,720,000	2015	525,000			525,000				
2016	5,720,000	2,060,000	10/12	7,780,000	2016	525,000			525,000				
2017	7,780,000			7,780,000	2017	525,000			525,000				
2018	7,780,000			7,780,000	2018	525,000			525,000				
2019	3,000,000			3,000,000	2019	525,000			525,000				
2020	3,000,000			3,000,000	2020	525,000			525,000				
2021	3,000,000	0		3,000,000	2021	525,000			525,000				
TF	Jan 1	Quota Increase	Increase Date	Dec 31									
2009*	440,000			440,000									
2010	440,000			440,000									
2011	440,000	1.42.000	1/20	440,000	* Indica	tes the quota in	n the year pric	or to the GT-II	FO Program.				
2012	440,000	142,000	1/30	582,000		al shallow-wat							
2013	582,000			582,000		shallow-water							
2014	582,000			582,000	was 7.48 mp in 2009. In this table, the gag and red grouper individual quotas are listed, while the remainder of the aggregate quota is listed as the SWG quota.								
2015	582,000			582,000									
2016	582,000			582,000									
2017	582,000			582,000									
2018	582,000			582,000									
2019	582,000 582,000			582,000									
2020				582,000 582,000									
2021	582,000			582,000									

Table 13: IFQ commercial quota by year

The percentage of the quota landed can be influenced by environmental disasters such as hurricanes, although effects may be variable across regions, and other natural events (e.g., red tide). The percentage of the program landings are largely driven by the share categories with larger quotas (i.e., DWG and RG). Between 39-92% of the program's quota is landed annually, with the lowest years occurring in 2010, 2017, and 2018 (Table 14). The lower percentage of quota landed in 2010 was due to the impact of the Deepwater Horizon (DWH) oil spill that closed off large areas to fishing (Appendix 2). The lower program landings in 2017 and 2018's are directly related to the large RG quota and proportionally smaller percentage of quota landed. The RG share category consistently has the largest quota each year,

with fishermen landing 43-98% of the quota throughout the years. The years with the lowest utilization of the quota corresponded with the years with considerably greater quotas (7.78 mp). From 2011 to 2016, 4.5-5.5 mp of quota were landed, regardless of the increased quota in 2016. Landings decreased in 2017 to 3.3 mp despite a 7.78 mp quota, and have since been under a 3 mp quota. Decreased landings were likely related to decreases in stock size due to environmental conditions and were not caused by the IFQ program's management. Even with a consistent DWG quota since 2016, the percentage of quota landed is between 78% - 93% of the quota. The greatest landings occurred in 2014 (1.05 mp) with a quota of 1.110 mp. Despite an increased quota from 2015 onward (0.939 mp), the percentage of GG quota landed has been decreased from 2017-2020, with only an increased in landings in 2021. SWG landings have also decreased in recent years despite having a consistent quota of 0.525 mp since 2015. TF quota has been consistent since 2012 at 0.582 mp, but landings have varied between 60% - 92% of the quota.

By share category, monthly landings average between 2% to 25%, indicating a year round fishery for all categories (<u>Appendix 5</u>). Peak monthly landings for GG and RG typically occur in early spring from February through May. Both DWG and SWG landings peaked in late spring and summer between May and August. TF landings were generally greater in October. All share categories saw increased landings in December, as participants seek to use allocation before it expires for the year. In 2020, landings were decreased in April and May as a result of the pandemic.

	Annual landings				
DWG	Landings	% Quota	GG	Landings	% Quota
2010	624,762	61%	2010	493,938	35%
2011	779,519	76%	2011	320,137	74%
2012	963,835	86%	2012	525,066	93%
2013	912,923	82%	2013	579,664	82%
2014	1,048,142	94%	2014	689,513	83%
2015	911,339	83%	2015	554,941	59%
2016	867,040	85%	2016	777,190	83%
2017	821,899	80%	2017	443,156	47%
2018	817,452	80%	2018	451,914	48%
2019	951,729	93%	2019	469,875	50%
2020	803,760	78%	2020	468,562	50%
2021	800,288	78%	2021	628,496	67%
RG	Landings	% Quota	SWG	Landings	% Quota
2010	2,913,858	51%	2010	158,234	39%
2011	4,782,194	91%	2011	186,235	45%
2012	5,217,205	97%	2012	300,367	59%
2013	4,594,672	83%	2013	307,846	59%
2014	5,497,993	98%	2014	263,251	50%
2015	4,784,992	84%	2015	282,338	54%
2016	4,631,388	60%	2016	358,163	68%
2017	3,377,210	43%	2017	239,046	46%
2018	2,404,300	31%	2018	224,161	43%
2019	2,099,186	70%	2019	185,014	35%
2020	2,375,474	79%	2020	165,072	31%
2021	2,884,527	96%	2021	187,386	36%
TF	Landings	% Quota	All	Landings	% Quota
2010	249,708	57%	2010	4,440,500	49%
2011	386,134	88%	2011	6,454,219	86%
2012	451,121	78%	2012	7,457,594	91%
2013	440,091	76%	2013	6,835,196	81%
2014	517,268	89%	2014	8,016,167	92%
2015	537,512	92%	2015	7,071,122	80%
2016	429,003	74%	2016	7,062,784	65%
2017	484,895	83%	2017	5,366,206	49%
2018	386,138	66%	2018	4,283,965	39%
2019	422,926	73%	2019	4,128,730	68%
2020	0 10 0 1 1	6/10/.	2020	A 161 717	69%
2020 2021	348,844 484,032	60% 83%	2020 2021	4,161,712 4,984,729	82%

Table 14: Annual landings

#### Landings by Species

Three of the share categories (DWG, SWG, and TF) contain multiple species. One species within each of these categories comprises the majority of the landings for that share category (Table 15; Figure 1). Landings may be strongly influenced by social and economic factors such as share price, allocation price, allocation availability, market desirability, and ex-vessel price for these species within the IFQ program. All of the species in a category use the same shares and allocation, although landings and exvessel prices may differ among these species. Differences in ex-vessel price among species within the same share category may influence the fishing behavior as fishermen target species that receive a higher

ex-vessel price. While this may occur in non-catch share fisheries, this behavior may be magnified due to the allocation costs and availability. If a fisherman has limited allocation available, they may change effort to harvest the fish with a higher ex-vessel value to maximize their economic benefits.

#### **DWG** species


The DWG share category contains four species: snowy grouper, speckled hind, warsaw grouper, and yellowedge grouper. Yellowedge grouper accounted for 70-82% of the DWG landings, followed by snowy grouper (9-17%; Table 15; Figure 1). Both warsaw grouper and speckled hind landings were typically less than 10% each year. Warsaw grouper landings have been decreasing since 2013, which was the year landings for Warsaw grouper were highest.

#### SWG species

The SWG share category contains four species: black grouper, scamp, yellowfin grouper, and yellowmouth grouper. Scamp accounted for 70-85% of the SWG landings, followed by black grouper (11-26%). Both yellowfin grouper and yellowmouth grouper are each less than 1% of the landings (Table 15; Figure 1). The landings of species within SWG have changed with the start of the GT-IFQ program, with an increased proportion of scamp landings and decreased proportion of black grouper and yellowfin grouper landings. Yellowfin grouper landings pre-IFQ consisted of 2% of the SWG landings, but decreased to less than 1% during the GT-IFQ years. Black grouper landings pre-IFQ made up 36% of the SWG landings, but decreased at the start of the GT-IFQ program to represent only 12%. The black grouper landings then increased to 26% in 2014 and 23% in 2015, but have since represented between 15% and 20% in more recent years.

#### TF species

The TF share category contains three species: golden tilefish, blueline tilefish, and goldface tilefish. During the program, golden tilefish accounted for 70-90% of the TF landings, followed by blueline tilefish (9-30%) and goldface tilefish (<1% to 7%; Table 15; Figure 1). The landings of species within TF have changed with the start of the GT-IFQ program. Prior to the GT-IFQ program, golden tilefish comprised 74% of the TF landings, but increased to 84% in the first year of the GT-IFQ program. Thereafter, golden tilefish landings continued to comprise an increasing proportion of the TF landings until 2019 when landings returned to their pre-IFQ levels. In contrast, blueline tilefish composed 26% of the TF landings before the GT-IFQ program began, but then dropped to 9% at the start of the program. Blueline tilefish did not comprise more than 18% of the TF landings once the program began, but like golden tilefish, blueline tilefish also returned to pre-IFQ levels in 2019 and has remained there since. Goldface tilefish in the first year of the GT-IFQ program comprised 7% of the TF landings, but in the following years decreased considerably and continues to account for less than 1% of the TF landings.



Share Cat.	8	D	WG		GG	RG		SV	VG			TF	
Species	Snowy grouper	Speckled hind	Warsaw grouper	Yellowedge grouper	Gag	Red grouper	Black grouper	Scamp	Yellowfi n grouper	Yellow mouth grouper	Blueline tilefish	Golden tilefish	Goldface tilefish <sup>2</sup>
Pre-IFQ <sup>1</sup>	161,175	47,913	74,476	792,055	952,555	3,910,083	156,778	266,193	10,122	466	123,072	352,080	NA
2010	90,180	15,359	56,496	443,887	496,826	2,910,970	20,905	153,533	1,394	85	22,555	209,641	16,559
2011	132,971	24,925	61,661	558,908	318,663	4,783,668	34,970	149,286	945	548	44,841	341,260	33
2012	168,759	43,344	86,212	667,785	523,138	5,219,133	47,537	249,320	739	506	82,025	366,763	2,333
2013	108,689	34,922	103,074	673,349	575,335	4,599,001	56,750	242,170	856	959	49,454	383,132	7,505
2014	159,857	72,241	75,426	773,621	586,377	5,601,905	60,555	167,840	568	1,285	74,221	442,992	55
2015	108,980	55,550	55,502	735,218	542,774	4,797,159	54,831	182,108	442	1,046	53,681	483,779	35
2016	94,830	41,151	44,635	709,349	910,996	4,497,582	48,788	284,987	709	754	47,898	380,125	212
2017	87,587	51,061	44,362	677,926	492,095	3,328,271	37,032	162,435	152	390	61,808	423,054	33
2018	89,416	60,618	35,976	677,310	492,934	2,363,280	34,806	142,787	440	260	66,936	318,133	1,069
2019	91,430	67,082	33,590	804,558	532,015	2,037,046	25,634	113,908	377	164	127,162	295,691	73
2020	99,072	36,187	22,707	665,412	475,714	2,368,322	25,345	118,784	66	259	99,688	246,168	2,988
2021	91,258	41,428	17,419	681,667	562,849	2,950,174	25,890	129,792	47	173	123,191	355,304	5,537

Table 15: Landings by species and year

<sup>1</sup> Pre-IFQ data were averaged over three years: 2007-2009.
<sup>2</sup> Goldface tilefish were grouped with unclassified tilefish prior to the start of the GT-IFQ program.
<sup>3</sup> Pounds are by species and not the share category the species of landing.

Multi-use for gag and red grouper species

	allocation
GGM	RGM
8%	4%
8%	NA
8%	NA
70%	NA
47%	NA
33%	4.8%
33%	4.8%
43.6%	3.5%
43.6%	3.5%
17%	9.2%
17%	9.2%
17%	9.2%
	8% 8% 8% 70% 47% 33% 33% 43.6% 43.6% 17% 17%

Table 16. Multi use allocation

A portion of the gag or red grouper allocation may be reserved each year for multi-use allocation, which may be used to land either gag or red grouper. The multi-use provision is to ensure that there may be allocation to use if either gag or red grouper are landed as incidental catch. The percentage of multi-use may change each year and may even be zero (Table 16). Since 2013, the red grouper multi-use (RGM) and gag multiuse (GGM) allocation was based on formulas (see below) using the commercial quota and the annual catch limits for gag and red grouper. If either stock is under a rebuilding plan, the percentage of the other species multi-use allocation will equal zero. Multi-use allocation cannot be used until all the species-specific allocation has been landed or transferred,

including allocation in shareholder and all associated vessel(s) accounts. For example, gag may not be landed under GGM or RGM until there is no GG allocation remaining in the shareholder and associated vessel(s) accounts. Similarly, multi-use allocation may only be transferred after landing or transferring all the corresponding species-specific allocation in the shareholder and associated vessel(s) accounts.

$$RGM \ allocation = 100 * \frac{(Gag \ ACL - Gag \ Commercial \ Quota)}{Red \ Grouper \ Commercial \ Quota}$$

$$GGM allocation = 100 * \frac{(Red Grouper ACL - Red Grouper Commercial Quota)}{Gag Commercial Quota}$$

There was no RGM allocation from 2011-2014 because gag was under a rebuilding plan. Since 2017, multi-use has been set at 43.6% GGM and 3.5% RGM, as the buffers between the ACL and quota for both species have remained constant. The majority of RGM and GGM multi-use allocation was used typically to harvest gag (Table 17). In 2020, the majority of RGM multi-use allocation was used to harvest red grouper, and in 2021, both RGM and GGM multi-use allocation were predominantly used to harvest red grouper.

Year	RG	U	GG	M
rear	Red Grouper	Gag	Red Grouper	Gag
2010	73% (13,833 lb)	27% (5,091 lb)	28% (2,203 lb)	72% (5,654 lb)
2011	NA	NA	14% (1,474 lb)	86% (8,700 lb)
2012	NA	NA	6% (1,928 lb)	94% (32,230 lb)
2013	NA	NA	1% (4,329 lb)	99% (376,528 lb)
2014	NA	NA	35% (103,151 lb)	65% (188,950 lb)
2015	82% (98,466 lb)	18% (20,998 lb)	26% (33,165 lb)	74% (92,661 lb)
2016	8% (11,441 lb)	92% (135,471 lb)	1% (1,665 lb)	99% (220,088 lb)
2017	11% (6,145 lb)	89% (51,137 lb)	2% (2,198 lb)	98% (116,163 lb)
2018	4% (1,656 lb)	96% (41,364 lb)	0.3% (344 lb)	99.7% (114,984 lb)
2019	38% (43,610 lb)	62% (71,349 lb)	19% (9,209 lb)	81% (39,266 lb)
2020	74% (85,218lb)	27% (30,677 lb)	46% (23,525 lb)	54% (27,701 lb)
2021	96% (235,454 lb)	4% (9,272 lb)	77% (74,919 lb)	23% (22,200 lb)

#### Table 17: Percentage of multi-use landings

#### **Remaining Allocation and Overage Measure**

At the end of each year on December 31, any remaining allocation in an account expires. Over 69% of the accounts have remaining allocation in at least one share category (Table 17). Within a share category, the percentage of accounts with remaining allocation is never less than 39% and as great as 90%. In recent years, the percentage of accounts with remaining allocation have decreased compared to the early years of the program (Table 18). By share category, roughly half of these accounts were inactive. The majority of remaining pounds, however, were held by active accounts.

DWG	Acct	lb	Inact. lb	Inact. Acct	GG	Acct	lb	Inact. lb	Inact. Acct
2010	390 (76%)	395,615	64,601	169	2010	706 (89%)	916,034	114,277	257
2011	283 (54%)	240,703	15,731	140	2011	531 (69%)	109,780	17,991	259
2012	235 (47%)	163,126	11,177	103	2012	425 (57%)	41,981	11,808	221
2013	253 (54%)	205,088	14,192	115	2013	467 (65%)	128,169	21,471	217
2014	195 (43%)	62,405	5,406	103	2014	418 (58%)	145,486	17,536	196
2015	238 (51%)	189,347	8,411	109	2015	519 (69%)	384,151	51,875	232
2016	228 (49%)	156,744	11,209	107	2016	463 (62%)	162,234	37,993	220
2017	250 (55%)	202,191	24,698	131	2017	556 (72%)	495,728	72,492	250
2018	264 (55%)	206,622	44,402	139	2018	573 (76%)	487,166	100,678	262
2019	202 (45%)	71,973	9,766	108	2019	503 (70%)	467,614	80,922	224
2020	256 (55%)	220,000	27,248	119	2020	503 (68%)	468,807	61,945	221
2021	207 (46%)	446,382	34,440	111	2021	434 (60%)	617,434	106,998	212
RG	Acct	lb	Inact. lb	Inact. Acct	SWG	Acct	lb	Inact. lb	Inact. Acct
2010	666 (90%)	2,835,405	343,665	235	2010	630 (83%)	251,503	33,961	277
2011	501 (68%)	448,926	64,216	184	2011	513 (68%)	223,743	22,514	261
2012	356 (50%)	152,249	38,159	167	2012	441 (60%)	208,450	22,711	220
2013	441 (65%)	935,526	62,605	171	2013	493 (68%)	210,129	20,999	233
2014	317 (46%)	132,651	46,907	153	2014	461 (64%)	259,689	20,948	208
2015	478 (67%)	935,240	58,501	190	2015	499 (67%)	242,619	26,732	223
2016	582 (80%)	3,148,565	194,289	191	2016	476 (64%)	166,837	25,570	212
2017	571 (76%)	4,403,288	463,690	221	2017	538 (72%)	285,942	50,372	243
2018	607 (80%)	5,376,103	681,565	242	2018	536 (72%)	300,925	59,759	252
2019	478 (70%)	898,038	187,090	203	2019	485 (70%)	337,610	52,680	213
2020	443 (64%)	621,566	126,335	199	2020	483 (68%)	358,547	58,045	215
2021	309 (45%)	222,544	83,018	163	2021	447 (64%)	670,472	108,032	202
TF	Acct	lb	Inact. lb	Inact. Acct	ALL	Acct	lb	Inact. lb	Inact. Acct
2010	219 (73%)	190,857	59,798	101	2010	750 (92%)	4,589,414	453,584	245
2011	142 (46%)	53,920	5,343	77	2011	667 (80%)	1,077,088	96,463	260
2012	130 (45%)	130,903	5,951	59	2012	596 (73%)	696,709	75,785	254
2013	148 (52%)	141,968	11,614	70	2013	608 (77%)	1,620,880	110,513	244
2014	113 (41%)	64,855	2,380	54	2014	561 (71%)	665,086	85,800	232
2015	122 (43%)	44,613	4,410	64	2015	635 (76%)	1,795,970	109,014	251
2016	121 (44%)	153,031	14,684	61	2016	692 (82%)	3,787,411	238,076	251
2017	133 (50%)	97,149	10,317	76	2017	695 (80%)	5,484,298	529,912	276
2018	157 (55%)	195,955	43,906	82	2018	723 (82%)	6,566,771	861,310	298
2019	128 (46%)	158,757	5,989	70	2019	628 (77%)	1,933,992	300,076	252
2020	159 (55%)	232,923	18,187	66	2020	632 (76%)	1,901,837	259,540	259
2021	113 (39%)	195,334	6,280	52	2021	572 (69%)	2,152,166	284,452	252

Table 18: Number of accounts with remaining allocation and volume by activity status

An overage flexibility measure allows accounts that hold shares to land in excess of their remaining allocation once per category per year. This overage measure allows one of the shareholder's vessels to land 10% more allocation for that category than was on the vessel at that point in time. Such overages are anticipated to occur because it is difficult to accurately estimate the weight of fish at sea. Overages typically occur late in the year, as there must be no allocation in the shareholder or any associated vessel accounts for the overage measure to take effect, but may occur at any point in time. All overages are deducted from the shareholder's allocation in the following year. The shareholder is prevented from transferring shares equal to the overage.

The total amount of landings from overages is small, less than 0.05% each year (Table 19). By share category, only a small number of accounts (< 30) utilized the overage provision. Average overages per share category are low (between 2 and 1,139 lb), while median values were typically smaller (between 1 and 105 lb).

DWG	Acct	lb (gw)	Average lb	Median lb	GG	Acct	lb (gw)	Average lb	Median lb
2010	2	31	16	16	2010	5	372	74	49
2011	8	260	33	22	2011	20	206	10	3
2012	2	88	44	44	2012	24	263	11	5
2013	4	30	8	5	2013	9	79	9	4
2014	5	491	98	4	2014	3	14	5	4
2015	4	325	81	57	2015	4	25	6	6
2016	2	46	23	23	2016	7	277	40	15
2017	4	74	19	21	2017	4	27	7	4
2018	4	93	23	23	2018	7	33	5	1
2019	4	206	52	11	2019	4	16	4	4
2020	5	223	45	25	2020	2	162	81	81
2021	1	65	65	65	2021	1	8	8	8
RG	Acct	lb (gw)	Average lb	Median lb	SWG	Acct	lb (gw)	Average lb	Median lb
2010	14	52	52	26	2010	0	0	0	0
2011	13	1,139	1,139	31	2011	8	253	32	16
2012	9	236	236	6	2012	7	69	10	6
2013	4	85	85	8	2013	6	113	19	2
2014	6	833	833	79	2014	4	43	11	3
2015	6	688	688	41	2015	2	8	4	4
2016	1	82	82	82	2016	3	25	8	10
2017	3	318	106	48	2017	5	31	6	8
2018	3	149	50	9	2018	1	2	2	2
2019	7	675	96	12	2019	1	12	12	12
2020	7	854	122	46	2020	1	12	12	12
2021	7	178	25	1	2021	1	38	38	38
TF	Acct	lb (gw)	Average lb	Median lb	ALL	Acct	lb (gw)	Average lb	Median lb
2010	0	0	0	0	2010	9	455	51	26
2011	3	22	7	7	2011	48	1,880	39	10
2012	0	0	0	0	2012	33	656	20	10
2013	3	17	6	4	2013	23	324	14	4
2014	3	127	42	32	2014	19	1,508	79	30
2015	2	209	105	105	2015	16	1,255	78	35
2016	0	0	0	0	2016	12	430	36	12
2017 2018	0	0 53	0 27	0 27	2017 2018	14 14	450	32 24	14 8
2018 2019	2 1	13	13	13		14	330 922	24 71	8
2019 2020		57	13	5	2019 2020			87	
2020	3	45	23	2	2020	15 9	1,308 334	87	46
2021	2	43	23	Z	2021	9	334	57	4

Table 19: Number of accounts with overages and associated volume

## **Effort and Discards**

#### Effort

Effort for all trips landing GT-IFQ species was determined using the Southeast Fisheries Science Center's (SEFSC) coastal logbook records, which were available for 2007-2020<sup>6</sup>. SEFSC coastal logbook data for 2021 were not available in time for release of this report. The number of trips, average trip length, average landings of GT-IFQ species per trip, and average total landings per trip are analyzed by gear (Table 20). Note that values are not adjusted for misidentified species (e.g., gag as black grouper). Vertical line (VL) gear included all types of vertical gear (e.g., hand lines, bandit reels, hook and line, etc.), as well as miscellaneous gear (e.g., spearfishing). The longline gear category (LL) does not include any other gear. Differences in effort may be influenced by gear and region. Due to the multispecies nature of the reef fish fishery, effort data on a share category may also be influenced by the targeted species for each trip. This information was not utilized, as the analysis was by share category and not by species.

The number of trips taken to harvest GT-IFQ species were consistently greater on trips using VL gear than LL gear (Table 20 and Table 21). The average number of trips with VL gear were less than pre-IFQ years, yet remained consistent between 3,000 and 4,500 trips/year. In 2020 and 2021, the number of trips decreased to around 3,000 trips, which is likely in response to the pandemic. The average length of trips with VL gear remained consistent both pre-IFQ and post-IFQ, around 4 days. The average pounds of GT-IFQ species decreased in 2016 for trips with VL gear from between 550-700 lb/trip to 300-505 lb/trip, which coincided with a decrease in average pounds of RG caught per trip. Average total landings per trip has consistently been between 1,600 and 2,000 lb/trip since the GT-IFQ program has been implemented.

On average, 650-820 trips are taken each year using LL gear. This is decreased from pre-IFQ years where more than 1,000 GT trips were taken per year. Trip length has remained consistent pre- and post-IFQ near 10-12 days. The average pounds of GT-IFQ species landed per trip has been generally greater post-IFQ (3,600 - 7,000 lb/trip) than pre-IFQ (3,600 lb/trip) as have total landings per trip (pre-IFQ = 4,000 lb/trip vs post-IFQ 4,500 - 7,600 lb/trip). In more recent years, however, there has been fewer average pounds per trip, which may be due to the pandemic and increased quota for the RS-FIQ program. The majority of the catch by weight on LL gear trips is composed of GT-IFQ species.

Differences in pre-IFQ to post-IFQ may be influenced by factors both directly and indirectly related to the GT-IFQ program, such as elimination of trip limits and short fishing seasons, increases in quota, changes in fishermen targeting behavior, and regulations on other reef fish species.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> SEFSC Coastal Logbooks accessed 9/13/2022

1 abie 20:	ventical	inte enort	(number o	1 /	resting GI-IFQ species					
DWG	Trips	Avg. days/trip	Avg. lb/trip	Avg. Total Landing lb/trip	GG	Trips	Avg. days/trip	Avg. lb/trip	Avg. Total Landing lb/trip	
Pre-IFQ	477	6.0	286	3,118	Pre-IFQ	3,348	4.4	202	1,358	
2010	563	5.8	196	3,995	2010	2,711	4.7	139	1,575	
2011	624	6.1	211	4,091	2011	2,143	4.6	109	2,002	
2012	839	6.5	231	3,825	2012	2,664	4.4	146	1,955	
2013	697	6.1	174	3,964	2013	2,460	4.7	153	1,878	
2014	711	5.7	162	4,257	2014	2,698	4.6	131	1,835	
2015	565	5.9	157	4,201	2015	2,287	4.3	122	1,727	
2016	549	6.1	126	4,415	2016	2,626	4.3	192	1,600	
2017	425	6.1	139	4,653	2017	2,234	4.2	137	1,541	
2018	364	6.2	131	4,489	2018	2,018	4.0	154	1,579	
2019	372	5.7	156	3,941	2019	2,067	3.7	164	1,690	
2020	270	5.1	129	4,139	2020	1,940	3.5	147	1,727	
2021	254	5.0	156	5,437	2021	1,919	3.8	164	1,976	
RG	Trips	Avg. days/trip	Avg. lb/trip	Avg. Total Landing lb/trip	SWG	Trips	Avg. days/trip	Avg. lb/trip	Avg. Total Landing lb/trip	
Pre-IFQ	4,222	4.3	466	1,166	Pre-IFQ	2,648	5.0	94	2,152	
2010	3,183	4.7	488	1,342	2010	1,773	5.6	65	2,400	
2010	3,201	4.3	520	1,648	2010	1,974	5.2	53	2,562	
2011	3,407	4.4	633	1,749	2011	2,380	5.5	76	2,581	
2012	3,186	4.4	465	1,492	2012	1,943	5.7	78	2,615	
2013	3,482	4.3	560	1,459	2013	2,000	5.4	62	2,515	
2015	3,387	4.1	547	1,330	2015	1,807	5.1	62	2,585	
2016	3,234	4.1	385	1,243	2016	2,043	5.3	79	2,600	
2017	2,899	4.1	350	1,214	2017	1,651	5.2	56	2,663	
2018	2,636	3.8	249	1,197	2018	1,605	4.9	51	2,477	
2019	2,619	3.5	220	1,210	2019	1,540	4.6	45	2,612	
2020	2,516	3.4	284	1,247	2020	1,460	4.2	44	2,599	
2021	2,372	3.6	427	1,470	2021	1,422	4.4	56	3,032	
TF	Trips	Avg. days/trip	Avg. lb/trip	Avg. Total Landing lb/trip	ALL	Trips	Avg. days/trip	Avg. lb/trip	Avg. Total Landing lb/trip	
Pre-IFQ	201	5.8	79	3,049	Pre-IFQ	5,484	4.2	556	1,480	
~	159		72		2010					
2010 2011	206	6.3 5.8	52	3,357 3,735	2010 2011	3,898 3,935	4.0	545	1,667 1,953	
2011	200	6.5	175	3,686	2011	4,216	4.4	703	2,004	
2012 2013	207	5.9	89	2,908	2012	3,903	4.3	551	1,872	
2013	243	5.0	145	2,908	2013	4,351	4.4	593	1,872	
2014	243	4.9	139	2,635	2014	4,306	4.0	548	1,742	
2015	149	5.3	167	2,780	2015	4,246	4.1	473	1,707	
2010	154	5.3	65	2,614	2010	3,883	4.0	382	1,658	
2017	134	5.1	113	2,814	2017	3,485	3.8	319	1,638	
2010	192	5.2	201	2,041	2010	3,462	3.5	312	1,662	
2019	148	4.2	131	1,924	2019	3,192	3.4	350	1,716	
2020	155	4.5	314	2,755	2020	2,960	3.6	505	2,070	
2021	1. 0000			-,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	2021	2,500			2,070	

Table 20: Vertical line<sup>1</sup> effort (number of trips) harvesting GT-IFQ species

Data from the SEFSC Coastal Logbook records were available as of 9/13/2022 and may not contain complete 2021 data. Pre-IFQ data are the average from 2007-2009. The total number of trips maybe be less than the sum across gear, because some vessels may use multiple gear types.

<sup>1</sup>Vertical line includes spearfishing, buoy, and other gear types.

	Longine			narvesting G1-II	Q species				
DWG	Trips	Avg.	Avg.	Avg. Total	GG	Trips	Avg.	Avg.	Avg. Total
	-	days/trip	lb/trip	Landing lb/trip		-	days/trip	lb/trip	Landing lb/trip
Pre-IFQ	443	10.0	2,151	4,592	Pre-IFQ	664	10.4	410	4,042
2010	243	10.5	2,025	4,798	2010	348	10.8	293	4,969
2011	296	10.4	2,131	6,443	2011	363	10.5	208	6,732
2012	341	9.9	2,131	6,456	2012	408	9.7	301	7,274
2013	336	10.9	2,307	7,190	2013	481	10.3	365	6,847
2014	348	11.6	2,513	7,740	2014	526	11.1	365	7,644
2015	385	12.3	2,175	6,923	2015	563	11.8	421	6,773
2016	436	12.1	1,794	6,799	2016	650	11.5	589	6,580
2017	406	12.5	1,871	5,847	2017	584	12.3	282	5,441
2018	365	12.3	2,145	5,544	2018	517	12.1	311	4,982
2019	370	12.1	2,366	5,382	2019	465	11.9	360	4,875
2020	370	10.6	2,020	4,718	2020	482	10.5	346	4,816
2021	354	11.0	2,021	5,305	2021	525	10.3	371	5,489
RG	Trips	Avg. days/trip	Avg. lb/trip	Avg. Total Landing lb/trip	SWG	Trips	Avg. days/trip	Avg. lb/trip	Avg. Total Landing lb/trip
Dro IEO	778	10.0	2,502	3,772	Pre-IFQ	680	10.3	280	4,055
Pre-IFQ					~				
2010	342	10.8	3,673	4,848	2010	303	10.7	250	4,954
2011	556	10.2	5,253	6,346	2011	447	10.4	184	6,591
2012 2013	508 546	9.4 10.3	5,483 5,269	6,837	2012 2013	459 490	9.9 10.7	263 288	6,985
2013	584	10.3	5,719	6,723 7,259	2013	490	11.3	193	7,156
2014 2015	571	11.5	4,681	6,433	2014 2015	538	11.5	206	7,848 6,801
2013	665	11.5	4,081	6,207	2015	605	11.6	200	6,827
2010	621	11.8	3,521	5,021	2010	561	12.5	180	5,515
2017	541	11.8	2,919	4,683	2017	524	12.3	168	5,173
2010	516	11.6	2,579	4,489	2010	436	12.1	156	5,065
2019	550	10.0	2,689	4,483	2020	443	10.7	170	4,863
2021	533	10.1	3,278	5,298	2021	458	10.6	193	5,681
		Avg.	Avg.	Avg. Total			Avg.	Avg.	Avg. Total
TF	Trips	days/trip	lb/trip	Landing lb/trip	ALL	Trips	days/trip	lb/trip	Landing lb/trip
Pre-IFQ	289	10.2	1,606	4,875	Pre-IFQ	1,063	9.9	3,638	4,035
2010	152	9.6	1,600	4,859	2010	489	10.3	4,436	4,868
2011	181	10.3	2,028	6,524	2011	681	10.1	5,986	6,341
2012	225	9.8	1,634	6,183	2012	660	9.4	6,247	6,592
2013	178	11.2	2,183	7,345	2013	684	10.5	6,370	6,885
2014	193	12.1	3,156	9,093	2014	722	10.9	7,078	7,673
2015	227	12.3	2,183	7,272	2015	730	11.6	5,964	6,702
2016	196	12.7	1,930	6,938	2016	821	11.4	5,767	6,373
2017	237	12.6	1,937	6,042	2017	781	11.9	4,701	5,332
2018	211	12.6	1,661	6,018	2018	705	11.9	4,200	4,998
2019	273	12.5	1,296	5,629	2019	706	11.7	3,960	4,923
2020	292	10.7	1,120	4,784	2020	763	10.1	3,664	4,506
2021	303	11.0	1,285	5,323	2021	738	10.2	4,248	5,305

Table 21: Longline effort (number of trips) harvesting GT-IFQ species

Data from the SEFSC Coastal Logbook records were available as of 9/13/2022 and may not contain complete 2021 data. Pre-IFQ data are the average from 2007-2009. The total number of trips maybe be less than the sum across gear, because some vessels may use multiple gear types.

The GT-IFQ species are part of the reef fish complex that contains both IFQ and non-IFQ species. Vessels typically harvest both IFQ, including red snapper, and non-IFQ species on the same trip. The RS-IFQ and GT-IFQ programs eliminated the mini seasons (red snapper) and derby fishing conditions, as well as the trip limits associated with grouper and tilefish species. Gag continues to make up 25% or less

of the total catch for trips using either VL or LL gear, as it did pre-IFQ (Table 22). Red grouper caught on VL trips pre-IFQ was bimodal in relation to total catch, either being 25% or less of the catch landed or between 76-100% of the landed catch. This trend continued after the IFQ program. For trips using LL gear, red grouper generally was 76-100% of the total catch landed both pre- and post-IFQ. In recent years (2018-2021), there is a slight shift towards red grouper making up less than 76% of the landed catch. This shift is due to the lower quota for red group and catchability.

Floot		% of gag	to all reef	fish landed	ł	% of red grouper to all reef fish landed				
Fleet	Year	0-25%	26-50%	51-75%	76-100%	Year	0-25%	26-50%	51-75%	76-100%
	Pre-IFQ	60.8	16.4	10.2	12.5	Pre-IFQ	33.7	12.5	14.2	39.7
	2010	74.3	14	6.6	5.1	2010	42.9	14.4	14.5	28.3
	2011	83.8	8.1	4.4	3.6	2011	48.4	12.8	14.5	24.3
	2012	81.5	9.9	4.9	3.6	2012	44.6	15.7	16.2	23.5
ne	2013	78.7	10.3	6.5	4.5	2013	42.4	18.5	14.4	24.7
Vertical Line <sup>1</sup>	2014	81.2	9.2	4.6	5	2014	40.7	16	12.8	30.5
cal	2015	80.2	8.9	4.2	6.6	2015	37.6	15.8	10.2	36.4
Ē	2016	74.6	13.5	6.5	5.4	2016	43.8	16.5	13.7	25.9
Ve	2017	78	14.1	4.8	3	2017	43.2	16.3	13.6	27
	2018	77.5	13	5.7	3.8	2018	51.7	18.2	12.9	17.1
	2019	78.2	14.8	4.6	2.4	2019	55.6	18.3	9.8	16.3
	2020	78.7	11.9	5.3	4.2	2020	52.1	19.7	11.9	16.3
	2021	82.5	9.9	3.9	3.8	2021	44.9	19.2	15.4	20.5
	Pre-IFQ	88.1	9.8	1.6	0.5	Pre-IFQ	13.4	13.3	19.5	53.7
	2010	97.1	2.6	0.3	0	2010	10.5	8.2	17.5	63.7
	2011	99.4	0.6	0	0	2011	5.2	7.4	11	76.4
	2012	98.8	1.2	0	0	2012	6.7	8.9	14.4	70.1
e	2013	97.9	2.1	0	0	2013	6	7.5	18.3	68.1
Line	2014	97.3	2.7	0	0	2014	7.9	6.8	15.4	69.9
<b></b>	2015	93.6	6.4	0	0	2015	8.8	14.7	17.7	58.8
Long	2016	89.7	9.5	0.8	0	2016	7.4	10.7	23.9	58
-	2017	96.9	3.1	0	0	2017	10.8	9.7	25.9	53.6
	2018	95.2	4.6	0.2	0	2018	13.1	18.5	22.2	46.2
	2019	93.8	5.4	0.9	0	2019	17.4	20.9	25.2	36.4
	2020	92.3	7.7	0	0	2020	13.8	21.1	22.5	42.5
	2021	94.1	5.5	0.4	0	2021	13.9	18.6	26.8	40.7

Table 22:	Percentage of	gag and red	grouper 1	pounds landed to	o total reef fish	pounds landed
		0.0	8			

Data from the SEFSC Coastal Logbook records were available as of 9/13/2022 and may not contain complete 2021 data. Pre-IFQ data are the average from 2007-2009.

<sup>1</sup>Vertical line includes spearfishing, buoy, and other gear types.

#### **Discards**

Data from the SEFSC reef fish observer program (RFOP) were used to evaluate changes in GT-IFQ species discards. Data were used from only those trips selected as part of the normal observer selection process; therefore, no special project trips were included. Data from the RFOP were categorized by gear: longline (LL) and vertical line (VL; primarily hand lines and bandit reels, but also includes buoy and spearfishing effort). The number of RFOP trips sampled has been variable over time and generally has been decreasing in number in the more recent years of the program compared to the initial years (Table 23). A larger percentage of RFOP coverage shifted towards vessels using LL gear beginning in 2009 and coverage levels have fluctuated between gear every year since. Insufficient data were available to include 2020 in this report due to the pandemic, but sample sizes improved in 2021.

RFOP observers record disposition status as: landed/kept, discarded alive, discarded dead, and unknown. These disposition statuses were used to calculate discard ratios by gear and region. The discard ratio is the number of discarded fish for each fish landed. Values greater than one indicated that more fish are being discarded than kept. Discard ratios may be influenced by the amount of allocation available to the observed vessels.

IFQ species may be discarded due to the lack of allocation or fish that are below the minimum size limit. Five species in the GT-IFQ program have minimum size limits: gag, red grouper, black grouper, scamp, and yellowfin grouper. Due to limited sample sizes, this report concentrates on only gag and red grouper discards through the RFOP. From 2007 through 2011, the minimum size limit for gag was 24 inches total length (TL). Starting in 2012, the minimum size limit was reduced to 22 inches TL, but was increased to 24 inches TL again in 2018 (Appendix 3.1). In 2009 and prior to the start of the GT-IFQ program, the red grouper minimum size limit changed from 20 inches TL to 18 inches TL (Appendix 3.2).

Gag and red grouper were caught on the 35% or more of the trips sampled by the RFOP observers each year. Typically, a higher number of observed trips occurred on vessels fishing with VL gear rather than LL gear. Gag and red grouper were observed on 60% or more of the LL gear trips, and between 34%-74% of VL gear trips.

1 aute 23.	Reef II		1								<b>1</b>
Year			All trips				LL trips	5		VL trips	52
I Cal	All	GG	% GG	RG	% RG	All	GG	RG	All	GG	RG
2007	111	68	61%	73	66%	11	8	9	100	60	64
2008	62	37	60%	38	61%	5	1	2	57	36	36
2009	83	52	63%	58	70%	33	24	22	50	28	36
2010	136	84	62%	99	73%	55	41	39	81	43	60
2011	194	144	74%	153	79%	81	71	72	113	73	81
2012	280	186	66%	204	73%	19	16	15	261	170	189
2013	220	140	64%	158	72%	83	68	70	137	72	88
2014	147	79	54%	94	64%	28	22	21	119	57	73
2015	241	127	53%	146	61%	26	22	21	215	105	125
2016	212	125	59%	127	60%	56	45	43	156	80	84
2017	85	35	41%	47	55%	14	11	11	71	24	36
2018	45	24	53%	23	51%	4	3	4	41	21	19
2019	36	16	44%	17	47%	5	5	4	31	11	13
2020	26	9	35%	10	38%	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
2021	52	27	52%	28	54%	10	8	6	42	19	22

#### Table 23: Reef fish observer trips<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Data source: SEFSC Reef Fish Observer Program, accessed 5/27/2022

<sup>2</sup> Vertical line includes buoy and spearfishing trips

Note: Insufficient data were available to include 2020 due to the pandemic.

Both gag and red grouper discard rates were low, and often were less than one fish discarded per one landed fish for harvest under both VL and LL gear (Table 24). Gag discard rates during IFQ years were greatest early in the program, which coincided with the DWH oil spill event (2010) and decreased gag quota (2011). Gag discard rates since 2012 remained at less than one fish discarded per every fish caught, regardless of harvest gear. Discard rates for red grouper were low, near or under one fish discarded per landed fish, from 2010 through 2016, regardless of gear. Trips using LL gear had an increased discard rate in recent years. This is possibly influenced by the low sample size during these years.

Gag	VL	LL	Red	VL	LL
Ung	, L		grouper	• •	
2007	0.63	0.03	2007	0.75	1.45
2008	0.34	$0.00^{2}$	2008	0.81	1.17
2009	1.45	0.08	2009	0.83	1.15
2010	1.45	0.04	2010	0.93	1.18
2011	1.13	2.16	2011	0.64	0.89
2012	0.47	0.44	2012	0.44	0.88
2013	0.23	0.52	2013	0.42	0.50
2014	0.15	0.05	2014	0.25	0.55
2015	0.16	0.01	2015	0.41	0.52
2016	0.17	0.04	2016	0.54	0.51
2017	0.19	0.04	2017	0.57	1.11
2018	0.34	0.01	2018	1.29	1.19
2019	0.55	0.13	2019	0.8	1.62
2020	NA	NA	2020	NA	NA
2021	0.45	0.07	2021	0.43	0.64

Table 24: Discard ratio (number discarded to landed fish) of vertical line and longline gear

<sup>1</sup>Data from the Reef Fish Observer Program accessed are as of 5/27/2022. Pre-IFQ data are 2007-2009.


<sup>2</sup> Indicates that all fish were landed and no fish were discarded.

Note: Insufficient data were available to include 2020 due to the pandemic.


Discarded fish were analyzed by length (Figure 2 and 3). Landed to discarded length distributions of gag and red grouper further compare gear differences (Figures 2 and 3). Length information obtained by the RFOP was converted to maximum TL using conversion factors found in SEDAR 33 and SEDAR 42. Length frequencies were calculated by year and gear and aggregated every two years into one inch bins (e.g., if  $1 \le \text{length} < 2$  then length =1) for each disposition of discarded or landed. VL vessels target gag in the 22-30 inch TL size bins and red grouper in the 18-24 inch TL size bin. For VL gear, few gag or red grouper were discarded above the minimum size limit except for 2011-2012 for gag. Discards in these years are most likely due to low or no allocation available to the vessel, because the quota was considerably lower in those years than other years (Table 13). In most recent years, few VL discards of gag were observed, most likely related to the gag minimum size being reduced in 2012 and the increases in quotas. There was a slight increase in VL discards of red grouper associated with an increase in undersized red grouper seen in 2017 (SEDAR 61).

LL trips typically capture larger gag in the 30-36 inch TL size bins and red grouper in the 18-20 inch TL size bins. Few fish are discarded above the size limit for LL gear, except for gag in 2011 through 2013, which was probably due to a lack of allocation from the decreased quotas. Due to the gear type and

location fished, LL gear does not often encounter gag below the size limit. Discards for gag are most likely related to available allocation. There was an increase in the LL discards of red grouper in 2017-2019, which is possibly due to the increase in undersized red grouper caught by the gear.



Data from the Reef Fish Observer Program accessed as of 5/27/2022.




The RFOP determines immediate discard mortality through surface observations of individual fish after discard. Some fish were recorded with an unknown discarded disposition due to the difficulty in observing discards attributed to poor lighting, high seas, or other factors. Short-term survival was assumed if the fish rapidly or slowly was able to descend and immediate mortality was classified when the fish floated on the surface or floated on the surface then slowly descended (not swimming). Individual fish recorded as dead upon arrival were included in the analyses since the goal was to examine total discard mortality. The immediate mortality percentage was determined using the number discarded dead out of those released as either alive or dead. Confidence intervals were calculated using the score interval with continuity correction. Interpretation of the immediate discard mortality should be taken with caution, as it is based on a small sample size and may not be indicative of the fishery as a whole.

In general, LL gear had higher mortality rates compared to VL for both gag and red grouper (Table 25; Figure 4). Immediate discard mortalities rates were between 3-71% for LL and between 1-19% for VL. Red grouper discard mortalities rates are typically greater than gag discard mortalities. Confidence intervals for gag caught on LL gear are considerably greater than gag on VL or red grouper on either VL or LL, and therefore some caution should be taken when interpreting these values. Additionally, many of these differences in discard mortality observed are likely to be confounded by other factors such as depth of capture, gear type, and sample size.

Gag	VL	LL	Red grouper	VL	LL
Pre-IFQ	1%	21%	Pre-IFQ	10%	25%
2010	1%	26%	2010	17%	33%
2011	2%	11%	2011	13%	24%
2012	4%	19%	2012	14%	21%
2013	3%	34%	2013	12%	31%
2014	3%	25%	2014	15%	32%
2015	7%	71%	2015	13%	30%
2016	11%	27%	2016	16%	33%
2017	9%	50%	2017	18%	29%
2018	8%	50%	2018	12%	26%
2019	8%	35%	2019	13%	17%
2020	NA	NA	2020	NA	NA
2021	0%	3%	2021	19%	19%

Table 25: Immediate discard mortality percent by gear

<sup>1</sup> Data from the Reef Fish Observer Program accessed are as of 5/27/2022. Pre-IFQ data are 2007-2009. Note: Insufficient data were available to include 2020 due to the pandemic.



### **Price Information**

Share, allocation, and ex-vessel price information is important for evaluating the performance of catch share programs. Economic theory suggests that when fishermen no longer have to engage in a "race for fish," their profits will likely increase as they adjust their operations to take advantage of weather and market conditions. The elimination of "derby" fishing is expected to increased market stability. As more efficient and profitable operators are willing to pay higher prices to purchase shares and allocation, share and allocation prices increase, which may result in increased profits. Theoretically, allocation

prices should reflect the expected annual profit from harvesting one unit of quota, whereas, share prices should reflect the net present value of the expected profit from harvesting one unit of quota in the longrun. Dockside or ex-vessel prices are anticipated to increase as well as fishermen no longer have to race to fish, which in turn should reduce market gluts and generate higher quality products. All inflationadjusted values in the analysis below were calculated based on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator.<sup>7</sup> The GDP deflator was chosen as the measure of inflation because it includes prices for all domestically produced goods and services and so is broader than other indexes.

### **Share Transfer Prices**

Reporting of share transfer value was not required until mid-2010, when a minimum transfer value of \$0.01 was required for all share transfers. Each year, there are share transactions that have either underreported or missing share transfer value information. Submitted share transfer values were converted to a share price per equivalent pound<sup>8</sup> based on the quota at the time of transfer. Transactions that reported low or no value could be due to, but not limited to, any of the following: entering a price per pound equivalent instead of transaction price, reluctance to enter price information, gifts, transferring to a related accounts, part of a package deal (e.g., sale of shares with a permit, vessel, and/or other equipment), and/or unrecorded bartering of shares within the GT-IFQ or RS-IFQ programs. This misreporting of value led to a 2012-2013 mail survey to participants about share value and prices. The survey was mailed to both the transferor and transferee for all past transfers where information was incomplete or identified as an outlier value. Participants were asked to verify or correct the value and price information and select one of seven share transfer reasons: "Barter trade for allocation," "Barter trade for shares," "Gift," "Transfer to a related account," "Sale to another shareholder," "Package deal," and "No comment." Beginning in 2013, a submission of one of these share transfer reasons was required to complete every share transfer to better monitor the performance of the program.

The majority of share transfers have either "Sale to another shareholder" or "No comment" selected as the transfer reason (Appendix 6). By volume, the most listed reasons were "Sale to another shareholder," "Transfer to a related account," and "No comment." By transfers, "Sale to another shareholder" and "No comment" are the most often selected reasons. Discussion at the Council's Advisory Panels indicate that transfers to related accounts may be interpreted differently by participants. The intent was to identify transfers between accounts with a similar entity, but industry also interpreted related accounts to include business relationships.

For share price analysis, the data were limited to share transfers with representative price per pound equivalents (<u>Appendix 7</u>). Confusion between the price and value can still be found in the data, with participants entering the price per pound instead of the total value in the system. For example, a share transfer equivalent to 33 lb of DWG with a total value of \$13 was entered, resulting in a price per pound

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> A price per pound equivalent is the share percentage that would equal one pound for that particular period. The exact share percentage that is equivalent to one pound depends on the total commercial quota and will change as the quota changes from year to year or within a year for any quota increases.

less than a dollar. The value of \$13 is most likely the price per pound and not the total value. Adjustments were made to the analyzed dataset to account for these types of errors. Adjustments were made to the analyzed dataset to account for this type of error. This error type was more often found in the early years of the program. From 2013 onward, the system started collecting price data from the transferee of the share transfer in addition to the transferor, and sometimes these prices did not match. When the prices differed between the transferor and transferee, a final price was determined based on the more representative transfer value entered. For example, if the transferor enters \$13 for a DWG share transfers equivalent to 33 lb and the transferee enters \$429 for the same transfer, the \$429 is the value used in analysis, as it is assumed that the \$13 was a price per pound instead of total value. All values were weighted by the pounds instead of on a transactional basis.

Submission of representative share prices has been improving in recent years, but continues to remain a problem (Table 26). Since 2013, representative share prices have been between 55-75% of all submitted prices, while in earlier years they were near or under 50% of all prices submitted. The transactions that do not contain representative prices often selected "Transfer to a Related Account" and "No comment" as the transfer reason. Share prices within categories, typically followed similar patterns as the program as a whole.

Since the start of the program, the average price per equivalent pound increased for all share categories. The GG share category had the greatest variability in share price that corresponded to quota changes. In recent years (2019-2021), the average share prices have not varied much, with DWG being an exception. From 2019 to 2020, the DWG average share price increased by nearly \$5.00 to \$13.96 per equivalent pound, and then decreased in 2021 by nearly \$3.00 to \$11.14 per equivalent pound. This variability in the DWG average price is likely impact of the pandemic.

Table 20:	INUIIIO	ber of tep	resentative	share trans	sters with pl	ices								
DWG	N	%	Avg.	Median	Infadj. avg*	GG	Ν	%	Avg.	Median	Infadj. avg*			
2010	53	33%	\$8.19	\$9.00	\$10.08	2010	107	42%	\$5.35	\$6.00	\$6.59			
2011	44	46%	\$11.35	\$12.02	\$13.68	2011	47	34%	\$24.24	\$25.00	\$29.23			
2012	34	44%	\$10.78	\$12.00	\$12.76	2012	68	53%	\$25.91	\$30.00	\$30.67			
2013	30	57%	\$12.58	\$12.00	\$14.63	2013	52	59%	\$31.41	\$30.02	\$36.54			
2014	38	61%	\$13.04	\$13.00	\$14.89	2014	78	74%	\$30.18	\$30.02	\$34.47			
2015	40	47%	\$12.74	\$13.00	\$14.40	2015	94	61%	\$21.97	\$22.00	\$24.85			
2016	37	66%	\$12.48	\$12.75	\$13.97	2016	55	65%	\$14.29	\$15.00	\$16.00			
2017	23	74%	\$12.63	\$12.80	\$13.88	2017	42	63%	\$15.88	\$16.00	\$17.45			
2018	15	44%	\$10.92	\$13.25	\$11.72	2018	39	62%	\$9.78	\$10.00	\$10.49			
2019	25	74%	\$9.14	\$7.49	\$9.63	2019	50	71%	\$9.55	\$10.00	\$10.07			
2020	15	54%	\$13.96	\$12.00	\$14.54	2020	37	63%	\$8.82	\$7.00	\$9.19			
2021	11	61%	\$11.14	\$10.05	\$11.14	2021	38	74%	\$8.19	\$8.00	\$8.19			
RG	N	%	Avg.	Median	Infadj. avg*	SWG	Ν	%	Avg.	Median	Infadj. avg*			
2010	111	42%	\$3.73	\$3.30	\$4.59	2010	76	39%	\$6.91	\$6.49	\$8.51			
2011	76	45%	\$6.24	\$5.97	\$7.52	2011	42	40%	\$9.93	\$11.99	\$11.97			
2012	124	61%	\$8.02	\$8.00	\$9.49	2012	41	42%	\$7.80	\$7.99	\$9.23			
2013	106	73%	\$13.16	\$13.70	\$15.31	2013	49	60%	\$8.30	\$7.25	\$9.66			
2014	107	74%	\$13.06	\$13.00	\$14.91	2014	33	52%	\$7.36	\$7.50	\$8.40			
2015	150	70%	\$12.86	\$13.00	\$14.54	2015	62	64%	\$6.74	\$6.00	\$7.62			
2016	81	69%	\$10.11	\$10.00	\$11.32	2016	26	46%	\$5.84	\$5.97	\$6.54			
2017	90	77%	\$5.17	\$5.00	\$5.68	2017	25	56%	\$8.69	\$11.00	\$9.55			
2018	53	63%	\$4.10	\$4.20	\$4.40	2018	27	49%	\$4.87	\$4.50	\$5.23			
2019	50	75%	\$5.69	\$5.75	\$6.00	2019	42	78%	\$5.62	\$5.50	\$5.92			
2020	47	71%	\$6.17	\$6.00	\$6.43	2020	28	55%	\$5.08	\$5.00	\$5.29			
2021	35	75%	\$6.40	\$4.58	\$6.40	2021	31	72%	\$5.62	\$5.50	\$5.62			
TF	Ν	%	Avg.	Median	Infadj. avg*	ALL	Ν	%						
2010	38	42%	\$3.11	\$2.15	\$3.83	2010	385	40%	*Inflation	adjustments	s from:			
2011	24	41%	\$5.77	\$5.14	\$6.96	2011	233	41%	http://ww	w.bea.gov/ v	vith 2021			
2012	14	32%	\$8.22	\$9.00	\$9.73	2012	281	51%	as the bas	e year using	the GDP			
2013	13	45%	\$8.44	\$8.00	\$9.82	2013	250	63%	deflator.					
2014	17	50%	\$8.75	\$8.50	\$9.99	2014	273	67%						
2015	33	58%	\$9.18	\$9.00	\$10.38	2015	379	63%	Note: N in	ndicates the	number of			
2016	21	62%	\$10.02	\$10.00	\$11.22	2016	220	63%	share tran	sfers that pro	ovided			
2017	16	67%	\$8.70	\$9.00	\$9.56	2017	196	69%	representa	ative share tr	ansfer			
2018	6	30%	\$10.70	\$10.25	\$11.48	2018	140	55%	prices.					
2019	11	79%	\$9.50	\$8.88	\$10.01	2019	178	74%						
2020	12	52%	\$8.48	\$9.00	\$8.83	2020	139	61%						
2021	7	58%	\$9.18	\$9.50	\$9.18	2021	122	71%						

Table 26: Number of representative share transfers with prices

### **Allocation Transfer Prices**

Allocation transfer prices are collected on a per pound basis, but were not required to complete a transfer until late 2020. Each year, allocation transfers were either missing price information or have underreported price information (e.g., \$0.01/lb). Transfers that had low or no price information may be due to, but not limited to, any of the following: reluctance to enter price information, gift, transferring to a related account, part of package deal, or bartering for shares and/or allocation. To better evaluate the program's performance, the selection of one of seven allocation transfer reasons was required for every allocation transfer beginning in 2013. Allocation transfer reasons that could be selected were "Barter trade for allocation," "Barter trade for shares," "Gift," "Transfer to a related account," "Sale to another shareholder," "Package Deal," and "No comment" (<u>Appendix 8</u>).

Fifty-two percent or more of the allocation transactions each year had no or under-reported allocation prices (e.g., \$0.01/lb). Since the implementation of requiring a transfer price with every allocation transfer in 2020, however, there has been an improvement in the percent of representative prices reported. In 2021, only 26% of allocation transfers had an under-reported price. The majority of allocation transfers had "No comment" selected as the allocation transfer reason, followed by "Sale to another shareholder" and "Transfer to a related account" (Appendix 8). While not all transfers are of equal quantities, a similar pattern occurred looking at the total amount of allocation transferred.

For the allocation price analysis, data were limited to representative prices (<u>Appendix 7</u>). Unadjusted inflation prices were used when determining outlier price values each year, whereas inflation-adjusted average values are compared across time. As the pounds per allocation transfer are variable, all statistics were computed by using a weighted pounds model and not on a transactional basis.

In the early years of the program, representative prices were between 14% and 51% of all submitted prices. There was some improvement between 2014 and 2020 thanks to outreach efforts, with 42% to 51% of reported allocation prices being representative (Table 27). The implementation of requiring allocation prices with each transfer in late 2020 further improved the percentage of representative prices reported to between 56% and 75% across all share categories. There is still a need to improve reported allocation prices. A large majority of the transactions that did not contain representative prices listed "No comment" as the transfer reason, again indicating a reluctance to submit accurate price information.

Inflation adjusted average allocation prices have decreased over time for all share categories (Table 27), with the greatest differences occurring in GG (\$1.95/lb), SWG (\$0.88/lb), and RG (\$0.83/lb). Average allocation prices might be influenced by quotas and the availability of multi-use allocation. The median, the middle value in a distribution, generally has been slightly greater than the average value for DWG, similar for TF and RG, and lesser for GG and SWG. When median values are greater than average values, this indicates that there are more values on the lower end of the distribution. These lower values may be due to fluctuations in allocation price across regions or during the year (<u>Appendix 9</u>).

DWG	N	%	Avg.	Median	Infadj. avg*	GG	Ν	%	Avg.	Median	Infadj. avg*
2010	68	14%	\$1.32	\$1.50	\$1.62	2010	150	16%	\$1.18	\$1.00	\$1.45
2011	116	18%	\$1.36	\$1.40	\$1.64	2011	303	24%	\$1.74	\$1.50	\$2.10
2012	213	28%	\$1.19	\$1.25	\$1.41	2012	631	36%	\$2.27	\$2.25	\$2.69
2013	215	35%	\$1.14	\$1.15	\$1.33	2013	705	41%	\$2.40	\$2.50	\$2.79
2014	325	38%	\$1.11	\$1.10	\$1.27	2014	1,015	45%	\$2.04	\$2.00	\$2.33
2015	282	31%	\$1.18	\$1.25	\$1.33	2015	847	46%	\$1.90	\$2.00	\$2.14
2016	285	30%	\$1.16	\$1.20	\$1.30	2016	1017	47%	\$1.38	\$1.25	\$1.55
2017	250	32%	\$1.18	\$1.25	\$1.29	2017	574	39%	\$1.45	\$1.50	\$1.59
2018	296	36%	\$0.99	\$1.00	\$1.06	2018	439	49%	\$1.01	\$1.00	\$1.09
2019	403	39%	\$1.05	\$1.00	\$1.10	2019	768	44%	\$0.85	\$0.80	\$0.90
2020	315	39%	\$1.05	\$1.00	\$1.09	2020	869	45%	\$0.73	\$0.75	\$0.76
2021	532	56%	\$1.04	\$1.00	\$1.04	2021	1,641	61%	\$0.80	\$0.80	\$0.80
RG	Ν	%	Avg.	Median	Infadj. avg*	SWG	Ν	%	Avg.	Median	Infadj. avg*
2010	153	14%	\$0.92	\$1.00	\$1.13	2010	75	12%	\$1.15	\$1.00	\$1.41
2011	482	31%	\$0.54	\$0.50	\$0.65	2011	117	21%	\$1.25	\$1.40	\$1.51
2012	746	39%	\$0.79	\$0.75	\$0.93	2012	279	31%	\$1.15	\$1.00	\$1.36
2013	827	47%	\$0.97	\$1.00	\$1.13	2013	354	39%	\$0.83	\$0.75	\$0.97
2014	1,337	58%	\$0.97	\$1.00	\$1.11	2014	443	44%	\$0.73	\$0.60	\$0.83
2015	1,331	54%	\$1.07	\$1.00	\$1.21	2015	529	49%	\$0.60	\$0.50	\$0.68
2016	1,391	47%	\$0.89	\$0.95	\$1.00	2016	870	55%	\$0.56	\$0.50	\$0.62
2017	898	51%	\$0.42	\$0.40	\$0.46	2017	545	48%	\$0.58	\$0.60	\$0.63
2018	668	49%	\$0.32	\$0.20	\$0.34	2018	474	47%	\$0.53	\$0.50	\$0.57
2019	1,270	54%	\$0.59	\$0.60	\$0.62	2019	497	43%	\$0.59	\$0.60	\$0.62
2020	1,473	57%	\$0.47	\$0.50	\$0.49	2020	642	53%	\$0.57	\$0.70	\$0.59
2021	2,304	75%	\$0.65	\$0.60	\$0.65	2021	902	63%	\$0.59	\$0.50	\$0.59
TF	Ν	%	Avg.	Median	Infadj. avg*	ALL	Ν	%			
2010	35	13%	\$0.65	\$0.50	\$0.80	2010	481	14%	*Inflatio	n adjustmen	ts from:
2011	62	19%	\$0.67	\$0.70	\$0.80	2011	1,080	25%		vw.bea.gov/	
2012	93	24%	\$0.66	\$0.65	\$0.78	2012	1,962	34%		se year using	- Carlos and
2013	88	30%	\$0.67	\$0.65	\$0.78	2013	2,188	41%	deflator.		5
2014	153	36%	\$0.72	\$0.75	\$0.82	2014	3,273	48%			
2015	186	37%	\$0.77	\$0.75	\$0.88	2015	3,175	47%		indicates the	
2016	202	39%	\$0.66	\$0.75	\$0.74	2016	3,765	46%		n transfers the	
2017	171	36%	\$0.72	\$0.75	\$0.79	2017	2,438	43%	represent	ative allocati	on prices.
2018	189	45%	\$0.72	\$0.75	\$0.77	2018	2,066	42%			
2019	368	55%	\$0.72	\$0.75	\$0.76	2019	3,306	47%			
2020	317	57%	\$0.63	\$0.75	\$0.65	2020	3,616	51%			
2021	465	67%	\$0.63	\$0.60	\$0.63	2021	5,844	66%			

Table 27: Number of representative allocation transfers and prices

#### **Ex-vessel Prices**

Ex-vessel prices, the price paid to the vessel operator by a dealer per pound of fish, are required to complete a landing transaction, with a minimum value of \$0.01/lb. Ex-vessel prices may differ by region, season, and year. Ex-vessel prices may be under-reported for a variety of reasons: to minimize cost recovery fees and/or capital gains, contractual arrangements between dealers and shareholders, and deductions for transferred allocation, goods (e.g., bait, ice, fuel), and/or services (e.g., repairs, machinery

replacement). In June 2011, regulations modified the definition for ex-vessel price and explicitly prohibited the deduction of allocation, goods, and/or services when reporting the ex-vessel price. For ex-vessel price analysis, the data were limited to representative ex-vessel prices (<u>Appendix 7</u>). All statistics were weighted by pounds rather than on a transactional basis. All ex-vessel prices prior to the start of the program were calculated using the SEFSC Accumulated Landings System (ALS) database.<sup>9</sup> After the start of the GT-IFQ program, ex-vessel prices are reported to both the ALS and GT-IFQ systems, but IFQ prices are used in this analysis.

Ex-vessel price may be influenced by the amount of quota, demand (local, Gulf-wide, or the Southeast region), landings, and local economic differences. The majority (94-100%) of ex-vessel prices submitted were representative of the industry (Table 28). After adjusting for inflation, there has been a steady increase in the ex-vessel price received per pound of fish in all share categories. Slightly lower values in 2020 were seen and are indicative of the pandemic's effect on the industry. GG typically has the greatest ex-vessel prices compared to the other categories, and TF consistently has the lowest ex-vessel prices. Median ex-vessel prices are typically slightly lower than average values in all share categories.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> SEFSC Accumulated Landings System accessed on 3/29/2022.

Table 20.	. INUIIIDEI	of ex-vess	sei transa	cuons and p	brices								
DWG	Ν	%	Avg.	Median	Infadj. avg*	GG	Ν	%	Avg.	Median	Infadj. avg*		
2010	1,529	94%	\$3.61	\$3.70	\$4.44	2010	3,226	99%	\$4.27	\$4.25	\$5.26		
2011	1,961	96%	\$3.80	\$3.75	\$4.58	2011	2,811	98%	\$4.59	\$4.75	\$5.53		
2012	2,450	96%	\$4.06	\$4.00	\$4.81	2012	3,562	98%	\$4.69	\$4.75	\$5.55		
2013	2,006	97%	\$4.30	\$4.50	\$5.00	2013	3,509	99%	\$4.90	\$5.00	\$5.70		
2014	2,090	97%	\$4.44	\$4.50	\$5.07	2014	3,940	98%	\$4.83	\$5.00	\$5.52		
2015	1,762	97%	\$4.62	\$4.95	\$5.22	2015	3,179	97%	\$5.07	\$5.25	\$5.73		
2016	1,825	97%	\$4.62	\$4.95	\$5.17	2016	3,505	98%	\$5.13	\$5.25	\$5.74		
2017	1,601	97%	\$4.73	\$4.85	\$5.20	2017	2,914	99%	\$5.25	\$5.25	\$5.77		
2018	1,494	99%	\$5.08	\$5.25	\$5.45	2018	2,746	99%	\$5.66	\$5.75	\$6.07		
2019	1,659	98%	\$5.61	\$5.80	\$5.91	2019	2,678	99%	\$6.04	\$6.25	\$6.37		
2020	1,370	97%	\$5.26	\$5.25	\$5.48	2020	2,655	98%	\$5.89	\$6.00	\$6.13		
2021	1,400	97%	\$5.69	\$5.60	\$5.69	2021	2,946	99%	\$6.18	\$6.20	\$6.18		
RG	Ν	%	Avg.	Median	Infadj. avg*	SWG	Ν	%	Avg.	Median	Infadj. avg*		
2010	3,803	99%	\$3.05	\$3.00	\$3.75	2010	2,282	98%	\$4.06	\$4.10	\$5.00		
2011	4,563	99%	\$3.15	\$3.24	\$3.80	2011	2,782	97%	\$4.14	\$4.00	\$4.99		
2012	4,587	99%	\$3.21	\$3.25	\$3.80	2012	3,273	97%	\$4.33	\$4.25	\$5.13		
2013	4,383	100%	\$3.54	\$3.55	\$4.12	2013	2,954	98%	\$4.48	\$4.50	\$5.21		
2014	4,891	99%	\$3.77	\$3.80	\$4.31	2014	3,188	98%	\$4.50	\$4.50	\$5.14		
2015	5,009	98%	\$3.94	\$4.00	\$4.45	2015	3,046	96%	\$4.61	\$4.50	\$5.21		
2016	5,123	98%	\$4.01	\$4.05	\$4.49	2016	3,413	98%	\$4.63	\$4.50	\$5.18		
2017	4,455	99%	\$4.27	\$4.25	\$4.69	2017	2,849	98%	\$4.76	\$5.00	\$5.23		
2018	3,983	99%	\$4.75	\$4.79	\$5.10	2018	2,769	99%	\$5.21	\$5.25	\$5.59		
2019	3,985	99%	\$5.31	\$5.40	\$5.60	2019	2,468	98%	\$5.56	\$5.50	\$5.86		
2020	3,639	97%	\$5.09	\$5.00	\$5.29	2020	2,323	97%	\$5.53	\$5.55	\$5.76		
2021	3,658	97%	\$5.23	\$5.25	\$5.23	2021	2,358	98%	\$5.92	\$6.00	\$5.92		
TF	Ν	%	Avg.	Median	Infadj. avg								
2010	357	100%	\$2.07	\$2.11	\$2.55	*1.01.0	1. (		1	1	/1		
2011	411	100%	\$2.31	\$2.40	\$2.79					ww.bea.gov	/_with		
2012	529	99%	\$2.27	\$2.25	\$2.69	2021 og the bege veen nerne the CDD detleter							
2013	447	98%	\$2.58	\$2.75	\$3.00								
2014	512	94%	\$2.61	\$2.80	\$2.98								
2015	531	97%	\$2.90	\$3.00	\$3.28					r which a sp			
2016	470	99%	\$2.94	\$3.15	\$3.29					when a speci			
2017	492	99%	\$2.97	\$3.20	\$3.26					the price is			
2018	477	99%	\$2.82	\$3.00	\$3.03	53.03 for that category (e.g., red grouper landed under gag multi is counted in the GG price per pound).							
2019	638	100%	\$2.88	\$3.00	\$3.04	is counte	ed in the G	G price p	per pound	).			
2020	636	99%	\$2.79	\$3.00	\$2.91								
2021	700	1000/	<b>#2</b> 00	<b>00.1</b>	¢2.00								

Table 28: Number of ex-vessel transactions and prices

2021

792

100%

\$3.09

\$3.15

Ex-vessel prices evaluated at the species level may reveal which species are driving the average exvessel prices for multi-species share categories. Red grouper and gag species prices will differ slightly from the RG and GG share categories, as the share categories are based on the allocation used to harvest and the species are based on specimen caught, regardless of allocation used to harvest the species. Similar to the ex-vessel prices seen by share category, species ex-vessel prices have increased over time for most species, with the exception of 2020 values. The ex-vessel prices in 2020 were most likely influenced by the pandemic and dropped for nearly all species compared to the previous year. Within the DWG category, yellowedge grouper always had the greatest ex-vessel price, and can be as much as a \$1.00/lb or more greater than warsaw grouper, which typically had the lowest DWG ex-vessel price

\$3.09

(Table 29). Within the SWG category, black grouper generally had the greatest ex-vessel prices, while yellowfin grouper generally had the lowest ex-vessel prices. Yellowmouth grouper also typically had lower ex-vessel prices than both black grouper and scamp. Within the TF category, golden tilefish typically had the greatest ex-vessel price, while blueline tilefish typically had the lowest price. Goldface tilefish landings only comprise less than 1% of the TF landings, and so these values should be taken with a degree of caution.

Share Cat.	Species	Pre-IFQ	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
	Snowy grouper	\$4.03	\$3.87	\$4.17	\$4.08	\$4.32	\$4.43	\$4.74	\$4.82	\$4.88	\$5.21	\$5.59	\$5.33	\$5.47
	Speckled hind	\$3.68	\$3.74	\$3.83	\$3.86	\$4.12	\$4.25	\$4.53	\$4.40	\$4.52	\$5.19	\$5.52	\$5.26	\$5.34
DWG	Warsaw grouper	\$3.62	\$3.20	\$3.26	\$3.68	\$4.18	\$4.28	\$4.44	\$4.35	\$4.47	\$4.56	\$4.78	\$4.44	\$4.72
	Yellowedge grouper	\$4.58	\$4.71	\$4.84	\$5.16	\$5.26	\$5.32	\$5.37	\$5.30	\$5.28	\$5.53	\$6.00	\$5.53	\$5.74
GG	Gag	\$5.05	\$5.27	\$5.53	\$5.55	\$5.71	\$5.69	\$5.81	\$5.73	\$5.78	\$6.06	\$6.39	\$6.19	\$6.26
RG	Red grouper	\$3.69	\$3.74	\$3.80	\$3.80	\$4.12	\$4.32	\$4.45	\$4.46	\$4.67	\$5.09	\$5.57	\$5.28	\$5.23
	Black grouper	\$4.78	\$4.90	\$5.02	\$5.14	\$5.24	\$5.38	\$5.53	\$5.52	\$5.61	\$5.84	\$6.24	\$5.96	\$6.04
	Scamp	\$5.17	\$5.03	\$5.06	\$5.21	\$5.29	\$5.22	\$5.28	\$5.18	\$5.34	\$5.71	\$5.99	\$5.87	\$6.07
SWG	Yellowfin grouper	\$4.72	\$4.19	\$3.81	\$4.25	\$4.82	\$5.05	\$4.57	\$4.20	\$4.54	\$4.09	\$4.86	\$4.58	\$5.75
	Yellowmouth grouper	\$3.55	\$4.84	\$4.68	\$5.24	\$4.29	\$4.60	\$4.62	\$5.45	\$4.49	\$4.12	\$4.76	\$5.02	\$5.41
	Blueline tilefish	\$1.92	\$1.16	\$1.36	\$1.56	\$1.75	\$1.54	\$1.79	\$1.99	\$1.90	\$2.04	\$2.16	\$2.01	\$2.31
TF	Golden tilefish	\$2.49	\$2.66	\$2.98	\$2.95	\$3.16	\$3.22	\$3.44	\$3.46	\$3.46	\$3.24	\$3.42	\$3.25	\$3.36
	Goldface tilefish	\$2.22	\$3.11	\$1.69	\$2.86	\$2.78	\$1.14	\$2.11	\$2.25	\$3.30	\$2.37	\$2.58	\$3.45	\$3.40

Table 29: Average inflation adjusted ex-vessel price by species

Note: Ex-vessel prices are on a species level, not a share category level, and therefore average price for red grouper and gag species will differ compared to the RG and GG categories. Pre-IFQ prices are the average ex-vessel prices from 2007-2009.

Pre-IFQ annual average ex-vessel prices from the SEFSC's ALS were adjusted for inflation based on the GDP deflator. In general, ex-vessel prices were stable for most species since the late 1990s onward and then increased with the start of the GT-IFQ program. The exceptions were yellowmouth grouper and yellowfin grouper, which had highly variable ex-vessel prices both pre- and post-IFQ. Pre-IFQ the blueline tilefish ex-vessel price was steadily decreasing. Once the GT-IFQ program was implemented, the blueline tilefish ex-vessel price has continued to increase. In comparison, golden tilefish ex-vessel price was stable since 2000, and increased with the start of the GT-IFQ program.

### **Cost Recovery and Ex-vessel Value**

The Magnuson-Stevens Act requires the Secretary of Commerce to adopt regulations implementing a cost recovery program to recover the actual incremental costs of managing and enforcing the GT-IFQ program. The cost recovery fee established for the GT-IFQ program is currently 3% of the actual exvessel value of GT-IFQ species. GT-IFQ fishermen who completed a landing transaction were responsible for payment of the fee. The dealer who purchased GT-IFQ species was responsible for collecting and submitting to NMFS the fee on a quarterly basis. Monies collected were used for administration of the program, maintenance and upgrades to the online system, enforcement of the GT-IFQ program, and scientific research.

Cost recovery fees were calculated from the reported ex-vessel value, and therefore changes in ex-vessel prices and landings will affect the amount of cost recovery fees collected (Table 30 and Table 31). Ex-vessel values in the program were highest in 2014 (\$31,220,969), which resulted in the highest total cost recovery fees collected at \$936,634. Ex-vessel prices and resulting cost recovery fees have been decreasing in most years since. The variability in ex-vessel value is a consequence of changing quotas, variable landings, and changes in ex-vessel price over time. The RG share category ex-vessel value has represented more than 50% of the total GT-IFQ ex-vessel value throughout most of the program. The cost recovery fees recorded here were based on landings and may not represent the actual dollars recovered, due to non-payment by IFQ participants. Overall, there are very few dealers that did not pay the cost recovery fees and the amount not collected is often less than 0.50% of the expected recovered dollars. Dealer accounts with unpaid cost recovery fees are set to delinquent and cannot accept more IFQ landings until the delinquent fees are paid to the agency.

Year	DWG	<b>GG</b>	RG	SWG	TF	Total
2010	\$2,206,106	\$2,105,130	\$8,875,259	\$637,127	\$517,706	\$14,341,283
2011	\$2,949,252	\$1,463,237	\$15,049,541	\$765,285	\$893,616	\$21,120,932
2012	\$3,909,578	\$2,457,341	\$16,739,801	\$1,285,110	\$1,023,692	\$25,415,521
2013	\$3,912,673	\$2,831,039	\$16,251,479	\$1,368,639	\$1,134,578	\$25,498,408
2014	\$4,647,386	\$3,317,315	\$20,729,024	\$1,180,005	\$1,347,240	\$31,220,969
2015	\$4,204,690	\$2,802,739	\$18,853,659	\$1,289,988	\$1,555,302	\$28,706,377
2016	\$3,998,935	\$3,981,994	\$18,542,049	\$1,652,826	\$1,261,874	\$29,437,677
2017	\$3,876,639	\$2,321,605	\$14,392,388	\$1,134,004	\$1,438,310	\$23,162,946
2018	\$4,150,613	\$2,554,003	\$11,405,696	\$1,166,757	\$1,088,903	\$20,365,972
2019	\$5,338,015	\$2,833,128	\$11,080,157	\$1,017,722	\$1,219,101	\$21,488,123
2020	\$4,140,886	\$2,748,131	\$12,023,907	\$899,350	\$971,254	\$20,783,528
2021	\$4,494,792	\$3,879,405	\$15,021,216	\$1,103,757	\$1,496,465	\$25,995,635

Table 30: Ex-vessel value by share category

Year	DWG	GG	RG	SWG	TF	Total
2010	\$66,184	\$63,156	\$266,260	\$19,115	\$15,531	\$430,246
2011	\$88,479	\$43,899	\$451,488	\$22,960	\$26,809	\$633,634
2012	\$117,288	\$73,722	\$502,196	\$38,555	\$30,711	\$762,477
2013	\$117,381	\$84,932	\$487,547	\$41,060	\$34,037	\$764,959
2014	\$139,423	\$99,521	\$621,957	\$35,401	\$40,417	\$936,634
2015	\$126,141	\$84,084	\$565,612	\$38,701	\$46,659	\$861,198
2016	\$119,969	\$119,462	\$556,264	\$49,587	\$37,856	\$883,137
2017	\$116,300	\$69,650	\$431,774	\$34,022	\$43,150	\$694,896
2018	\$124,519	\$76,622	\$342,173	\$35,004	\$32,667	\$610,985
2019	\$160,141	\$84,996	\$332,407	\$30,534	\$36,573	\$644,651
2020	\$124,227	\$82,446	\$360,719	\$26,982	\$29,138	\$623,511
2021	\$134,844	\$116,384	\$450,639	\$33,114	\$44,895	\$779,875

#### Table 31: Cost recovery fees by share category

### **Enforcement and Administrative Actions**

#### Law Enforcement Activities

Effective law enforcement is a crucial component of the IFQ programs. Special agents and officers from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) National Marine Fisheries Service's (NMFS) Office of Law Enforcement (OLE) Southeast Division, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and state wildlife officers and game wardens under authority of state law, or operating under the authority of joint enforcement agreements (JEA) with OLE, enforce the regulated activities mandated under the Gulf IFQ programs through a variety of mechanisms. These mechanisms include at-sea and dockside inspections, offload monitoring, investigations of potential violations, and the seizure of illegally caught fish.

Enforcement of the IFQ regulations includes all of the enforcement options and activities present in all of NOAA's enforcement work. Law enforcement personnel from OLE, the USCG, and state JEA partners conduct at-sea and dockside patrols and inspections designed to educate the regulated community about the program and detect and deter violations. In addition, OLE conducts follow up investigations in the event of more complicated violations such as the undocumented landing and sale of IFQ species and the trafficking of illegally landed red snapper or grouper-tilefish in interstate or foreign commerce. If the USCG or JEA partners detect a violation related to the IFQ program, they can provide compliance assistance to fix the violation on the spot such as educating fishermen on the use of the technology used to monitor the program (VMS and IFQ notification systems), or, if the violation is of a more serious nature, they can forward the case to OLE for additional action. OLE's enforcement options include a wider range of actions including compliance assistance, written warnings, summary

settlements<sup>10</sup>, referral to NOAA's Office of General Counsel, Enforcement Section, for consideration of a civil penalty, or referral to the Department of Justice for prosecution of a criminal offense.

Major violations detected by law enforcement since the implementation of the IFQ programs include false reporting of species landed and under reporting of total weights landed. More typical violations include landing prior to the three-hour minimum landing notice, landing at an unspecified or unapproved location, insufficient allocation, transporting IFQ species without an approval code, completing a landing transaction without a landing notification, and offloading after approved hours. Typical dealer violations include misreporting IFQ species, failure to provide a current dealer permit and/or IFQ dealer endorsement, and failure to report IFQ species landed. The seizure of illegal catch is also an enforcement option, although OLE usually reserves this option for the most egregious violations. As the program has matured, the number of federal IFQ related cases that have resulted in seizures has decreased.

In 2021, OLE agents and officers in the Southeast Division conducted approximately 177 patrols. These patrols included monitoring the offloading of catch and investigations involving IFQ program regulations. The number of incidents resulting in seizures has decreased since the start of the program, and OLE continues to work with partners to proactively enforce IFQ regulations. In 2021, there were 116 IFQ investigations that resulted in the issuance of compliance assistance, written warnings, and violations.

## Summary of the 2021 fishing year

In the 12<sup>th</sup> year of the GT-IFQ program, the program has shown continued progress in achieving its main objectives of reducing overcapacity and mitigating the derby fishing conditions and auxiliary objectives such as increased market stability, fishing flexibility, and balancing social, economic, and biological benefits. During the 12 years of the program, there have been changes in participation and activity in the program. Participation can be seen in the status of accounts in relation to holding shares, permits, and allocation, while activity is determined in relation to accounts transferring shares or allocation or landing red snapper. The following tables provide a summary of the 2021 values and change from the previous year for changes in participation and activity (Table 32), transfers and landings (Table 33), economic information (Table 34), and effort and discards (Table 35).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Summary settlements are offers issued by OLE to settle violations listed on the Office of General Counsel, Enforcement Section's Summary Settlement Schedules. The summary settlement program is designed to provide a mechanism to resolve relatively low-level violations quickly, efficiently, and without the more formal procedures involved when the Office of General Counsel assesses a civil penalty. Up until 2019, previous settlement schedules only included penalties for red snapper violations and did not contain IFQ specific violations. In June 2019, the Southeast Region summary settlement schedule added penalties for red snapper violations relating to transport on land, landing notifications, arrival times, offloads, landing locations, and sufficient allocation. Fees begin at \$1,000 for each first offense and increase by \$500 for each subsequent second and third offense. See https://www.gc.noaa.gov/gces/2019/SE-SSS-Final-6-27-19.pdf.

		2021 Value	Change from 2020
	Shareholders	593	-13
Darticipation	Allocation Holders	824	-9
Participation	Dealers	107	-3
	Vessels	393	-32
	Shareholders without permits		
	Number of accounts	245	+7
	Percentage of accounts	41%	+2%
	Allocation holders without shares		
	Number	234	+1
A	Percentage	28%	0%
Activity	GT-IFQ Vessels landing RS-IFQ fish	90%	-1%
	Accounts with remaining allocation	572	-60
	Number of Active accounts	320	-53
	Percentage of accounts	69%	-6%
	Number of accounts with overages	9	-6
	Overage pounds	334 lb	-974 lb

Table 32: GT-IFQ program participation and activity

#### Table 33: GT-IFQ program transfers and landings

		<b>2021 Value</b>	Change from 2020
	Number of Share Transfers	171	-56
	Percentage of Shares Transferred	35%	-7%
Transfers and	Number of Allocation Transfers	8,833	+1,769
Landings	Amount of allocation transferred	12,158,356 lb	+2,074,681 lb
Ũ	Percentage of quota transferred	200%	+34%
	Landings Percentage of Quota	82%	+14%

#### Table 34: GT-IFQ program economic information

		2021 Value	Change from 2020
	Average share price per pound		
	DWG	\$11.14	-\$2.82
	GG	\$8.19	-\$0.63
	RG	\$6.40	+\$0.23
	SWG	\$5.62	+\$0.54
	TF	\$9.18	+\$0.70
	Percent of Representative Share Transfer Prices	71%	+10%
	Average Allocation price per pound		
	DWG	\$1.04	-\$0.01
	GG	\$0.80	+\$0.07
Economic	RG	\$0.65	+\$0.18
Information	SWG	\$0.59	+\$0.02
	TF	\$0.63	\$0
	Percent of Representative Allocation Transfer Prices	66%	+15%
	Average Ex-vessel price per pound		
	DWG	\$5.69	+\$0.43
	GG	\$6.18	+\$0.20
	RG	\$5.23	+\$0.14
	SWG	\$5.92	+\$0.39
	TF	\$3.09	+\$0.30
	Total ex-vessel value of GT-IFQ	\$25,995,635	+\$5,215,499

Table 35: GT-IFQ program effort and discards

		2021 Value	Change from 2020
	VL Trips	2,960	-232
	VL Days/Trip	3.6	-0.2
	VL Avg lb/Trip	505 lb	+155 lb
	LL Trips	738	-25
	LL Days/Trip	10.2	+0.1
	LL Avg lb/Trip	4,248 lb	-584 lb
	VL Discard Ratio D:L		
	Red Grouper		
Effort and	Gag		
Discards	VL Discard Mortality		
	Red Grouper		
	Gag		
	LL Discard Ratio D:L		
	Red Grouper		
	Gag		
	LL Discard Mortality		
	Red Grouper		
	Gag		

## Looking Ahead

The final rule for Amendment 36A to the Reef Fish FMP was effective on July 12, 2018 (83 FR 27297), and revoked shares non-activated IFQ accounts and allowed NMFS to withhold a portion of the quota from distribution if a quota reduction is anticipated. The Gulf Council is currently considering additional changes to both the RS-IFQ and GT-IFQ programs through Amendment 36B and 36C to the Reef Fish FMP, which would also establish a use for the revoked shares from Amendment 36A. Amendment 36B aims to improve the performance of the RS-IFQ and GT-IFQ programs based on suggestions from the Red Snapper 5-year review, an advisory panel, and Gulf Council discussions. Amendment 36B, which is under development by the Gulf Council, considers shareholding requirements and divestment of shares resulting from such restrictions, while Amendment 36C deals with the redistribution of reclaimed shares from 36A (and potentially 36B), quota banks, and accuracy of weights estimated in landing notifications.

The Catch Share Online System successfully transitioned to a new system on December 21, 2020. This migration was necessary as the software that supported the system was at end of life. On August 27, 2021, the Permit Information Management System was also migrated to a new platform to modernize that system. Since both migrations, improvements to the systems have been a continued effort to improve function and connectivity between the systems. The SERO Catch Share staff are continuously looking for ways to improve the interaction with the online Website. If you have a suggestion on how the online system can be further improved, please call or e-mail SERO Catch Share customer support as listed on the cover page.

## **Appendices**

### **Appendix 1: Program history**

Development of the Grouper-Tilefish (GT) Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) program began in 2008, when a majority of eligible voters, Gulf of Mexico (Gulf) reef fish permit holders that had annual average grouper and tilefish landings of at least 8,000 pounds during 1999-2004, supported the formation of the GT-IFQ program through a referendum. During 2008, the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council (Gulf Council) developed <u>Amendment 29</u><sup>11</sup> to the Fishery Management Plan for the Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf of Mexico, outlining the key components of the GT-IFQ program. In January 2009, the Gulf Council approved Amendment 29 by a vote of 14 to 3. Amendment 29<sup>12</sup> was approved by NOAA's National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) in July 2009. Implementation of the first five years of the program, shares and allocation could only be sold to and fished by an entity that held a valid commercial reef fish permit and had an active GT-IFQ online account. After January 1, 2015, all U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens were eligible to purchase GT-IFQ shares and allocation, although a valid reef fish permit was still required to harvest, possess, and land any allocation.

Prior to implementation of the GT-IFQ program, commercial grouper-tilefish species were managed with limited access fishing permits, trip limits, size limits, closed seasons, and quotas. This resulted in overcapitalization of the commercial grouper-tilefish segment of the reef fish fishery. The collective harvesting capacity of fishing vessels was in excess of that required to harvest the commercial grouper-tilefish quotas, resulting in quota overages and early closures. In 2004 and 2005, the shallow-water grouper fishing season was shortened by 6-10 weeks, and between 2003 and 2009, the deep-water grouper and tilefish seasons were shortened by more than 50%. The deep-water grouper and tilefish seasons in 2003-2004 were shortened by more than 50% with closures in April through June, and seasons as short as 15 weeks. It was anticipated that under the prevailing management regime incentives for derby fishing would persist.

Initial shares were issued based on the amount of grouper-tilefish logbook landings reported under each entity's qualifying permit during 1999 through 2004, with an allowance for dropping one year of data. Initial shares were issued in five different GT-IFQ categories: deep-water grouper, gag, red grouper, other shallow-water grouper, and tilefish (Table 1). There were 766 GT-IFQ shareholder accounts created based on the number of entities (unique individual[s] and/or corporations) that qualified for initial shares in one or more share categories. Initial quota shares issued to an account ranged from 2.35 to 14.7% depending on the share category (Table 2). The minimum amount of shares issued for any share category was 0.000001%.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> https://gulfcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/Reef-Fish-Amdt-29-Dec-08\_508Compliant.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2009/08/31/E9-20954/fisheries-of-the-caribbean-gulf-of-mexico-and-south-atlantic-reef-fish-fishery-of-the-gulf-of-mexico

In mid-2010, shortly following the start of the GT-IFQ program, share transfer prices became mandatory for the transferor to report. On June 1, 2011, actual ex-vessel price was redefined to ensure equivalent reporting among dealers. The definition now states that "actual ex-vessel price" represents the price paid per pound of fish before any deductions are made for transferred (leased) allocation (i.e., pounds of fish) and goods and/or services (e.g., bait, ice, fuel, repairs, machinery replacement).

A survey on share price was conducted 2012-2013 to update share prices and share reasons for those years. In 2013, transfer reasons were added to both share and allocation transfers in order to capture more information about the types of transfer that occur and the reasons for the transfers, especially as how they related to price. Also in 2013, the share transfer price became mandatory for the transferee to report as they accepted the share transfer. In 2015, transfer reasons for shares and allocation became mandatory. On Dec 21, 2020, allocation prices became mandatory.

On October 27, 2014, there were administrative revisions to IFQ programs to improve enforcement, monitoring, and administration, and to clarify existing regulatory requirements. The rule made changes to landing notifications, offloading, landing transactions, as well as administrative changes. Modification to landing notifications included: 1) allows allocation be held in either a vessel or linked shareholder account at the time the landing notification is submitted, 2) extends the landing notification reporting window from 12 to 24 hours, 3) requires that vessels must land within an hour after the arrival time given in the landing notification, and 4) specifies that any changes to a landing notification would require a new landing notification and would supersede a previous notification. The captain will not be required to wait an additional 3 hours if only one superseding landing notification has been submitted for the trip. If more than one superseding notification has been made for a trip or the landing location is changed, the vessel will be required to provide at least 3 hours' notice before landing. The rule also allows vessels to land prior to the 3-hour notification if an authorized officer is present, is available to meet the vessel, and authorizes the vessel to land early. The final rule included a change to the offloading process, where offloading could continue past 6 p.m. if an authorized officer is present, is available to remain at the offloading site while the offload continues, and authorizes the vessel to continue offloading. The rule modified landing transactions such that: 1) requires the dealer and vessel to complete a landing transaction on the day of offload and within 96 hours of the landing, and 2) prohibits the deduction of ice and water weight when reporting an IFQ landing transaction unless the actual weight of the ice and water is determined using a scale. The intent of these modifications is to improve timeliness and accuracy of landing transactions. The administrative changes included: 1) allowing participants to close an IFQ account by submitting a Close Account form to NMFS, and 2) allows NMFS to close an IFQ account if no landing transactions or IFQ transfers have been completed by the IFQ account holder in at least one year and if either the account does not hold shares or allocation (shareholder account) or the account has paid all cost recovery (dealer account). The rule also clarified the following: 1) fish must be sold to a federally permitted dealer and dealers must report all landings and their actual ex-vessel value via the IFQ system, 2) a dealer may only receive IFQ fish that have a corresponding transaction approval code, 3) removed a phrase stating NMFS will "add other methods of complying with advance notice of landing requirement" because NMFS has already identified numerous methods for submitting landing notifications, 4) removed regulatory language that prevents a dealer

from completing a landing transaction if a landing notification is not submitted, and 5) explicitly stated that IFQ species must be landed at an approved landing location.

The IFQ website and database systems were modified in 2014 and 2015 to include the Gulf Headboat Collaborative (HBC) pilot program and the Highly Migratory Species (HMS) Bluefin Tuna Individual Bycatch Quota (BFT) program. With the additions of these programs, the homepage was retitled to "SERO Catch Shares Programs" and additional information was added for each program. Each program contains a separate tab on the Public home page with information specific to that program and the Log In dialogue box was changed to reflect the additional roles for each program. The public "View Landing Locations" page was changed to include both IFQ and HBC landing locations, with a drop down box to select by program. The Additional Information page was changed to allow for selection of documents by program: IFQ, HBC, or BFT.

In 2017, Amendment 36A to the Reef Fish FMP (Commercial IFQ Program Modifications) was approved by the Gulf Council. The final rule published on June 12, 2018 (83 FR 27297). Amendment 36A included three actions: 1) require that the owner or operator of a commercial reef fish permitted vessel landing commercially caught, federally managed reef fish from the Gulf provide a landing notification at least 3 hours, but no more than 24 hours, in advance of landing, 2) return permanently to NMFS any shares contained in IFQ accounts that have never been activated since January 1, 2010, and 3) allow NMFS to withhold the distribution of IFQ allocation equal the amount of an expected commercial quota reduction on January 1, for any IFQ species or multi-species quota, and redistribute the allocation back to fishermen should the expected quota reduction not be implemented by June 1. The effective date for the return of shares and the provision to withhold quota was effective July 11, 2018, but the effective date for the advance notification of landing was delayed until Jan 1, 2019. Additional information can be found on the Southeast Region webpage:

### https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/action/reef-fish-amendment-36a-modifications-commercialindividual-fishing-quota-programs.

In 2017, updates were made to improve the GT-IFQ program. IFQ staff created the IFQ species identification document, which provides helpful tips when identifying and differentiating similar IFQ species (e.g., red snapper and mutton snapper, black grouper and gag, golden tilefish, and goldface tilefish). This document was made available under additional information tab in the online system. Additionally, GIS interactive maps of dealer and landing locations was added on the public home page. The log in procedure to the catch share online system was also simplified. Users no longer have to specify their role before logging in, and users no longer have to click the "Accept Terms of Use." Simply clicking on the login button indicates acceptance of the Terms of Use of the web application. The final addition to the online system was a print button on confirmation screens when performing allocation or share transfers.

Several updates were made in 2018 to improve the Gulf Reef Fish IFQ online systems. A new share and allocation calculator was added to the home page that can convert between share percentages and

equivalent pounds for each share category. VMS lists for dealers and landing locations have been generated to assign a code to each unique dealer and landing location. These codes will replace the text lists that were formerly used to select form for each landing notification submitted via VMS. This change removes the need to update VMS units when new dealers and landing locations are added to the program. Additionally, a new feature to view what has been typed into the PIN field when logging into a user account was added to allow the user to see what they have entered.

Also in 2018, a stock assessment assessed a lower yield of RG available. This assessment resulted in a quota decrease that became effective January 1, 2019.

In 2020-2021, a five-year joint review of both the RS-IFQ and GT-IFQ programs was conducted, making it the second instance that each of the programs were reviewed. The first review of each program aimed to compare the fisheries before and after the implementation of the programs, and specifically to evaluate the progress towards achieving the stated goals of reducing overcapacity and eliminating the problems associated with derby fishing. The joint review aimed to compare more recent trends seen in the program to those seen when the programs were first implemented to further analyze the program's progress in achieving those goals. Data were obtained from a variety of sources: the SERO IFQ database; Southeast Fisheries Science Center's coastal logbooks accumulated landings system, and reef fish observer program; the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health; and surveys of the IFQ participants. In general, the review found that the program remains moderately to highly successful in achieving its stated goals, although there is still room for further achievement. Areas that have room for improvement include overcapacity, discard mortality, price reporting, and social and community analyses.

In late 2020, the IFQ system was redesigned to function in a cloud environment and additional features were added to the system for flexibility and security. The cloud environment should ensure that the system remains running even during natural disasters such as a hurricane. The system was brought up to current security standards to secure the transmission and storage of program information. The website was redesigned to allow access through mobile devices and tablets and the landing transaction form was modified to allow for the entry of different prices for the same species in one landing transaction. The IFQ program migrated to the new platform in late December 2020, after two years of development.

In late 2021, several improvements were developed for the IFQ system. The loan program was officially launched on September 2, 2021 to support NOAA's Fisheries Finance Program to issue loans for IFQ related needs. On September 11, 2021, a new Vessel Signature PIN was developed that will have fewer security requirements compared to the Vessel Account PIN to ease the difficulty of submitting a landing transaction. A new feature was also incorporated alongside the Vessel Signature PIN to require that the Vessel Signature PIN be provided to confirm that a landing transaction submission will draft a 10% allocation overage from the Vessel account. This additional warning was implemented to provide a warning to users to confirm they wish to take advantage of that flexibility.

<b>Closure Date</b>	Area (sq mi)	Area (sq km)	% Coverage of Gulf EEZ	% Change in Coverage
2-May	6,817	17,648	2.8	N/A
7-May	10,807	27,989	4.5	58.5
11-May	16,027	41,511	6.6	48.3
12-May	17,651	45,717	7.3	10.1
14-May	19,377	50,187	8.0	9.8
17-May	24,241	62,784	10.0	25.1
18-May	45,728	118,435	18.9	88.6
21-May	48,005	124,333	19.8	5.0
25-May	54,096	140,109	22.4	12.7
28-May	60,683	157,169	25.1	12.2
31-May	61,854	160,200	25.6	1.9
1-Jun	75,920	196,633	31.4	22.7
2-Jun	88,522	229,270	36.6	16.6
4-Jun	78,182	202,491	32.3	-11.7
5-Jun	78,603	203,582	32.5	0.5
7-Jun	78,264	202,703	32.3	-0.4
16-Jun	80,806	209,286	33.4	3.2
21-Jun	86,985	225,290	35.9	7.6
23-Jun	78,597	203,564	32.5	-9.6
28-Jun	80,228	207,790	33.2	2.1
4-Jul	81,181	210,259	33.5	1.2
12-Jul	84,101	217,821	34.8	3.6
13-Jul	83,927	217,371	34.7	-0.2
22-Jul	57,539	149,026	23.8	-31.4
10-Aug	52,395	135,703	21.7	-8.9
27-Aug	48,114	124,614	19.9	-8.2
2-Sep	43,000	111,369	17.8	-10.6
3-Sep	39,885	103,303	16.5	-7.2
21-Sep	31,915	82,659	13.2	-20.0
1-Oct	26,287	68,083	10.9	-17.6
5-Oct	23,360	60,502	9.7	-11.1
15-Oct	16,481	42,686	6.8	-29.4
22-Oct	9,444	24,461	3.9	-42.7
15-Nov	1,041	2,697	0.4	-89.0

### **Appendix 2: 2010 Deepwater Horizon (DWH) oil spill closures**

**Appendix 3: Commercial Management History for Grouper-Tilefish Species** 

Year	Days Open	Size Limit (" TL)	Quota <sup>1</sup> (mp gw)	Harvest <sup>2</sup> (mp gw)	Commercial Management Action
		12)			20" TL minimum size limit
					SWG season: Jan 1 – Nov 7 (Amend. 1)
					Created deep-water and shallow-water aggregates (Amend. 1)
1990	311	20	7.8 SWG	0.79	11 mp ww commercial quota for all groupers: 1.8 mp ww for DWG (Amend. 1)
					Established commercial reef fish permit (Amend. 1)
					Longline gear prohibited inshore of 50 fathoms depth west and 20 fathoms east of Cape San
					Blas, FL (Amend. 1)
1991	365	20	7.8 SWG	0.93	
1000	244	20	8.2 SWG		Establish a moratorium on issuing new reef fish permits for 3 years, but allows transfers
1992	366	20		1.24	(Amend. 4)
1993	365	20	8.2 SWG	1.48	
1994	365	20	8.2 SWG	1.28	Extends reef fish permit moratorium through 1995
1995	365	20	8.2 SWG	1.34	
1996	366	20	8.2 SWG	1.27	New reef fish permit moratorium through 2000 (Amend. 11)
1997	365	20	8.2 SWG	1.27	New reer han permit moratorium unough 2000 (runend: 11)
1998	365	20	8.2 SWG	2.25	
1998	303	20	0.2 SWG	2.23	L
1999	220	24	0.2 GWG	1 74	Increased commercial size limit to 24" TL Prohibited cale of any form Each 15 (most and ensuring account)
1999	320	24	8.2 SWG	1.74	Prohibited sale of gag from Feb 15 – Mar 15 (peak gag spawning season) Established two marine reserves
2000	220	24	0.2 GWC	1.01	
2000	320	24	8.2 SWG	1.91	Extend reef fish permit moratorium through 2005 (Amend. 17)
2001	320	24	8.2 SWG	2.78	
2002	320	24	8.2 SWG	2.66	
2003	320	24	8.2 SWG	2.29	
2004	275	24	8.8 SWG	2.88	Secretarial amendment 1 reduced the SWG quota to 8.8 mp gw
2005	320	24	8.8 SWG	2.47	Established permanent limited access system for commercial Gulf reef fish (Amend. 24)
2005	520	24	0.0 5 WU	2.47	Aggregate deep-water and shallow-water grouper commercial trip limit of 6,000 lb gw
2006	320	24	8.8 SWG	1.37	Required commercially permitted reef fish vessels to be equipped with VMS
2007	320	24	8.8 SWG	1.26	
2008	320	24	8.8 SWG	1.32	
					Defined maximum stock size threshold and optimum yield for gag
					Set gag and red grouper allocations between recreational and commercial sectors
					Reduced SWG quota from 8.80 mp to 7.8 mp
					Set gag quota at 1.32 mp gw (Amend 30B)
					Repealed the commercial closed season (Feb 15-Mar 15)
2009	320	24	1.32	0.75	Jan – April seasonal closure at Edges 40 fathom contour and at Steamboat Lumps (Amend 3
					Created a longline endorsement permit for vessels in the Eastern Gulf (Amend 31)
					May – Oct: Emergency interim regulation prohibiting longlines inside of 50 fathoms
					Oct: Reef fish bottom longline fishing restricted inside of the 35-fathom depth contour and
					limited to 1,000 hooks, with no more than 750 rigged for fishing under Endangered Species
					Began the IFQ system for commercial grouper and tilefish (Amend. 29)
2010	265	24	1 410	0.407	Longline endorsement required (Amend. 31)
2010	365	24	1.410	0.497	Reef fish bottom longline fishing restricted to outside the 35-fathom depth contour from Jun
					August (Amend. 31)
					Longlines limited to 1000 hooks, with no more than 750 rigged for fishing (Amend. 31)
2011	365	24	0.430	0.319	Gag quota initially set at 0.10 mp gw
					Mid-year quota increase of 0.33 mp gw
					Mid-year quota increase of 0.137 mp gw
					Set ACLs and ACTs for gag (Amend. 32)
2012	366	22	0.567	0.523	Established rebuilding plan for gag (Amend. 32)
					Adjust multi-use IFQ shares in the GT-IFQ program (Amend. 32)
					Reduced gag commercial size limit to 22" TL (Amend. 32)
2013	365	22	0.708	0.575	
2014	365	22	0.835	0.586	
2015	365	22	0.939	0.542	
2016	366	22	0.939	0.777	
2017	365	24	0.939	0.443	Increased gag commercial size limit to 24" TL (Framework Action)
2017	365	24	0.939	0.452	The constant and continue of the first of th
	365	24	0.939	0.432	
2010		24	0.939	0.470	
2019 2020	365	24	0.939	0.469	

### Appendix 3.1: Gag grouper commercial management history

<sup>1</sup> Prior to 2009, gag was included in the shallow-water groupers (SWG) quota. During this time, SWG included: black grouper, gag, red grouper, yellowfin grouper, yellowmouth grouper, rock hind, red hind, speckled hind, and scamp. <sup>2</sup> Harvest from 1990-2009 taken from the SEFSC ACL database; harvest from 2010 to current from IFQ database.

# Appendix 3.2: Red grouper commercial management history

Year	Days Open	Size Limit (" TL)	Quota <sup>1</sup> (mp gw)	Harvest <sup>2</sup> (mp gw)	Commercial Management Action
1990	311	20	7.8 SWG	4.74	SWG season: Jan 1 – Nov 7 (Amend. 1) Created deep-water and shallow-water aggregates (Amend. 1) 11 mp ww commercial quota for all groupers: 1.8 mp ww for DWG (Amend. 1) Established commercial reef fish permit (Amend. 1) Longline gear prohibited inshore of 50 fathoms depth west and 20 fathoms east of Cape San Blas, FL (Amend. 1)
1991	365	20	7.8 SWG	5.07	
1992	366	20	8.2 SWG	4.46	Establish a moratorium on issuing new reef fish permits for 3 years, but allows transfers (Amend. 4)
1993	365	20	8.2 SWG	6.36	
1994	365	20	8.2 SWG	4.89	Extends reef fish permit moratorium through 1995
1995	365	20	8.2 SWG	4.65	
1996	366	20	8.2 SWG	4.34 4.67	New reef fish permit moratorium through 2000 (Amend. 11)
<u>1997</u> 1998	365 365	20 20	8.2 SWG 8.2 SWG	3.70	
1998	320	20	8.2 SWG	5.80	Prohibited sale of red grouper from Feb 15 – Mar 15 (peak gag spawning season) Established two marine reserves
2000	320	20	8.2 SWG	5.70	Extend reef fish permit moratorium through 2005 (Amend. 17)
2001	320	20	8.2 SWG	5.80	
2002	320	20	8.2 SWG	5.79	
2003	320	20	8.2 SWG	4.83	
2004	319	20	5.31	5.64	
2005	282	20	5.31	5.38	Established permanent limited access system for commercial Gulf reef fish (Amend. 24) Aggregate deep-water and shallow-water grouper commercial trip limit of 6,000 lb gw Secretarial Amendment 1 to the Reef Fish FMP set red grouper quota at 5.31 mp gw
2006	365	20	5.31	5.10	
2007	365	20	5.31	3.64	
2008	366	20	5.31	4.75	
2009	365	18	5.75	3.70	Set gag and red grouper allocations between recreational and commercial sectors Reduced SWG quota from 8.90 mp to 7.48 mp Increased red grouper quota from 5.31 to 5.75 mp Repealed the comm1.3ercial closed season (Feb 15-Mar 15) Jan – April seasonal closure at Edges 40 fathom contour and at Steamboat Lumps May – Oct: Emergency interim regulation prohibiting longlines inside of 50 fathoms Oct: Reef fish bottom longline fishing restricted inside of the 35-fathom depth contour and limited to 1,000 hooks, with no more than 750 rigged for fishing under Endangered Species Act
2010	365	18	5.750	2.911	Began the IFQ system for commercial grouper and tilefish (Amend. 29) Longline endorsement required (Amend. 31) Reef fish bottom longline fishing restricted to outside the 35-fathom depth contour from June – August (Amend. 31) Longlines limited to 1000 hooks, with no more than 750 rigged for fishing (Amend. 31) Set red grouper TAC at 5.68 mp gw for 2011 (76% commercial = 4.32 mp gw)
2011	365	18	5.230	4.784	Mid-year quota increase of 0.91 mp gw Regulatory amendment allows red grouper TAC to increase until 2015, as long as TAC not exceeded in previous years
2012	366	18	5.370	5.219	Set ACLs and ACTs for red grouper (Amend. 32) Adjust multi-use IFQ shares in the GT-IFQ program (Amend. 32)
2013	365	18	5.530	4.599	
2014	365	18	5.630	5.602	
2015	365	18	5.720	4.798	
2016	366	18	7.780	4.631	Mid-year quota increase of 2.06 mp gw
2017	365	18	7.780	3.377	
2018	365	18	7.780	2.404	
2019 2020	365 366	18	3.000 3.000	2.099 2.375	
2020	65	18 18	3.000	2.885	
2021	05	10	5.000	2.005	

<sup>1</sup> Prior to 2004, red grouper was included in the shallow-water groupers (SWG) quota. During this time, SWG included: black grouper, gag, red grouper, yellowfin grouper, yellowmouth grouper, rock hind, red hind, speckled hind, and scamp. <sup>2</sup> Harvest from 1990-2009 taken from the SEFSC ACL database; harvest from 2010 to current from IFQ database.

# Appendix 3.3: SWG commercial management history

Year	Days Open	Quota <sup>1</sup> (mp gw)	Harvest <sup>2</sup> (mp gw)	Commercial Management Action
	Open	(mp 5,1)	(mp gw)	SWG season: Jan 1 – Nov 7 (Amend. 1)
				Created deep-water and shallow-water aggregates (Amend. 1)
				11 mp ww commercial quota for all groupers: 1.8 mp ww for DWG (Amend. 1)
1990	311	7.8	6.94	Established commercial reef fish permit (Amend. 1)
				Longline gear prohibited inshore of 50 fathoms depth west and 20 fathoms east of Cape San Blas, FL
				(Amend. 1) Minimum size limit: Nassau grouper, yellowfin grouper, and black grouper = 20" TL
1991	365	7.8	7.07	Speckled hind moved from shallow-water grouper to deep-water grouper (Amend. 3)
				Establish a moratorium on issuing new reef fish permits for 3 years, but allows transfers (Amend. 4)
1992	366	8.2	6.58	Scamp is shallow-water until closed, then deep-water
1002	2.6		0.61	Conversion from ww to gw modified to 1.05 for DWG and SWG
<u>1993</u> 1994	<u>365</u> 365	<u>8.2</u> 8.2	8.61 6.80	Extends reef fish permit moratorium through 1995
1994	365	8.2	6.50	
1996	366	8.2	6.12	New reef fish permit moratorium through 2000 (Amend. 11)
1997	365	8.2	6.53	Prohibited the harvest of Nassau grouper (Amend 14).
1998	365	8.2	6.38	
1999	320	8.2	8.11	Established two marine reserves
2000	320	8.2	8.18	Extend reef fish permit moratorium through 2005 (Amend. 17)
2001 2002	320 320	<u>8.2</u> 8.2	9.19 9.05	
2002	320	8.2	7.77	
2004	319	8.88	8.88	
2005	282	8.88	8.18	Established permanent limited access system for commercial Gulf reef fish (Amend. 24)
				Aggregate deep-water and shallow-water grouper commercial trip limit of 6,000 lb gw
2006	365	8.88	6.74	
2007 2008	365 366	8.88 8.88	5.19 6.35	
2008	300	0.00	0.33	Reduced SWG quota from 8.88 mp to 7.48 mp
				Jan – April seasonal closure at Edges 40 fathom contour and at Steamboat Lumps
2009	365	7.48	4.70	May - Oct: Emergency interim regulation prohibiting longlines inside of 50 fathoms
				Oct: Reef fish bottom longline fishing restricted inside of the 35-fathom depth contour and limited to 1,000
				hooks, with no more than 750 rigged for fishing under Endangered Species Act Began the IFQ system for commercial grouper and tilefish (Amend. 29)
				Longline endorsement required (Amend. 31)
				Reef fish bottom longline fishing restricted to outside the 35-fathom depth contour from June – August
2010	365	0.410	0.176	(Amend. 31)
				Longlines limited to 1000 hooks, with no more than 750 rigged for fishing (Amend. 31)
				Reduced SWG quota to 0.41 mp Multi-use flexibility allows warsaw grouper and speckled hind to be landed with SWG allocation
2011	365	0.410	0.187	white hexionity anows warsaw grouper and specked initia to be randed with 5 w 6 anotation
				Increased TAC to 0.51 mp
2012	366	0.509	0.298	Minimum size limits: black grouper = 24" TL; yellowfin grouper = 20" TL; Scamp = 16" TL
2013	365	0.518	0.301	
2014	365	0.523	0.230	
2015	365	0.525	0.238	
2016	366	0.525	0.358	
2017	365	0.525	0.239	
2018	365	0.525	0.224	
2019	365	0.525	0.185	
2020	366	0.525	0.165	
2021	365	0.525	0.187	

<sup>1</sup> In 1990-1996, shallow-water grouper included: black grouper, gag, red grouper, yellowfin grouper, yellowmouth grouper, rock hind, red hind, scamp, speckled hind, and Nassau grouper. In 1991, speckled hind was moved to deep-water grouper. In 1997, Nassau grouper was removed from shallow-water grouper and harvest was prohibited. From 2004-2009, while red grouper had its own quota, it was also part of the aggregate SWG quota. In 2009, both gag and red grouper had their own quota, which was also part of the aggregate SWG quota. Beginning in 2010, gag and red grouper quotas were removed from the shallow-water aggregate quota. In 2012, red hind and rock hind were removed.

<sup>2</sup> Harvest from 1990-2009 taken from the SEFSC ACL database; harvest from 2010 to current from IFQ database.

# Appendix 3.4: DWG commercial management history

Yea	Days Open	Quota <sup>1</sup> (mp gw)	Harvest <sup>2</sup> (mp gw)	Commercial Management Action
	1		(p.g.,)	Created deep-water and shallow-water aggregates (Amend. 1)
				11 mp ww commercial quota for all groupers: 1.8 mp ww for DWG (Amend. 1)
1990	365	1.52	1.03	Established commercial reef fish permit (Amend. 1)
				Longline gear prohibited inshore of 50 fathoms depth west and 20 fathoms east of Cape San Blas, FL
				(Amend. 1)
1991	365	1.52	1.00	Speckled hind moved from shallow-water grouper to deep-water grouper (Amend. 3)
1992	366	1.6	1.29	Establish a moratorium on issuing new reef fish permits for 3 years, but allows transfers (Amend. 4)
1992	500	1.0	1.28	Scamp is shallow-water until closed then deep-water Conversion from ww to gw modified to 1.05 for DWG and SWG
1993	365	1.6	0.95	Conversion noin www.orgw.mounted.to 1.05 for D.w.G and S.w.G
1994		1.6	1.27	Extends reef fish permit moratorium through 1995
1995		1.6	0.97	
1996		1.6	0.63	New reef fish permit moratorium through 2000 (Amend. 11)
1997	365	1.6	0.90	
1998		1.6	0.77	
1999		1.6	1.20	Established two marine reserves
2000		1.6	1.39	Extend reef fish permit moratorium through 2005 (Amend. 17)
2001		1.6	1.04	
2002		1.6	1.07	
2003		1.6	1.54	
2004	177	1.02	1.25	Reduced commercial quota for DWG (Secretarial Amend. 1)
2005	130	1.02	1.14	Established permanent limited access system for commercial Gulf reef fish (Amend. 24) Aggregate deep-water and shallow-water grouper commercial trip limit of 6,000 lb gw
2001	150	1.02	1.14	Closed on June 23, 2005
2006	152	1.02	1.07	Closed on June 27, 2006
2007	-	1.02	1.16	Closed on June 2, 2007
2008		1.02	1.11	Closed on May 10, 2008; re-opened DWG Nov 1-10, 2008
				Jan – April seasonal closure at Edges 40 fathom contour and at Steamboat Lumps
2009	196	1.02	1.13	May – Oct: Emergency interim regulation prohibiting longlines inside of 50 fathoms
2002	170	1.02	1.15	Oct: Reef fish bottom longline fishing restricted inside of the 35-fathom depth contour and limited to 1,000
				hooks, with no more than 750 rigged for fishing under Endangered Species Act
				Began the IFQ system for commercial grouper and tilefish (Amend. 29)
				Longline endorsement required (Amend. 31) Reef fish bottom longline fishing restricted to outside the 35-fathom depth contour from June – August
2010	365	1.020	0.606	(Amend, 31)
2010	505	1.020	0.000	Longlines limited to 1000 hooks, with no more than 750 rigged for fishing (Amend. 31)
				Reduced DWG quota to 1.02 mp
				Multi-use flexibility allows scamp to be landed with DWG allocation
2011		1.020	0.779	
2012	366	1.127	0.966	Increased TAC to 1.13 mp; misty grouper removed from Reef Fish FMP and IFQ program
2013	365	1.118	0.920	
2014	365	1.110	1.081	
2015	365	1.101	0.955	
2016	366	1.024	0.867	
2017	365	1.024	0.822	
2018	365	1.024	0.817	
2019	365	1.024	0.952	
2020	366	1.024	0.804	
	500	1.024	0.001	

<sup>1</sup> Deep-water grouper in 1990 included: misty grouper, snowy grouper, yellowedge grouper, and warsaw grouper. In 1991, speckled hind was moved from shallow-water grouper to deep-water grouper and scamp was included as deep-water grouper once the shallow-water grouper quota was filled. In 2010, the IFQ system was established and included: misty grouper, snowy grouper, yellowedge grouper, warsaw grouper, and speckled hind. While scamp may be landed with deep-water allocation, it is not included in the quota. In 2012, misty grouper was removed from the deep-water grouper. <sup>2</sup> Harvest from 1990-2009 taken from the SEFSC ACL database; harvest from 2010 to current from IFQ database.

Year	Days Open	Quota <sup>1</sup> (mp gw)	Harvest <sup>2</sup> (mp gw)	Commercial Management Action
				Established commercial reef fish permit Longline gear prohibited inshore of 50 fathoms depth west and 20 fathoms east of Cape San Blas, FL Added golden tilefish, goldface tilefish, blackline tilefish, and or tilefish, and blueline tilefish to the FMP
1990	365	NA	0.39	(Amend. 1).
1991	365	NA	0.33	
1992	366	NA	0.40	Establish a moratorium on issuing new reef fish permits for 3 years, but allows transfers (Amend. 4)
1993	365	NA	0.37	
1994	365	NA	0.49	Extends reef fish permit moratorium through 1995
1995	365	NA	0.49	
1996	366	NA	0.23	New reef fish permit moratorium through 2000 (Amend. 11)
1997	365	NA	0.44	
1998	365	NA	0.36	We defend to the second s
1999	365	NA	0.42	Established two marine reserves
2000	366	NA	0.55	Extend reef fish permit moratorium through 2005 (Amend. 17)
2001 2002	365 365	NA NA	0.53	
2002	365	NA	0.55	
2003	366	0.44	0.48	Secretarial Amendment 1: established a commercial quota of 0.44 mp gw for all tilefish (equal to average annual harvest from 1996-2000)
				Established permanent limited access system for commercial Gulf reef fish (Amend. 24)
2005	324	0.44	0.63	Aggregate deep-water and shallow-water grouper commercial trip limit of 6,000 lb gw
2006	202	0.44	0.42	
2007	107	0.44	0.42	
2008	130	0.44	0.50	
2009	134	0.44	0.55	Jan – April seasonal closure at Edges 40 fathom contour and at Steamboat Lumps May – Oct: Emergency interim regulation prohibiting longlines inside of 50 fathoms Oct: Reef fish bottom longline fishing restricted inside of the 35-fathom depth contour and limited to 1,000 hooks, with no more than 750 rigged for fishing under Endangered Species Act
2010	365	0.440	0.250	Began the IFQ system for commercial grouper and tilefish (Amend. 29) Longline endorsement required (Amend. 31) Reef fish bottom longline fishing restricted to outside the 35-fathom depth contour from June – August (Amend. 31) Longlines limited to 1000 hooks, with no more than 750 rigged for fishing (Amend. 31)
2011	365	0.440	0.386	
2012	366	0.582	0.451	Increased TAC to 0.58 mp; Anchor and blackline tilefish removed from Reef Fish FMP and IFQ program.
2013	365	0.582	0.440	
2014	365	0.582	0.517	
2015	365	0.582	0.537	
2016	366	0.582	0.429	
2017	365	0.582	0.485	
2018	365	0.528	0.386	
2019	365	0.528	0.423	
2020	366	0.528	0.349	
2021	365	0.528	0.484	

# Appendix 3.5: TF commercial management history

<sup>1</sup> Tilefish included: Golden tilefish, blueline tilefish, goldface tilefish, anchor tilefish, and blackline tilefish. In 2012, anchor and blackline tilefish were removed from the GT-IFQ program.

<sup>2</sup> Harvest from 1990-2009 taken from the SEFSC ACL database; harvest from 2010 to current from IFQ database.

### **Appendix 4: Gulf of Mexico Commercial Reef Fish Permit Data**

On August 27, 2021, the NMFS Permits Information Management System (PIMS) Database was transitioned onto a new platform to modernize the database, improve data collection, and automate many permitting processes for permit holders in the Southeast region. Summarization of the data on the new platform will require new tools and techniques that were not yet available for this report. All tables that require data from the PIMS Database, therefore, are presented here through 2020.

Appendix 4.1: Shareholders by permit status and the total share percentage held by those accounts

Cat.	Year	Permit N (share%)	No Permit N (share%)	Cat.	Year	Permit N (share%)	No Permit N (share%)
	2010	449 (99%)	12 (1%)		2010	690 (99%)	29 (<1%)
	2011	392 (96%)	39 (4%)		2011	578 (98%)	83 (2%)
	2012	359 (97%)	42 (3%)		2012	513 (97%)	99 (3%)
	2013	323 (95%)	59 (5%)		2013	475 (94%)	120 (6%)
	2014	296 (93%)	72 (7%)		2014	433 (94%)	142 (6%)
DWG	2015	275 (87%)	91 (13%)	GG	2015	404 (87%)	170 (13%)
	2016	262 (85%)	97 (15%)		2016	390 (85%)	181 (15%)
	2017	252 (85%)	109 (15%)		2017	379 (83%)	191 (15%)
	2018	239 (69%)	105 (31%)		2018	359 (80%)	164 (19%)
	2019	224 (69%)	112 (31%)		2019	343 (76%)	176 (24%)
	2020	213 (82%)	121 (18%)		2020	328 (73%)	182 (27%)
	2010	641 (99%)	24 (<1%)		2010	692 (99%)	29 (<1%)
	2011	537 (98%)	73 (2%)		2011	591 (97%)	83 (3%)
	2012	479 (98%)	90 (2%)		2012	527 (96%)	102 (4%)
	2013	440 (96%)	110 (4%)		2013	479 (94%)	125 (6%)
	2014	402 (95%)	128 (5%)		2014	433 (92%)	149 (8%)
RG	2015	369 (80%)	161 (20%)	SWG	2015	404 (85%)	177 (15%)
	2016	360 (79%)	170 (21%)		2016	390 (85%)	187 (15%)
	2017	362 (80%)	186 (20%)		2017	380 (85%)	196 (15%)
	2018	339 (79%)	166 (21%)		2018	352 (83%)	169 (17%)
	2019	321 (72%)	175 (28%)		2019	342 (82%)	175 (18%)
	2020	305 (71%)	183 (29%)		2020	330 (80%)	182 (19%)
	2010	282 (99%)	5 (<1%)		2010	714	29
	2011	238 (98%)	22 (2%)		2011	612	87
	2012	224 (98%)	22 (2%)		2012	556	109
	2013	200 (96%)	32 (4%)		2013	507	137
	2014	187 (95%)	40 (5%)		2014	465	163
TF	2015	167 (89%)	55 (11%)	Total	2015	441	204
	2016	155 (87%)	56 (13%)		2016	430	223
	2017	154 (89%)	60 (11%)		2017	424	243
	2018	151 (79%)	54 (21%)		2018	398	218
	2019	140 (70%)	58 (30%)		2019	385	230
	2020	137 (82%)	64 (18%)		2020	368	238

Note: N indicates the number of shareholders and share percent is the total share percentage held by all of those accounts. Shares from 2018 to 2020 do not equal 100% as the reverted shares are held in an administrative account until the Gulf Council determines distribution.

Cat.	Year	Ν	FL	Other Gulf	Cat.	Year	Ν	FL	Other Gulf
	2010	238	NA	NA		2010	493	NA	NA
	2011	187	142	59		2011	415	379	44
	2012	192	148	54		2012	363	336	29
	2013	206	165	52		2013	384	354	37
	2014	185	144	52		2014	367	334	40
DWG	2015	186	143	47	GG	2015	375	348	29
	2016	165	125	47		2016	374	347	32
	2017	170	130	47		2017	382	346	41
	2018	164	123	46		2018	374	347	30
	2019	166	122	47		2019	368	341	31
	2020	145	109	44		2020	354	323	36
	2010	546	NA	NA		2010	489	NA	NA
	2011	393	383	11		2011	322	284	54
	2012	383	375	9		2012	307	270	43
	2013	398	386	13		2013	343	304	52
	2014	363	356	9		2014	324	282	52
RG	2015	384	371	13	SWG	2015	353	310	46
	2016	376	369	9		2016	341	299	53
	2017	380	361	21		2017	346	295	59
	2018	376	368	8		2018	330	287	48
	2019	376	371	7		2019	326	279	55
	2020	359	349	10		2020	309	260	54
	2010	166	NA	NA		2010	630	NA	NA
	2011	79	66	22		2011	452	401	64
	2012	75	59	23		2012	440	388	59
	2013	97	81	21		2013	449	398	61
	2014	78	61	23		2014	414	364	57
TF	2015	91	75	18	Total	2015	434	386	51
	2016	86	66	24		2016	446	397	57
	2017	85	66	22		2017	441	387	60
	2018	79	60	21		2018	453	403	55
	2019	87	65	24		2019	455	402	61
	2020	96	78	22		2020	428	374	61

Appendix 4.2: Vessels that harvested GT-IFQ species by region

Note: N indicates the number of shareholders and share percent is the total share percentage held by all of those accounts. Shares from 2018 to 2020 do not equal 100% as the reverted shares are held in an administrative account until the Gulf Council determines distribution.

	N (% accts)	Shares		No Shares			N (%	Shares		No Shares	
DWG		Permit	No Permit	Permit	No Permit	GG	accts)	Permit	No Permit	Permit	No Permit
2010	182 (36%)	148	7	27	NA	2010	183 (23%)	156	14	13	NA
2011	212 (41%)	142	30	40	NA	2011	223 (29%)	164	35	24	NA
2012	209 (42%)	147	30	32	NA	2012	215 (29%)	156	37	22	NA
2013	182 (39%)	126	24	32	NA	2013	174 (24%)	123	33	18	NA
2014	186 (41%)	128	29	29	NA	2014	199 (27%)	137	38	24	NA
2015	203 (44%)	114	35	43	11	2015	210 (28%)	110	47	41	12
2016	206 (45%)	110	46	43	7	2016	214 (28%)	111	61	31	11
2017	176 (39%)	83	48	35	10	2017	194 (25%)	81	63	39	11
2018	186 (39%)	81	56	36	13	2018	184 (24%)	79	62	31	12
2019	206 (46%)	98	62	32	14	2019	197 (28%)	84	66	30	17
2020	207 (45%)	83	59	48	17	2020	218 (30%)	84	75	39	20
	N (%	Shares		No Shares			N (%	Shares		No Shares	
RG	accts)	Permit	No Permit	Permit	No Permit	SWG	accts)	Permit	No Permit	Permit	No Permit
2010	174 (23%)	144	12	18	NA	2010	203 (27%)	172	14	17	NA
2011	211 (29%)	156	37	18	NA	2011	227 (30%)	162	36	29	NA
2012	191 (27%)	136	34	21	NA	2012	214 (29%)	155	37	22	NA
2013	180 (26%)	122	31	27	NA	2013	190 (26%)	121	34	35	NA
2014	187 (27%)	127	39	20	NA	2014	190 (26%)	126	39	25	NA
2015	208 (29%)	110	46	36	16	2015	208 (28%)	106	44	46	12
2016	193 (27%)	98	60	24	11	2016	214 (29%)	109	60	35	10
2017	199 (27%)	77	61	46	15	2017	202 (27%)	86	59	46	11
2018	197 (26%)	75	68	39	15	2018	195 (26%)	76	60	46	13
2019	180 (26%)	73	70	25	12	2019	196 (28%)	90	63	29	14
2020	193 (28%)	74	77	25	17	2020	200 (28%)	80	65	35	20
		Sha	ares	No Shares			``````´				
TF	N (% accts)	Permit	No Permit	Permit	No Permit						
2010	132 (44%)	105	3	24	NA						
2011	164 (53%)	111	20	33	NA						
2012	146 (50%)	105	18	23	NA						
2012	136 (48%)	97	11	28	NA						
2013	142 (51%)	98	18	26	NA						
2015	144 (50%)	82	25	30	7						
2015	132 (48%)	74	32	22	4						
2010	116 (44%)	55	30	23	8						
2018	124 (43%)	62	27	28	7						
2010	118 (42%)	56	36	14	12						
2020	140 (48%)	57	36	37	10						

Appendix 4.3: Number and volume of accounts only transferring allocation

Note: N indicates the number of accounts only transferring allocation. The percentage under N indicates the percentage of these accounts out of all accounts with allocation.

## **Appendix 5: Monthly landings by share category**

**Appendix 5.1: DWG monthly landings** 

DWG	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Jan	35,392	38,204	34,848	29,235	32,717	49,141	22,883	31,203	26,003	32,756	30,355	34,223
Feb	50,751	58,313	42,385	34,613	69,426	30,201	53,885	82,037	40,594	55,972	81,966	42,575
Mar	61,150	57,849	57,181	55,393	77,186	70,793	71,268	66,274	51,282	84,469	71,289	61,330
Apr	91,009	60,320	66,874	108,063	83,354	113,801	87,684	77,450	60,621	64,067	33,812	69,534
May	100,750	50,734	72,627	118,960	75,556	92,505	100,293	96,044	93,159	62,379	65,066	81,278
Jun	55,413	82,159	78,863	102,574	118,921	132,601	110,991	88,361	90,413	104,374	92,985	98,418
Jul	23,210	78,053	78,803	82,606	202,172	105,722	116,957	127,458	137,637	122,188	97,004	108,454
Aug	73,442	107,643	109,564	136,636	121,783	75,875	94,728	87,208	124,413	162,450	87,288	83,900
Sept	27,411	41,232	92,812	50,247	59,900	57,064	42,143	30,605	41,019	55,793	41,212	39,723
Oct	26,855	71,477	118,894	65,751	47,439	60,078	57,404	32,449	33,029	68,553	61,869	51,751
Nov	31,500	68,986	89,764	62,209	47,896	38,770	40,162	39,611	51,059	71,950	54,782	41,451
Dec	47,879	64,549	121,220	66,636	111,792	84,788	68,642	63,199	68,223	66,778	86,132	87,651

### **Appendix 5.2: GG monthly landings**

GG	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Jan	43,562	24,071	60,119	53,809	33,365	38,717	33,482	33,005	34,882	74,982	36,767	50,766
Feb	48,530	20,557	47,387	53,261	72,979	40,135	139,315	66,707	52,881	69,149	49,407	45,799
Mar	59,766	8,535	84,824	67,014	54,496	68,525	96,987	40,255	31,632	54,160	48,158	41,590
Apr	54,033	6,470	48,400	62,902	59,951	48,889	77,818	37,960	38,530	44,890	17,757	41,403
May	56,455	7,542	54,861	79,613	69,165	56,515	90,094	50,348	51,732	67,217	82,664	55,389
Jun	43,773	35,315	25,247	48,369	60,321	65,145	66,023	36,954	40,718	30,830	59,586	53,568
Jul	22,486	25,211	44,672	38,466	36,146	37,457	40,623	28,171	21,296	26,979	32,264	46,476
Aug	27,624	25,077	23,116	35,058	31,287	34,054	28,506	17,899	29,344	20,592	33,291	25,366
Sept	27,371	27,614	29,441	22,929	22,746	22,785	74,168	20,029	25,351	18,453	14,678	25,586
Oct	25,727	23,666	24,270	27,367	38,902	21,120	59,567	20,194	30,315	12,763	11,920	35,240
Nov	19,537	34,324	32,495	19,533	42,836	39,099	37,644	40,452	54,907	19,654	18,896	54,277
Dec	65,074	81,755	50,234	71,343	167,319	82,500	32,963	51,182	40,326	30,206	63,174	153,036

Appendix 5.3: RG monthly landings

RG	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Jan	192,597	331,276	421,337	332,092	320,089	346,553	170,241	232,104	195,935	162,085	169,512	237,536
Feb	178,559	448,858	470,532	425,215	518,127	377,266	581,470	327,810	308,346	187,709	241,030	270,238
Mar	207,862	466,548	630,864	347,683	513,430	586,891	583,068	430,109	308,390	255,016	259,061	365,120
Apr	174,968	401,810	509,247	433,049	559,346	563,888	476,261	329,932	245,129	197,722	140,073	278,286
May	183,095	459,804	609,515	410,599	658,087	397,064	478,636	330,111	245,245	302,151	201,318	234,483
Jun	331,751	291,691	281,429	282,897	411,045	330,577	315,392	205,155	164,136	125,119	154,252	212,642
Jul	152,992	256,111	533,947	238,039	366,299	240,003	207,021	184,824	117,896	76,566	114,911	186,586
Aug	199,203	289,854	333,414	267,511	329,075	287,456	207,372	137,714	106,545	87,697	131,988	151,635
Sept	344,546	440,791	337,003	459,665	543,291	493,225	372,265	205,423	190,387	145,707	226,274	276,540
Oct	347,699	394,506	355,110	481,298	539,281	320,964	364,584	300,597	161,661	143,312	239,861	229,876
Nov	324,820	408,189	299,272	310,562	292,391	354,287	370,822	287,991	200,971	190,630	162,181	167,440
Dec	275,766	592,756	435,535	606,062	447,532	486,818	504,256	405,440	159,659	225,472	335,013	274,145

# Appendix 5.4: SWG monthly landings

SWG	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Jan	18,664	13,712	19,805	24,189	11,348	17,726	11,116	12,229	10,041	15,233	6,522	10,712
Feb	21,420	21,907	22,302	29,567	26,529	16,604	32,714	24,863	20,137	16,694	10,939	9,658
Mar	21,456	17,805	30,298	27,567	23,814	28,584	34,914	21,771	12,737	15,387	13,234	14,867
Apr	17,821	12,847	20,776	28,918	20,973	22,090	32,585	18,995	17,917	14,667	12,054	15,260
May	12,579	16,762	26,444	39,789	20,476	26,645	36,499	31,114	26,683	17,709	19,556	17,535
Jun	13,769	17,283	18,799	32,217	26,542	37,722	40,439	18,746	24,544	24,932	25,056	24,841
Jul	7,091	16,725	28,985	32,899	22,743	26,372	36,981	29,861	21,336	21,176	24,560	25,980
Aug	11,915	17,534	28,351	24,286	28,620	27,986	34,842	22,444	30,266	22,100	20,287	14,691
Sept	11,266	14,286	21,451	13,299	16,704	9,690	31,470	10,040	17,965	12,463	7,976	11,216
Oct	7,618	8,353	28,290	18,703	22,184	11,750	30,357	11,126	14,844	5,761	6,396	11,275
Nov	5,880	10,693	23,001	10,924	18,084	22,307	20,943	15,239	14,930	7,591	5,234	9,903
Dec	8,755	18,328	31,865	25,488	25,234	34,862	15,303	22,618	12,761	11,301	12,258	21,448

**Appendix 5.5: TF monthly landings** 

TF	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Jan	8,394	28,302	18,918	19,636	14,271	26,292	15,950	14,374	8,973	11,703	15,916	17,783
Feb	21,028	18,835	29,397	8,331	38,503	25,885	20,441	34,527	28,926	25,816	44,447	21,427
Mar	33,462	27,464	31,960	14,501	26,818	60,672	33,709	46,303	33,615	30,635	19,428	59,607
Apr	44,533	26,043	30,920	25,456	31,315	53,782	51,830	64,892	28,367	23,196	12,439	17,718
May	22,382	23,297	24,966	49,315	32,253	34,327	42,204	37,944	31,125	39,180	25,288	37,391
Jun	10,397	32,987	24,185	26,924	43,517	54,986	46,044	33,311	35,113	32,173	27,722	40,575
Jul	4,229	33,504	22,632	19,910	51,868	46,521	34,901	58,800	48,434	44,515	37,659	66,664
Aug	24,940	20,209	34,894	61,498	48,118	47,284	36,617	34,494	39,926	53,815	38,670	57,607
Sept	11,826	16,098	52,189	24,329	34,918	25,380	18,795	27,484	28,420	31,809	23,436	38,214
Oct	19,335	25,582	86,750	59,911	66,799	55,348	42,618	53,605	35,578	44,295	37,705	40,167
Nov	14,521	55,566	21,861	54,381	26,247	45,084	24,889	40,276	24,290	27,849	28,205	41,300
Dec	34,661	78,247	72,449	75,899	102,641	61,951	61,005	38,885	43,371	57,940	37,929	45,579

### **Appendix 6: Share Transfer Reasons**

Beginning in 2013, share transfers required the selection of one of seven transfer reasons for every share transfer to better monitor the program's performance. The tables below contain the number of share transactions and percentage transferred by transfer reason between 2013 and 2021.

Share Transfer Reason	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Barter trade for allocation	-	7	16	4	1	-	1	-	-
Barter trade for shares	8	10	40	12	14	1	-	-	2
Gift	11	11	-	2	13	6	8	15	10
No comment	67	68	164	94	62	83	61	65	38
Package deal	22	22	8	4	7	34	14	5	-
Transfer to a related account	66	44	91	55	36	24	17	48	20
Sale to another shareholder	223	247	287	136	151	108	138	94	101

#### **Appendix 6.1: Count of Share Transfer Reasons**

**Appendix 6.2: Percent of Shares Transferred for Each Transfer Reason** 

Share Transfer Reason	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Barter trade for allocation	-	0.97	1.28	0.03	0.01	-	0.13	-	-
Barter trade for shares	0.22	4.62	7.95	0.59	1.62	0.10	-	-	0.01
Gift	0.12	2.49	-	0.15	1.12	0.84	0.36	1.07	1.44
No comment	12.74	10.68	32.28	24.09	4.54	10.67	10.00	11.03	10.33
Package deal	3.62	3.40	0.87	0.35	0.03	8.00	1.09	2.68	-
Transfer to a related account	12.88	11.06	46.58	12.42	5.10	3.26	6.83	11.55	2.47
Sale to another shareholder	14.76	39.73	61.22	19.06	9.28	24.97	56.73	15.94	20.69

## **Appendix 7: Price Analysis Rationale**

Price information is crucial to the economic evaluation of the program. The Grouper-Tilefish Individual Fishing Quota (GT-IFQ) program continues to have price collection or reporting issues with respect to share transfers, allocation transfers, and ex-vessel prices, although some improvements have occurred. Since mid-year 2010, a minimum transfer price of \$0.01 has been required for all share transfers. Despite requiring participants to enter a transaction price for share transfers, many share transactions specify a transaction value of \$0.01. A minimum allocation transfer price of \$0.01 was only recently required by the online system as of December 21, 2020. Share prices were analyzed by year and generally resulted in right skewed distributions. Maximum share prices were selected to exclude unusually high and infrequent share prices. Minimum values were selected based on low-value outliers. Allocation prices were analyzed on a yearly basis. Allocation prices generally had a bimodal distribution that depicted a subset of transactions with low price information. The minimum allocation prices were selected to exclude unusually high and infrequent allocation prices, including all prices in excess of the maximum ex-vessel value reported. Share and allocation prices included in the analyses were equal to or greater than the minimum value selected and equal to or less than the maximum value selected (see table above).

Cat	Veen	Sh	are	Alloc	ation	Cat	Veen	Sh	are	Alloca	tion
Cat.	Year	Min.	Max.	Min.	Max.	Cat.	Year	Min.	Max.	Min.	Max.
	2010	\$2	\$30	\$0.50	\$3.00		2010	\$2	\$40	\$0.50	\$5.00
	2011	\$2	\$30	\$0.50	\$3.00		2011	\$4	\$60	\$0.50	\$5.00
	2012	\$2	\$30	\$0.50	\$4.00		2012	\$4	\$60	\$0.50	\$5.00
	2013	\$2	\$30	\$0.50	\$3.00		2013	\$4	\$60	\$0.50	\$5.00
	2014	\$2	\$30	\$0.50	\$3.00		2014	\$5	\$60	\$0.50	\$5.00
DWC	2015	\$2	\$30	\$0.50	\$3.00	GG	2015	\$5	\$60	\$0.50	\$5.00
DWG	2016	\$2	\$30	\$0.50	\$3.50	99	2016	\$5	\$60	\$0.50	\$5.00
	2017	\$2	\$30	\$0.50	\$3.00		2017	\$5	\$60	\$0.50	\$5.00
	2018	\$2	\$30	\$0.50	\$3.00		2018	\$5	\$60	\$0.50	\$5.00
	2019	\$2	\$30	\$0.50	\$3.00		2019	\$5	\$60	\$0.50	\$5.00
	2020	\$2	\$30	\$0.50	\$3.00		2020	\$4	\$60	\$0.50	\$5.00
	2021	\$2	\$30	\$0.50	\$3.00		2021	\$4	\$60	\$0.50	\$5.00
	2010	\$2	\$15	\$0.30	\$4.00		2010	\$2	\$30	\$0.30	\$5.00
	2011	\$2	\$15	\$0.30	\$4.00		2011	\$2	\$30	\$0.30	\$5.00
	2012	\$2	\$15	\$0.30	\$4.00		2012	\$3	\$30	\$0.30	\$5.00
	2013	\$2	\$20	\$0.30	\$4.00	SWG	2013	\$3	\$30	\$0.20	\$5.00
	2014	\$3	\$20	\$0.30	\$4.00		2014	\$3	\$30	\$0.20	\$5.00
RG	2015	\$3	\$20	\$0.30	\$4.00		2015	\$3	\$30	\$0.20	\$5.00
KU	2016	\$3	\$20	\$0.30	\$4.00		2016	\$3	\$30	\$0.20	\$4.00
	2017	\$2	\$20	\$0.10	\$4.00		2017	\$3	\$30	\$0.20	\$4.00
	2018	\$2	\$20	\$0.10	\$4.00		2018	\$3	\$30	\$0.20	\$4.00
	2019	\$2	\$20	\$0.10	\$4.00		2019	\$3	\$30	\$0.20	\$4.00
	2020	\$2	\$20	\$0.10	\$4.00		2020	\$3	\$30	\$0.20	\$4.00
	2021	\$2	\$20	\$0.10	\$4.00	_	2021	\$3	\$30	\$0.20	\$4.00
	2010	\$1	\$20	\$0.10	\$2.00						
	2011	\$1	\$20	\$0.10	\$2.00						
	2012	\$1	\$20	\$0.10	\$2.00						
	2013	\$1	\$20	\$0.10	\$4.00						
TF	2014	\$1	\$20	\$0.10	\$4.00						
11	2015	\$1	\$20	\$0.10	\$4.00						
	2016	\$1	\$20	\$0.10	\$4.00						
	2017	\$1	\$20	\$0.10	\$3.00						
	2018	\$1	\$20	\$0.10	\$3.00						
	2019	\$1	\$20	\$0.10	\$3.00						
	2020	\$1	\$20	\$0.10	\$3.00						
	2021	\$1	\$20	\$0.10	\$3.00						

Ex-vessel prices have varied since the start of the GT-IFQ program. Extremely low prices have been attributed to dealers reporting ex-vessel prices after deducting for transferred or leased allocation, goods (e.g., bait, ice, fuel) and/or services (e.g., repairs, machinery replacement). The definition of actual ex-vessel price was changed through regulations in June 2011 and prohibits the cost of allocation transfers, goods, and /or services from being deducted from ex-vessel prices. Despite the new regulation in 2011, ex-vessel prices in some instances continue to be under-reported in the IFQ online system. An expected range of reasonable prices was calculated for each price variable by investigating the frequency of each price within a given year(s). Any price value outside the given range was excluded from analysis. All price information decisions were verified against averages submitted by industry representatives. Ex-vessel prices were analyzed on a yearly basis. Ex-vessel price distributions were left skewed, with infrequent but unusually low prices for many of the species. Minimum prices were selected to exclude these unusually low and infrequent ex-vessel prices. It is thought that these prices reflect an additional deduction as stated above. The maximum value was selected as <\$10. Since 2014, \$20 is the maximum amount allowed to be entered into the system. Any values of \$10 were excluded, as they most likely resulted from typographical errors when entering the value. The table below shows the minimum price that was included in the ex-vessel price analyses.

		Deep Wa	ter Group	er		Red		Shallow	Water Gro	uper		Tilefish	
Year	Snowy	Speckle	Warsaw	Yellowedge	Gag	Grouper	Black	Scamp	Yellowfin	Yellowmouth	Blueline	Golden	Goldface
	Grouper	d Hind	Grouper	Grouper			Grouper	Seamp	Grouper	Grouper	Tilefish	Tilefish	Tilefish
2010	\$2.20	\$2.00	\$1.20	\$2.20	\$2.70	\$2.00	\$2.80	\$2.50	\$2.00	\$2.80	\$0.20	\$0.50	\$0.50
2011	\$2.20	\$2.00	\$1.20	\$2.20	\$2.70	\$2.00	\$2.80	\$2.50	\$2.00	\$2.80	\$0.20	\$1.00	\$0.50
2012	\$2.20	\$2.00	\$1.20	\$2.20	\$2.90	\$2.00	\$2.80	\$3.20	\$2.00	\$2.80	\$0.50	\$1.00	\$0.50
2013	\$2.20	\$2.00	\$2.20	\$2.20	\$2.90	\$2.00	\$2.80	\$3.20	\$2.00	\$2.80	\$0.80	\$1.00	\$0.50
2014	\$2.20	\$2.00	\$2.20	\$2.20	\$2.90	\$2.00	\$2.80	\$3.20	\$2.00	\$2.80	\$0.80	\$1.00	\$0.50
2015	\$2.20	\$2.00	\$2.20	\$2.20	\$2.90	\$2.00	\$2.80	\$3.20	\$2.00	\$2.80	\$0.80	\$1.00	\$0.50
2016	\$2.20	\$2.00	\$2.20	\$2.20	\$2.90	\$2.00	\$2.80	\$3.20	\$2.00	\$2.80	\$0.80	\$1.00	\$0.50
2017	\$2.20	\$2.00	\$2.20	\$2.20	\$2.90	\$2.00	\$2.80	\$3.20	\$2.00	\$2.80	\$0.80	\$1.00	\$0.50
2018	\$2.20	\$2.00	\$2.20	\$2.20	\$2.90	\$2.00	\$2.80	\$3.20	\$2.00	\$2.80	\$0.80	\$1.00	\$0.50
2019	\$2.20	\$2.00	\$2.20	\$2.20	\$2.90	\$2.00	\$2.80	\$3.20	\$2.00	\$2.80	\$0.80	\$1.00	\$0.50
2020	\$2.20	\$2.00	\$2.20	\$2.20	\$2.90	\$2.00	\$2.80	\$3.20	\$2.00	\$2.60	\$0.80	\$1.00	\$0.50
2021	\$2.20	\$2.00	\$2.20	\$2.20	\$2.90	\$2.00	\$2.80	\$3.20	\$2.00	\$2.60	\$0.80	\$1.00	\$0.50

Ex-vessel minimum price:

### **Appendix 8: Allocation Transfer Reasons**

Beginning in 2013, allocation transfers required the selection of one of seven transfer reasons for every allocation transfer to better monitor the program's performance. The tables below contain the number of allocation transactions and the total pounds transferred by transfer reason between 2013 and 2021.

Allocation Transfer Reason	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Barter trade for allocation	167	98	101	28	32	19	5	24	47
Barter trade for shares	14	19	35	9	10	45	15	5	9
Gift	139	126	80	113	128	179	180	149	175
No comment	2,276	3,145	3,484	4,850	5,406	4,377	6,032	5,742	5,883
Package deal	60	77	23	41	22	22	47	9	19
Transfer to a related account	1,075	1,043	1,211	1,409	1,671	1,838	2,575	2,798	2,601
Sale to another shareholder	1,549	2,317	1,879	1,764	2,031	2,127	2,646	2,486	4,491

#### **Appendix 8.1: Count of Allocation Transfer Reasons**

#### **Appendix 8.2: Pounds of Allocation Transferred for Each Transfer Reason**

Allocation Transfer Reason	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Barter trade for allocation	242,245	175,545	214,922	38,546	42,186	24,505	3,023	54,133	41,936
Barter trade for shares	62,235	56,675	292,573	7,054	8,312	42,549	10,004	8,443	7,604
Gift	147,140	81,314	38,276	202,270	177,616	157,690	253,538	128,924	176,508
No comment	3,363,517	5,362,720	6,196,445	11,990,710	12,297,855	10,101,566	10,662,533	10,605,738	9,772,723
Package deal	140,648	467,153	107,961	80,734	37,519	43,034	1,776,317	58,556	63,316
Transfer to a related account	3,011,559	2,651,134	3,819,045	4,043,051	3,936,138	5,584,058	4,374,343	4,317,216	4,307,884
Sale to another shareholder	2,422,142	3,763,044	4,469,944	4,331,621	5,281,279	4,733,629	6,142,046	5,446,879	8,734,000

## **Appendix 9: Average monthly allocation prices adjusted for inflation by share category**

All monthly allocation prices are adjust for inflation using: <u>http://www.bea.gov/</u> with 2021 as the base year using the GDP deflator.

DWG	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Jan	\$1.35	\$1.60	\$1.46	\$1.20	\$1.29	\$1.26	\$1.29	\$1.31	\$1.23	\$1.21	\$1.19	\$1.04
Feb	\$1.50	\$1.82	\$1.54	\$1.27	\$1.27	\$1.35	\$1.31	\$1.33	\$1.16	\$1.03	\$1.11	\$0.87
Mar	\$1.38	\$1.60	\$1.60	\$1.36	\$1.15	\$1.33	\$1.35	\$1.26	\$1.24	\$1.08	\$1.08	\$1.06
Apr	\$1.77	\$1.71	\$1.38	\$1.30	\$1.19	\$1.32	\$1.35	\$1.34	\$1.22	\$1.05	\$1.11	\$1.03
May	\$1.74	\$1.92	\$1.50	\$1.54	\$1.14	\$1.36	\$1.32	\$1.27	\$1.26	\$1.05	\$1.07	\$1.02
Jun	\$1.85	\$1.77	\$1.55	\$1.51	\$1.29	\$1.41	\$1.35	\$1.35	\$0.94	\$1.10	\$1.07	\$1.08
Jul	\$1.66	\$1.46	\$1.46	\$1.40	\$1.31	\$1.40	\$1.32	\$1.30	\$0.99	\$1.08	\$1.10	\$1.11
Aug	\$1.83	\$1.78	\$1.31	\$1.43	\$1.27	\$1.39	\$1.28	\$1.31	\$0.98	\$1.10	\$1.02	\$1.05
Sept	\$1.77	\$1.46	\$1.46	\$1.40	\$1.36	\$1.28	\$1.19	\$1.19	\$0.92	\$0.94	\$1.15	\$1.22
Oct	\$1.83	\$1.42	\$1.35	\$1.34	\$1.35	\$1.18	\$1.18	\$1.33	\$0.79	\$1.10	\$0.94	\$1.13
Nov	\$1.02	\$1.37	\$1.16	\$0.97	\$1.35	\$1.31	\$0.90	\$0.87	\$0.94	\$1.10	\$1.26	\$1.04
Dec	\$0.96	\$1.30	\$1.03	\$1.17	\$1.20	\$1.22	\$0.91	\$0.94	\$1.18	\$1.01	\$0.85	\$0.94

**Appendix 9.1: DWG monthly allocation prices adjusted for inflation** 

GG	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Jan	\$1.53	\$2.38	\$2.06	\$2.57	\$2.11	\$2.31	\$1.57	\$1.74	\$1.20	\$0.95	\$0.85	\$0.78
Feb	\$1.45	\$1.62	\$2.01	\$2.71	\$3.67	\$2.19	\$1.43	\$1.65	\$0.86	\$0.91	\$0.77	\$0.64
Mar	\$1.53	\$1.87	\$2.32	\$3.05	\$2.68	\$2.56	\$1.40	\$1.56	\$0.93	\$0.89	\$0.85	\$0.77
Apr	\$1.37	\$1.66	\$2.19	\$3.01	\$2.96	\$2.22	\$1.41	\$1.55	\$1.06	\$0.89	\$0.84	\$0.76
May	\$1.48	\$3.46	\$2.36	\$3.26	\$2.87	\$2.28	\$1.57	\$1.55	\$0.83	\$0.96	\$0.79	\$0.78
Jun	\$1.33	\$2.66	\$3.11	\$3.23	\$3.11	\$2.08	\$1.39	\$1.40	\$1.14	\$0.75	\$0.72	\$0.77
Jul	\$1.77	\$2.83	\$3.24	\$2.98	\$2.89	\$1.59	\$1.33	\$1.33	\$0.86	\$0.93	\$0.61	\$0.79
Aug	\$0.76	\$2.23	\$2.75	\$3.46	\$2.68	\$1.88	\$1.40	\$1.66	\$2.12	\$0.91	\$0.82	\$0.81
Sept	\$1.35	\$2.56	\$3.15	\$2.93	\$2.51	\$1.98	\$1.71	\$1.74	\$1.02	\$0.86	\$0.80	\$0.77
Oct	\$0.73	\$1.99	\$2.98	\$2.84	\$1.96	\$1.50	\$1.82	\$1.21	\$1.13	\$0.90	\$0.64	\$0.88
Nov	\$1.03	\$1.93	\$2.98	\$2.27	\$1.69	\$1.92	\$1.87	\$1.52	\$0.95	\$0.89	\$0.81	\$0.83
Dec	\$1.30	\$0.96	\$3.03	\$2.20	\$1.37	\$2.13	\$1.56	\$1.31	\$1.27	\$0.92	\$0.74	\$0.88

Appendix 9.2: GG monthly allocation prices adjusted for inflation

Appendix 9.3: RG monthly allocation prices adjusted for inflation

RG	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Jan	\$1.14	\$0.52	\$0.72	\$1.13	\$1.04	\$1.16	\$1.07	\$0.46	\$0.41	\$0.67	\$0.47	\$0.48
Feb	\$1.22	\$0.57	\$0.79	\$1.15	\$1.05	\$1.24	\$0.95	\$0.52	\$0.29	\$0.62	\$0.46	\$0.57
Mar	\$1.00	\$0.59	\$0.90	\$1.19	\$1.06	\$1.26	\$1.01	\$0.56	\$0.23	\$0.53	\$0.53	\$0.58
Apr	\$1.61	\$0.70	\$0.96	\$1.21	\$1.08	\$1.24	\$0.90	\$0.43	\$0.21	\$0.55	\$0.58	\$0.60
May	\$0.57	\$0.76	\$1.07	\$1.23	\$1.12	\$1.31	\$1.03	\$0.47	\$0.26	\$0.53	\$0.54	\$0.56
Jun	\$0.73	\$0.76	\$1.05	\$1.24	\$1.14	\$1.37	\$0.96	\$0.46	\$0.24	\$0.65	\$0.54	\$0.69
Jul	\$0.57	\$0.81	\$1.11	\$1.23	\$1.15	\$1.29	\$0.97	\$0.45	\$0.23	\$0.64	\$0.51	\$0.81
Aug	\$2.15	\$0.80	\$0.97	\$1.16	\$1.12	\$1.27	\$1.09	\$0.69	\$0.28	\$0.66	\$0.55	\$0.78
Sept	\$0.91	\$0.82	\$1.14	\$1.07	\$1.15	\$1.20	\$1.01	\$0.41	\$1.52	\$0.57	\$0.48	\$0.83
Oct	\$0.80	\$0.78	\$1.20	\$0.99	\$1.22	\$1.04	\$0.87	\$0.34	\$1.01	\$0.55	\$0.47	\$0.90
Nov	\$1.12	\$0.64	\$1.12	\$1.01	\$1.22	\$1.13	\$0.95	\$0.36	\$0.25	\$0.57	\$0.46	\$1.02
Dec	\$0.66	\$0.57	\$1.05	\$0.73	\$1.18	\$1.11	\$0.96	\$0.33	\$0.33	\$0.55	\$0.44	\$1.00

SWG	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Jan	\$1.38	\$1.70	\$1.46	\$0.98	\$0.90	\$0.72	\$0.59	\$0.60	\$0.59	\$0.66	\$0.64	\$0.54
Feb	\$1.39	\$1.70	\$1.28	\$0.79	\$0.90	\$0.70	\$0.50	\$0.66	\$0.43	\$0.60	\$0.55	\$0.53
Mar	\$1.64	\$1.01	\$1.25	\$1.01	\$0.69	\$0.69	\$0.68	\$0.66	\$0.62	\$0.64	\$0.87	\$0.59
Apr	\$1.97	\$1.80	\$1.37	\$1.11	\$0.89	\$0.64	\$0.56	\$0.62	\$0.65	\$0.56	\$0.79	\$0.49
May	\$1.64	\$2.23	\$1.33	\$0.83	\$0.94	\$0.70	\$0.57	\$0.63	\$0.50	\$0.61	\$0.58	\$0.48
Jun	\$1.77	\$1.72	\$2.06	\$1.49	\$1.02	\$0.72	\$0.65	\$0.76	\$0.55	\$0.65	\$0.57	\$0.49
Jul	\$2.15	\$1.34	\$0.97	\$1.12	\$0.86	\$0.58	\$0.82	\$0.54	\$0.40	\$0.51	\$0.54	\$0.61
Aug	\$0.82	\$1.75	\$0.97	\$0.81	\$0.96	\$0.54	\$0.64	\$0.62	\$0.76	\$0.61	\$0.47	\$0.60
Sept	\$1.00	\$1.27	\$1.92	\$1.08	\$0.79	\$0.71	\$0.63	\$0.73	\$0.62	\$0.62	\$0.60	\$0.56
Oct	\$1.16	\$0.89	\$1.75	\$1.09	\$0.80	\$0.58	\$0.75	\$0.75	\$0.60	\$0.58	\$0.47	\$0.69
Nov	\$1.49	\$0.95	\$1.30	\$0.95	\$0.93	\$0.80	\$0.54	\$0.65	\$0.50	\$0.71	\$0.59	\$0.54
Dec	\$1.75	\$1.06	\$1.12	\$0.77	\$0.83	\$0.67	\$0.45	\$0.56	\$0.49	\$0.60	\$0.54	\$1.10

Appendix 9.4: SWG monthly allocation prices adjusted for inflation

Appendix 9.5: TF monthly allocation prices adjusted for inflation

TF	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Jan	\$1.03	\$0.89	\$0.85	\$0.71	\$0.82	\$0.85	\$0.77	\$0.80	\$0.89	\$0.87	\$0.65	\$0.54
Feb	\$0.81	\$0.76	\$0.77	\$0.83	\$0.79	\$0.79	\$0.76	\$0.68	\$0.84	\$0.85	\$0.78	\$0.68
Mar	\$0.68	\$0.84	\$0.84	\$0.78	\$0.77	\$1.02	\$0.67	\$0.89	\$0.82	\$0.72	\$0.69	\$0.63
Apr	\$0.62	\$0.78	\$0.53	\$0.93	\$0.93	\$0.99	\$1.01	\$0.81	\$0.53	\$0.74	\$0.73	\$0.65
May	\$0.74	\$0.84	\$1.04	\$0.91	\$0.87	\$0.68	\$0.72	\$0.87	\$0.89	\$0.77	\$0.39	\$0.60
Jun	\$0.00	\$0.71	\$0.83	\$0.79	\$0.90	\$0.94	\$0.79	\$0.85	\$0.59	\$0.64	\$0.59	\$0.74
Jul	\$1.02	\$0.60	\$0.86	\$0.99	\$0.87	\$0.93	\$0.60	\$0.64	\$0.56	\$0.66	\$0.62	\$0.61
Aug	\$0.62	\$0.80	\$0.71	\$0.87	\$0.78	\$0.93	\$0.78	\$0.65	\$0.62	\$0.75	\$0.68	\$0.63
Sept	\$0.00	\$0.80	\$0.78	\$0.72	\$0.90	\$0.96	\$0.86	\$0.87	\$0.67	\$0.67	\$0.54	\$0.66
Oct	\$0.74	\$0.81	\$0.91	\$1.08	\$0.88	\$0.64	\$0.84	\$0.94	\$0.91	\$0.66	\$0.70	\$0.62
Nov	\$0.00	\$0.61	\$0.86	\$0.58	\$0.89	\$0.79	\$0.63	\$0.57	\$0.43	\$0.67	\$0.57	\$0.82
Dec	\$0.84	\$0.48	\$0.70	\$0.55	\$0.63	\$0.73	\$0.25	\$0.48	\$1.44	\$0.60	\$0.53	\$0.61

## **Appendix 10: Glossary**

**10% Overage** – A provision in the IFQ program that allows IFQ accounts that hold shares to land 10% over their remaining allocation on the last fishing trip of the year. Any overage will be deducted from the shareholder's allocation for the next fishing year and the shareholder is restricted from selling shares that would prohibit this take back action.

Active Account – An account in which the allocation holder has landed, bought, and/or sold allocation within that year. Accounts activity status changes yearly based on the actions taken by the account.

Allocation – Allocation is the actual poundage of GT-IFQ species by which an account holder is ensured the opportunity to possess, land, or sell, during a given calendar year. IFQ allocation will be distributed to each IFQ shareholder at the beginning of each calendar year, and expire at the end of each calendar year. Annual IFQ allocation is determined by the amount of the shareholder's IFQ share and the amount of the annual commercial GT-IFQ share category's quota. Dealer accounts may not possess allocation.

Allocation Holder – An account that holds allocation and may or may not hold shares.

Allocation Only Holder – An account that only holds allocation and does not hold shares.

Allocation Transfer – A transfer of allocation (pounds) from one shareholder account to another shareholder account. Before January 1, 2015, allocation could be transferred only to an entity that held a valid Gulf commercial reef fish permit.

**Entity** – An individual, business, or association participating in the IFQ program. Each IFQ account is owned by a unique entity.

**Ex-vessel price** – The price paid to the vessel by a dealer per pound of fish before any deductions are made for transferred (leased) allocation and goods and/or services (e.g., bait, ice, fuel, repairs, machinery replacement, etc.).

**Ex-vessel value** - A measure of the dollar value of commercial landings, usually calculated as the price per pound at first purchase of the commercial landings multiplied by the total pounds landed.

**Gulf of Mexico Commercial Reef Fish Permit Holder** – An entity that possesses a valid Gulf commercial reef fish permit and therefore, is eligible to be exempt from bag limits, to fish under a quota, or to sell Gulf reef fish in or from the Gulf Exclusive Economic Zone.

**IFQ Dealer Endorsement** – The IFQ dealer endorsement is a document that a dealer must possess in order to receive Gulf of Mexico GT-IFQ species. The dealer endorsement can be downloaded free of charge from the IFQ dealer's online account.

**Inactive Account** – An account in which the allocation holder has neither landed, bought, nor sold allocation within that year, including those who never logged into their account. Accounts activity status changes yearly based on the actions taken by the account.

Initial Account - An account that was never logged into by the account's owner(s).

**Landing Notification** - A required 3-24 hour advanced landing notification stating the vessel identification, approved landing location, dealer's business name, time of arrival, and estimated pounds to be landed in each IFQ share category. Landing notifications can be submitted using either a vessel's VMS unit, through an IFQ entity's on-line account, or through the IFQ call service. The landing notification is intended to provide law enforcement

officers the opportunity to be present at the point of landing so they can monitor and enforce IFQ requirements dockside. For the purpose of these regulations, the term landing means to arrive at the dock, berth, beach, seawall, or ramp.

Landing Transaction – The dealer completes a landing transaction by entering the date, time, and location of transaction; weight and actual ex-vessel price of GT-IFQ species landed and sold; and information necessary to identify the fisherman, vessel, and dealer involved in the transaction into the IFQ online system. The fisherman landing IFQ species must validate the dealer transaction report by entering his vessel's unique personal identification number when the transaction report is submitted. After the dealer submits the report and the information has been verified, the website will send a transaction approval code to the dealer and the allocation holder.

Median - The middle value in a statistical distribution, above and below which lie an equal number of values.

**Participant** - An individual or corporation that is part of an IFQ entity. For example, John Smith the participant may belong to multiple entities such as John Smith, John and Jane Smith, and ABC Company. Share and allocation caps are tracked at the IFQ participant level and not the IFQ entity level.

**Pound Equivalent** – The share percentage that would equal one pound for that particular time period. The exact share percentage that is equivalent to one pound depends on the total commercial quota and will change as the quota changes from year to year or within a year from any quota increases.

**Public Participant** – Accounts that do not have an associated Gulf commercial reef fish permit. Public participants may hold and transfer shares and allocation, but cannot harvest GT-IFQ species.

**Share** – A share is the percentage of the commercial quota assigned to a shareholder account that results in allocation (pounds) equivalent to the share percentage of the quota. With limited exceptions, your percent share of the quota does not change unless shares are transferred into or out of an account. Dealer accounts may not possess shares.

**Share Cap** – The maximum share allowed to be held by a person, business, or other entity. The share cap prevents one or more IFQ shareholders from purchasing an excessive amount of IFQ shares and monopolizing the GT-IFQ commercial sector.

**Share Transfer** – A transfer of shares from one shareholder account to another account. A shareholder must initiate the share transfer and the receiver must accept the transfer by using the online IFQ system. Before January 1, 2015, shares could be transferred only to an entity that held a valid Gulf commercial reef fish permit.

Shareholder – An account that holds a percentage of the commercial GT-IFQ quota by share category.

**Shareholder Account** – A type of IFQ account that may hold shares and/or allocation. This includes accounts that only hold allocation.